Unicity: The Transition

Future City Series No. 4

By Dr. Lloyd Axworthy & Jim Cassidy
1974

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A Report prepared by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION I: INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals and Structure</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Reform</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Outline</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION II: THE NEW SYSTEM</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical Background</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Structure</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Election Campaign</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION III: A PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Overall Performance</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Council Performance</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Characteristics</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Leadership</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-Making</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Administrative Performance</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Administrative Structure</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Process of Centralization</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure Patterns and New Budgeting Techniques</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBS in Winnipeg</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Community Committee Performance</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Resident Advisory Group Performance</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Structure of Resident Advisory Groups</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation of RAGs</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act and the Future of RAGs</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION IV: THE TRANSITION ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Orientation</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Downtown Development</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trizec</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Downtown Development Guidelines</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Development Plan</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoning and Land Use</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Case Study</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION V: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Limits of Structural Reform                          | 189  |
| Community Committees                                 | 191  |
| Transition Procedures                                | 193  |
| Scale of Representation                              | 195  |
| Executive Reorganization                             | 206  |
| Administrative Overhaul                              | 209  |
| Open Government                                      | 211  |
| Resident Advisory Groups                              | 213  |
| Intergovernmental Relations                          | 216  |
| Research and Evaluation                              | 218  |

SECTION VI: CONCLUSION                                | 221  |
SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

* GOALS AND STRUCTURE
* INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
* TRANSITION
* STUDY OUTLINE
Winnipeg has now completed its second year under a new system of civic government. Since its inception, the new system has been a focus of attention, both locally and throughout Canada. In Winnipeg there has been a growing concern about how well the new government is working, and already major changes are being proposed. The perspective of those outside the city is a little more detached -- they see the Winnipeg system as an interesting innovation in the structure of local government, one that could provide some answers to the general problem of how to manage an urban area. From either perspective there is a need to assess the new system and determine the degree to which the new structure is attaining the goals it was set up to achieve. This paper, then, will examine:

1) the transitional implementation of the re-organization,
2) the effectiveness of structural change, and
3) the preliminary impact of the new system.

Goals and Structure

The City of Winnipeg Act, which came into effect January 1, 1972, was based on a very clear set of objectives. The provincial government had issued a White Paper\(^1\) outlining what it considered to be the four major purposes behind local government reform in Winnipeg. First was to achieve financial equity between the fourteen municipal jurisdictions then existing in the Greater Winnipeg area. Second was the need to eliminate the conflict and stalemate then existing between the municipalities, especially the

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City of Winnipeg, and the Metropolitan Corporation of Winnipeg. Under the Metro Act of 1960, the second tier government of Metro had responsibility for planning, but the constituent municipalities had power of implementation. The result was a breakdown in implementing the long range development plan of the city. Third, there was the desire to achieve greater efficiency in municipal services through amalgamation of fire, police, administration, public works, etc. And, fourth, was the need to develop and encourage a greater degree of involvement and interest by the citizen in local government.

To achieve these goals, the provincial government introduced a regional government structure based upon the principle of administrative and financial centralization. The form of political organization, however, was decentralized, providing representation on a small scale, giving communities within the city some responsibility for governing their own local affairs, and opening access to government for the private citizen. This was achieved by electing councillors through a ward system based on approximately 10,000 population (50 in number), a community committee arrangement that combined three to six wards in a structure that had supervision over local services and local planning, and the attachment to each community committee of a resident advisory group composed of private citizens who could work with and advise councillors on local matters.2

The new Winnipeg system, therefore, was conceived as an answer to two of the most troublesome problems facing urban areas: overcoming the fragmentation of jurisdictions, with the resulting inefficiency and ineffectiveness of separate governments to cope with urban-regional problems; and developing closer involvement of urban citizens with their government.

It is this particular combination of goals that makes the Winnipeg innovation somewhat unique. While some urban areas have developed new forms of regional government, and others have experimented with local decentralization schemes, the Winnipeg system is designed to achieve both these goals in one integrated system. One of the important questions, then, is how well does this new structure in Winnipeg achieve these goals?

Institutional Reform

Related to this question is another issue that has been of some interest to political scientists in recent years: namely, how effective is institutional reform? In earlier years, when the study of local government was dominated by public administration theorists, it was naturally assumed that changes in local government institutions were the natural and only way to bring about improvements in local government. With the emergence of a more behavioural-oriented study of politics, however, the focus was altered. The emergence of community power studies centered attention on the power of informal political alliances and elites to make decisions, and the formal structure and organization of government was downplayed. Subsequently, social scientists began to examine how the social and economic characteristics of a city related to the kind of policy decisions that were made. For example, the work of Terry Clark related


variables such as population density, income levels and religious affiliation to expenditure patterns of government.\(^5\) Again the role of formal structures of government was downplayed.

There have also been attacks on the conventional wisdom that the way to overcome fragmentation and multiplicity of urban areas was through regional government. Banfield, Long and Wood, in particular, have emphasized that regional decisions can be made effectively by bargaining among different jurisdictions.\(^6\) Harold Kaplan's study of the Toronto Metro system highlights how political patterns in the urban community can seriously alter the performance of a regional system away from its original intentions.\(^7\)

Equally critical of institutional reform are many advocates of community participation. They see the formal structure of government as being of limited impact in the system of making decisions. To them, economic and class distinctions within a city are more significant determinants. They believe that the way to achieve greater citizen control is through mobilization of new power groups, not through tinkering with the governmental structure.\(^8\)

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Of late, there has been renewed interest in the relevancy of institutional reform. While acknowledging the importance of the underlying social and economic characteristics of a local community and the behavioural attributes of the system, it is now evident that the formal structures of a system also have a determining effect upon the policy decisions of local government. To give an example, Harlan Hahn points out that both the individual citizen and the public office holder may be prevented from playing constructive roles in government because of certain structural barriers, such as the nature of the electoral jurisdiction, the kind of suffrage, the powers given the mayor, the accessibility of government structures, and so on. Thus, a complete analysis of local government must relate environmental and behavioural features to institutional arrangements.

The research problem this creates is complex. There needs to be a separating of the different variables and then determine how divergent institutional variables affect the performance of the system. In some cases, the institutional structure may be the operative variable; in others it may not. The role they do play, however, is a very critical consideration at a time when there is increasing interest in matters of urban government reform, because it does influence the kind of strategy one chooses. Does one work towards a change in the politics of the city as has recently occurred in Toronto and Vancouver, only to have that reform thrust frustrated by institutional barriers? Or does one change the structure of local government, as in Winnipeg and lately in Montreal, but leave the politics of the system in the hands of the same people? There is also the question, particularly

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germane in the Winnipeg situation, of how the change in structure alters political alignments, or brings new political forces into play. The conflict between suburban politicians and central city politicians may now be exercised within the same structure of government, as opposed to the previous case, where the same political forces battled from separate jurisdictional bases. As well, to what extent does a resident advisory system on the neighbourhood level provide a focus for citizen activism and become a forum in which new community political groups can be heard and exercise some leverage?

Unfortunately, this kind of analysis of local communities in Canada is sadly lacking. There are very few community power studies, little behavioural work, and almost no system analysis that attempts to relate structural variables to environmental variables in an effort to assess their influence on policy outcome.\(^\text{10}\) There is also almost a total lack of comparative analysis essential for the testing of hypotheses about the impact of different environmental or structural variables. Therefore, while there is now emerging some sense of what a basic framework for analysis of decision-making on the local level should be, and therein a way to determine the impact of different structural or institutional changes, there is not sufficient data or relevant findings to enable a full assessment of the Winnipeg scheme to be made at this time.

There must be the build-up of a research design that would fill in more of the missing elements, particularly those related to the economic, social and political factors, and provide for a comparative testing of the institutional component of the Winnipeg scheme. This will take time.

Another difficulty related to the examination of the Winnipeg system is the problem of transition. Very little attention is normally paid to the problem of how to introduce and implement a major innovation in government. There is some literature on the question of implementation of innovation,\(^\text{11}\) and it indicates that normally there are serious problems in having the original intention of a piece of legislation carried out exactly. The fact is that innovations must overcome the built-in resistance of people's attitudes, perceptions and beliefs and the result can be a major distortion between the original idea and the way it is put into effect.

This is especially true in a situation such as Winnipeg, where a new system of government is replacing the old, but where many of the same politicians and administrators assume important roles in the new structure. They tend to bring with them the outlook and behaviour nurtured under the old system and will therefore be likely to react against new concepts and practices and to shape the system to suit their accustomed mode of thought. It may be that sooner or later, a new group of elected and appointed officials will emerge, bringing with them a different set of attitudes, or that the transplanted officials will over time become accustomed to working in a new structure. But, at present, the new institutions are being managed by people who acquired their experience and outlook in more traditional forms of local government. Thus, it is important not to judge the operation of

the system too early, as there are bound to be highly negative feelings in the first stage of the new system. Nonetheless, one of the dangers faced in this transition stage is that the early behaviour of hold-over decision-makers could substantially alter the new structure, before it has a chance to work as intended.

In a transition period there are problems in developing different administrative techniques of transferring people and resources. A particular issue in a period of transition is personnel. A change in government affects the security of civic employees, and there is confusion in trying to forge single hiring, payroll, and labour relation policies out of the different systems that existed in the former municipalities. Thus, a major focus of the transition period is on problems of conversion and there is little time and often resources to apply to new policies or directions.

What happens in this transition period is critical for the longer term prospects of the new system. Certain bureaucratic practices, once established, can become enshrined. A rule is interpreted by policy makers, and through a process of precedent, that interpretation becomes hallowed, though it may in fact contradict the original intention of the Act. For example, there is ambiguity over the role of Resident Advisors in the new system, and differences over the meaning of citizen participation as contained in the Act. Depending on what actions are taken in the early stages of the new system, the usefulness of the Resident Advisory system might be forestalled or enhanced.

In fact, there are already serious efforts being made by certain councillors and administrators to have the present structure altered. They
would like to see the size of council reduced to half, perhaps have the 
community committees eliminated or reduced to six in number, have the mayor 
elected directly, and perhaps eliminate the Resident Advisory system. 
There also are apparent problems in the way various processes of government 
are carried out, the most obvious being the lengthy procedure for the 
hearing and passage of building applications and zoning variations. 

Any judgement of these proposed changes should be taken against 
the backdrop of the longer term development of city government in Winnipeg. 
It would be unfortunate if changes were made too hastily, based upon 
assessments that did not specify causes, but only symptoms of problems. 
Equally, any proposed changes must be evaluated from the point of view of a 
realistic appreciation of the limits of institutional reform. The problems 
experienced in the operation of the new system of local government might 
very well lie in the political setting of the system, not in its institutions. 
Therefore, tinkering with the machinery will not necessarily help. For 
these reasons, a careful assessment of the significance of developments in 
the system during its transitional phase is important.

Study Outline

It is with these considerations in mind that this present report 
on the first transition phase of Winnipeg's new local government is based. 
It was not possible, nor was the time right, for a full, comprehensive 
evaluation to be made. That would require a major research undertaking and 
the lapse of at least three to five years. But, it was deemed important 
to provide an independent look at the transition phase, record the significant 
patterns that are beginning to emerge, provide some base line information
and an assessment framework for a longer term evaluation, and make some comment on existing proposals for changes in the system. The purpose of this report, therefore, is to examine the initial period of implementation of the new system and describe what appears to be happening in that system, how people in the system perceive it to be working, and whether the objectives set out in the legislation have some chance of being attained.

To achieve this, the report utilizes the following information: an overview of events and developments based upon documents, newspaper accounts and monitoring of various Council, Community Committee and Resident Advisory meetings; case studies of major planning and development issues designed to show certain dynamics of the system; a series of interviews with City Councillors, civil servants, provincial officials, resident advisors; a survey of public views of the new system; and a budget analysis to determine whether there are any departures in expenditure that indicate significant shifts.

Using this data, the report will contain observations on the following:

- the nature of problems encountered in the transition process,
- the emergence of certain political cleavages and alignments,
- the perceptions of a number of participants as to how well the system is operating,
- the identification of certain trends in the practice and operation of the new system, along with an isolation of certain serious problems related to the structure,
- commentary on the present proposals for change,
- an outline of what research and evaluation program should be introduced to ensure a full and comprehensive assessment of the new Winnipeg system.
These areas do not, of course, answer the central question that should be asked of any institutional reform; namely, does it in fact significantly change the impact of government upon its citizens? It will provide, hopefully, the beginning of an answer upon which more extensive evaluation might be based.
SECTION II

THE NEW SYSTEM

* HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
* THE STRUCTURE
* THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Historical Background

Winnipeg is a city of just over half a million people. Being the province's single large urban centre, it is the dominant unit in Manitoba, with approximately half the population of the province. It is one of the most ethnically heterogeneous urban areas in Canada, with approximately 45% of the population being of British origin, approximately 8% of French origin and 47% of other ethnic origin, consisting of Ukrainian, German, Polish and Jewish. The greater part of all the goods and services produced in the province are produced or generated in the Winnipeg area. It provides the most jobs and produces most of the tax revenues needed to run the province. Greater Winnipeg, it has been written, was a social and economic whole fragmented into a number of municipalities for the purposes of local government.

The city has, over the years, been transformed by successive waves of European immigration until it is now one of the most cosmopolitan areas in Canada -- and one of the few in which Anglo-Saxons are in a minority. Governed throughout its history by representatives of the Anglo-Saxon business elite, within the last two decades the ethnic majority has been making its political power felt. In terms of culture, Winnipeg is definitely a major urban centre supporting a symphony orchestra, one of the best ballet troupes in North America and a professional theatre company.

Historically, there has been an underlying socio-political consensus shaping the city's political environment. This consensus about the main principles and directions of urban politics is inherited from the business oriented Anglo-Saxons who were firm believers in "good government", "efficiency" and "business principles". This was translated into strong feelings about keeping politics out of local government, and operating local government according to sound no-nonsense administrative procedures. The smaller ethnic groups which have taken over these political posts seem to have an even stronger belief in these principles of non-partisanship, efficiency and conservatism. This state of the political mind in Winnipeg is, therefore, not different from that in most Canadian cities.\(^{15}\)

A breakdown is beginning to appear in this view of local government, most noticeably in Toronto and Vancouver, but it is still a dominant feature in Winnipeg. In part, this can be attributed to Winnipeg's lack of growth. The population increase of Winnipeg from 1966 to 1970 was only 5% as compared to 16% for Toronto, 15% for Vancouver, 16% for Edmonton and 21% for Calgary.\(^{16}\) Thus, while Winnipeg's heterogeneity in population would seem to indicate the development of a more divergent set of political values, the slow growth has promoted until just recently, the continuation of the more traditional outlook.

However, Winnipeg is experiencing the same kind of pressures for development and change that are generally part of the urban scene elsewhere in the country. Differences over downtown renewal, transportation systems,


\(^{16}\) The Globe and Mail (Toronto), November 9, 1971.
suburban land development and the provision of public housing have emerged as major issues in Winnipeg as it moved into the 1970's. In addition, there is the particularly striking problem of substantial in-migration of Native people from rural areas, so that it is estimated that there are over 20,000 urban Native people, many of whom are on the lowest income scale.  

These developments have had the impact of creating highly politicized issues and engendering growing cleavages over issues. Thus, just at the time when a new organization of local government was being introduced, the political, social and economic environment of the city was shifting and new political forces were coming into play.

This imposes important questions for any assessment of the new scheme of government. To begin with, it is hard to calculate the comparative weight the changed environment or the changed governmental structure has had on the policy outcomes. There is also the interaction between the structure and the environment to consider. For example, if the changing political and social environment is tending to develop major differences between suburban and inner city populations over an issue such as transportation, does the new structure which brings the conflict within one jurisdiction as opposed to between jurisdictions, provide for easier or a more difficult conflict resolution.


In other words, there are some very practical questions arising out of this relationship between structure and environment, because any alterations or amendments to the local government system should take into account the alterations in the political, economic and social context of Winnipeg if they are to be at all relevant.

The Structure

In June of 1969, a very important factor in the shaping of Winnipeg emerged with the surprise election to the provincial legislature of the New Democratic Party.

Prior to 1969, the NDP had been third in provincial seats with all of their members coming from urban areas, mainly from North Winnipeg. This switch from a rural-based Conservative government to one based primarily in the Central City was a major factor in the re-shaping of Winnipeg's system of government.

While Metropolitan reform was not a major issue in the provincial election campaign, a week prior to election day, the leader of the NDP, Ed Schreyer, held a news conference at Union Centre to announce his urban policy. Schreyer stated that, if elected, he would set up a new regional government with wider powers than the existing Metro structure. Such a new regional council might unify such services as fire, police and sanitation. But, he said, such a new council would not necessarily mean that there would be total amalgamation. Mr. Schreyer acknowledged that this represented a change in the party's policy of favouring a single unit of municipal government, but that this was his position. Although little noted at the time, the Premier's statement was an important one; at one and the same time he announced a policy of major reform while opposing total amalgamation and supporting
the idea of community units. It may be that the Premier was thinking of Ontario's scheme of regional governments and particularly the Ottawa-Carleton arrangement -- a scheme he may have been familiar with while living in Ottawa as a Member of Parliament. In any case, Bill 36 certainly follows the general outline of the June 24 statement, which suggests that the Premier may have had a more important role in developing the Unicity concept than many observers thought.

It is difficult to judge when the Government decided to opt for its own scheme, but sometime during the year Finance Minister Saul Cherniack began to set up a research team. Mr. Cherniack, one of the strongest members of the Government, had served on the first Metro Council and was a known supporter of amalgamation. Mr. Sidney Green, the runner-up to Mr. Schreyer as leader of the NDP, and one of the most powerful men in the Manitoba NDP, had also served on the first Metro Council and was a strong advocate of amalgamation. The "Cherniack-Green axis" was a powerful combination which pushed for urban change and particularly for unification.

The goal of the research was pre-determined -- Greater Winnipeg was to be united into one city. The job of the research team was to come up with a workable plan. To direct the research, Mr. Cherniack employed Meyer Brownstone, a professor of political science at the University of Toronto. Mr. Brownstone, a well known supporter of the NDP, had worked for the CCF government in Saskatchewan from 1947 to 1964 as a research economist. There he had made the acquaintance of Earl Levin, the Metro Planning Director who had also worked for the CCF and who joined him on the research team.

19. Separate from the work of this research team was a blue-ribbon study group called the Local Boundaries Commission which had been established by the previous Conservative Government. It too was working on a scheme for re-organizing Winnipeg, but it was ignored by the new government. See Tom Axworthy, Politics of Innovation, IUS, 1972.
team. Other members of the team included Lionel Feldman, an urban specialist from Toronto, and C. N. Kushner, a former suburban mayor. In the summer of 1970, the Government asked the Local Boundaries Commission to make their files and research totally accessible to Mr. Brownstone and his associates. Mr. Brownstone's research has undoubtedly influenced by many sources; both he and Mr. Feldman would be aware of the large literature on citizen participation and the desire for participation is an important part of the White Paper. The possible influence of the example set by the Ottawa-Carleton regional government scheme has already been noted. Another research source was the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission on Local Government in England which is quoted approvingly in the White Paper. It is likely that the Government got its idea of community councils from Redcliffe-Maud. Mr. Brownstone consulted with various individuals in Winnipeg but he did not go through the usual motions such as meetings with the Metro Council and the City of Winnipeg.

Sometime during the fall or early winter of 1970 the Brownstone recommendation went to Cabinet. There was definitely controversy within the cabinet over the Brownstone proposals and many were eventually changed. One highly placed source has said "what was left out of the White Paper is more important than what remains". The main issue of contention apparently was over the continued identity of the local municipalities. The main proponents of amalgamation were Cherniack and Green while Al Mackling, the Attorney-General and a former alderman for St. James, and Saul Miller, Education Minister and former mayor of

20. Interviews.

21. Interviews.
West Kildonan, opposed them and sought to preserve the separate identities of the suburban municipalities. The impasse was resolved with the compromise of the community councils. With his known talent for conciliation, it may well have been the Premier who engineered the compromise (a final policy which followed his statement of June 24th). In fact, Bill 36, is almost a perfect example of compromise; it allows a suburban member to emphasize the community council and a central city representative to praise unification.

Although the report of the Local Boundaries Commission had been submitted September 10, the Government held up its publication until the cabinet had decided on an alternative plan. Finally in late December the Local Boundaries Report was released and a week later on December 23, 1970 the White Paper was unveiled at a news conference. Mr. Cherniack who had been designated Minister of Urban Affairs, said the report was a "wholly new approach" which would continue the efficiency of centralization with more citizen participation. The Premier, for his part, emphasized that the White Paper meant one city but "with provision for reorganizing existing communities". 22 Mr. Cherniack, was made Minister of Urban Affairs and charged with the responsibility to implement the White Paper which advocated:

- a 48 member council
- 10 community committees staffed by the respective members of the central council
- mayor of the central council elected by the council members
- equalization of mill rates
- school division boundaries to remain unchanged.

There was much opposition expressed to the bill to create a one-city structure both in the legislature, in the public hearings held by the Municipal Affairs Committee and in the Press.

During the legislative debates both the Conservative and the Liberal Party leaders presented their plans for the restructuring of local government. The Progressive Conservative approach to urban reorganization would have consisted of a regional government based on representation from local councils where the division of powers would be by voluntary agreement. Such a plan would have in effect, created a regional government in name only as, evidenced by their positions and their briefs, the municipalities wanted more and not less control over themselves. The Liberal Party Plan for Reorganizing Local Government was essentially the same as that of the Conservatives. It was perhaps a little more structured, a little less voluntary and would have been another bigger and better Metro system.

At the height of the Unicity debate in March of 1971, the Institute of Urban Studies, in cooperation with the CBC, conducted a public opinion survey. The survey (see Appendix I) was designed to test public opinion regarding the issues and debate surrounding the Government White Paper. While the survey did not claim to be definitive, it was indicative, comprising a statistically acceptable percentage of the population and carried out through application of established techniques.

The following data illustrate some of the results:

1. People did not see the question of local government reorganization as a really vital one.

   - 51% said the issue would not affect the way they would vote provincially.
2. Question of whether or not change was desirable:

- 47% yes
- 32% no
- Change supported by those in Winnipeg, Transcona and East Kildonan.
- Change opposed by St. James-Assiniboia and Tuxedo.
- 7 other municipalities divided on question.
- 20% unable to indicate any preference (showing again lack of real concern on question).

3. People did not really understand the proposals and the debate.

- 52% said there had not been enough discussion.
- Misunderstanding pointed out by the fact that 39% were in favour of government plan and 59% were in favour of strong council and community committee system.

4. On the question of direct election of the mayor, 87% of the people were in favour of it.

5. On the question of support for government plan or Boundaries Commission plan:

- 39% favoured government plan.
- 46% favoured small change.
- 35% of people in suburbs favoured government plan.
- 60% of people in Winnipeg favoured government plan.
- Only 2 cities, St. Boniface and St. James-Assiniboia, strongly opposed the government plan.
- The remaining cities (except Winnipeg) divided on question.

6. In correlating the question of whether or not change was desirable with job classifications, income, and rent-own situation:

- The highest status job, highest degree of mobility and highest income people favoured change and the government plan and would be willing to pay higher taxes for a more democratic government.

- The lowest status job, lowest degree of mobility and lowest income people favoured change and government plan and would be willing to pay higher taxes for a more democratic government.
- The average status job, average mobility and middle level income people were more opposed to change and the government plan and would not be willing to pay higher taxes for a more democratic government.

7. 30% of the people favoured party politics in city elections.

- Results showed that the Liberal Party supporters were as much in favour of party politics as were NDP party supporters, and the Conservatives were the major group opposed to party politics at the local level.

The Legislative Municipal Affairs Committee started receiving public briefs on the government's proposed central city bill in July of 1971. In all, more than 30 presentations were made to the Committee. Of all the briefs presented by the mayors and reeves, only one brief expressed outright approval of Bill 36, that of Mr. Juba, the mayor of the City of Winnipeg. However, there was dispute over the issue of election of the mayor. The original proposal to have the mayor elected by Council appeared contrary to the interests of Mr. Juba, as it would appear unlikely that he would take his chances under such circumstances. Several of the briefs directed themselves to the issue, and there was obvious public support for a system of direct election.

During the summer of 1971 the government announced their amendments to Bill 36. Most of the amendments were minor in nature, but there were some which were of major significance. Firstly, the mayor was to be directly elected for the first term while all subsequent mayors would be elected by and from the members of the central Council. Secondly, the new city was to be called Winnipeg instead of Greater Winnipeg. Thirdly, the mayor's salary was to be $18,000 per year (one-third tax free), and the councillors' to be $5,700 per year. Fourthly, the new city would gain all rights formerly held by the City of Winnipeg to operate its own hydro and utilities but the suburban rates must be equalized, meaning a
rise in cost to the residents of the City of Winnipeg and a reduction in cost to the suburban residents. Regarding committees, the executive committee was increased from seven members to ten members and no members of a standing committee were to be allowed to sit on the executive committee. Also, after the second term of office, the mayor may be removed by a two-thirds majority vote. Community Committees were given the authority to strike their own subcommittees. The joint Winnipeg Community Committees (six of them) were renamed the Inner City Joint Committee.

Of these amendments, the most important was the direct election of the mayor, because it fundamentally altered the political/organizational theory of the authors of the reform. They had built a structure based on parliamentary model, wherein the chief executive would have to enjoy the confidence and support of a majority of elected members of Council. In this way a degree of executive leadership could be assured, and a corresponding discipline imposed upon Council. It was also assumed that a party system would evolve because of the need to develop a working majority on Council. With the direct election provision, however, the mayor was freed from the necessity to command majority support, and there was far less imperative to develop cohesive working coalitions to support executive action. It was introducing a presidential type system into a parliamentary base, making for a hybrid arrangement. The government, however, didn't follow the logic of their illogical act, because they gave the mayor's office no powers such as a veto, right of appointment or budget-making that could give some leverage vis-a-vis Council. Thus, he became a weak mayor, at least as far as official powers were concerned. This hasty political judgement on the election of the mayor was to result in a major handicap in the new system and the cause of major difficulties in developing an effective decision-making system.
Bill 36 was passed in the Legislature on Saturday, July 24, 1971. Criticism had not subsided and some parties were left rather bitter as Sidney Spivak, the Conservative Party Leader, took some parting shots at the amendments and Mayor Turner of St. Boniface flew their flag at City Hall upside down and at half-staff as a signal of distress.

The City of Winnipeg Act was scheduled to come into effect on January 1, 1972, which provided approximately six months to plan and organize the transition. The provincial government established a team of task forces to help guide the transition, but other than preparing background papers and helping with some aspects of the transition, the provincial government appeared to take a hands-off attitude towards its new creation.

The final structural organization set out in Bill 36 saw the twelve separate municipalities disbanded and formed into one city. The city was then divided into fifty wards with one councillor per ward elected from that ward. Three, four, five or six of these wards would form a Community Committee area which are roughly contiguous with the old municipalities. The councillors represent their ward, sit on their Community Committee and sit on Council, as well as sitting on Community Committee subcommittees and Council committees.

The executive arm of the new structure would be the fifty man Council and the mayor (who was elected at large for the first term, but who, according to the Act, should be elected from and by the fifty man Council). In order to facilitate the Council's decision-making role and its policy execution role, there are four major committees -- Environment Committee, Finance Committee, Committee on Works and Operations and Executive Policy Committee.
This Executive Policy Committee would be the overall policy arm of the Council and the other committees would be administrative ones. The Executive Policy Committee would consist of the mayor and the other committee chairmen as well as six members of Council.

The administrative arm would be the Board of Commissioners, consisting of four commissioners and the mayor. They are the link between the Council and the administration and theoretically would make recommendations on all matters concerning the carrying out of executive and administrative functions and would also be responsible to the central council for general management, direction and control of the city's administration.

This Board of Commissioners system is similar to that found in Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. The Board is chaired by a Chief Commissioner and its members are the various commissioners of the executive departments.

While the foregoing reorganizational elements were new to Winnipeg and innovative in the way that they were put together, their purpose was a standard one -- an attempt to increase local government efficiency.

The other objective of the new structure, that of providing for and legislating for citizen participation, becomes one of the most innovative and exciting concepts in the history of local government. This was the Community Committee and Resident Advisory Group concept. This concept grew out of the desire to devise at the community level a framework within which the citizen could clearly perceive the issues affecting him and act forcefully and effectively in his own self-interest.

The Community Committees would be akin to Neighbourhood Councils and were intended to provide ready access to the people in that area and supervise local administrative functions. Their primary role was a
linkage one between the citizen, his elected representative and the central Council. Their most important responsibility, and the one which in practice has been the most neglected, is the responsibility of developing effective ways and means of keeping citizens informed of what their Council is doing, planning or proposing.  

The Community Committee also had been given the responsibility of supervising the delivery of local services.

The meaning of the word 'supervise' soon required qualification and this came about during the summer of 1972. Some suburban Community Committees had continued to operate their administration in the same style as when they were municipalities exercising hiring and firing responsibility. The intentions of the Manitoba Government were for central Council and administration to have this power and not Community Committees. The redefinition of 'supervise' became "to watch, observe, and make qualitative assessment". The new definition made clear that Community Committees have no real power and that power is centralized as intended.

It was clear from these provisions that the notion of citizen participation envisioned by the government fit into the conventional formula of representative government. It was designed to bring people into closer contact with government, not to give them a role in making decisions on the local level.

23. For a discussion of the origin of the new City of Winnipeg Act and its original purposes, see the two publications, I and II, of the Future City Series, published by the Institute of Urban Studies.

The ward system which was built into the new structure also deserves some attention. Previously, the City of Winnipeg had been divided into three large wards and the Metropolitan Corporation Council divided the entire Greater Winnipeg area into ten large wards. These large ward systems had the advantage of including a diverse cross-section of a city for a councillor to represent.

But they also had many disadvantages: they did not make their representative responsible to a homogeneous and parochial interest; the representative tended to lose contact with the people simply because of the large number of people he had to represent; in areas where poorer and more affluent areas comprised a ward, the representative almost always tended to come from, and to work for, the more affluent area.

A small ward system has the advantage of "intense representation", since a councillor represents a relatively small population (about 10,000 to 20,000). The residents have a better chance of knowing who he is and the councillor finds it easier to be in contact with and know the problems of a smaller ward. It ensures strong representation for the ward. But on the other hand, a small ward system can and does often yield representatives who are concerned exclusively with their own wards, representatives who can't see or don't care to see the larger problems of the area or the city. The small ward system also discourages discussion of issues and ends up electing favourite sons or well known people in the community. A small ward system of a large city inevitably results in a large Council -- fifty in Winnipeg's case. The problems of parochialism and a disorganized large Council are reported to be two of the internal problems facing Unicity. But for the first time in this city's history, many of the disadvantaged and minority groups find that they have a voice on Council and that their feelings and attitudes are being heard.
The Election Campaign

In August of 1971, the Provincial Government selected October 6, 1971, as the date for new city elections. Early that summer, during June and July, many former city and suburban councillors had announced their intentions of seeking a seat on the new Council, but very little actual campaigning went on over the summer.

What did emerge over the summer was a new municipal election organization. This Independent Citizens' Election Committee replaced the old Greater Winnipeg Election Committee. Like the previous election committees on the Winnipeg scene, the ICEC was organized to oppose the NDP party at the local level, and any concern with policies was secondary. As one prominent politician remarked, "The main thing is to get organized in opposition to the NDP. Policies we can sort out later."25

The NDP provincial party did not seem terribly anxious to field and/or support a full slate of NDP municipal candidates. But great pressure was being exerted by some of the more radical elements of the local NDP organizations. A total of 39 NDP municipal candidates declared and in August of 1971 they held their municipal policy convention. Some 500 delegates from the Winnipeg area attempted to formulate policy in six areas of urban concern -- community participation, transportation, environment, housing, urban development and taxation.

This discussion of and consensus on policy direction for the new city put the ICEC in an awkward position. The ball was now in their court.

and the emphasis was now on them to say something about policy for the new city. The ICEC called a policy convention for September -- the first time a civic election committee in Winnipeg had ever done so. The ICEC convention was much more elaborate than the NDP convention had been, with four guest speakers and five workshops. The workshops were to cover policy areas and were similar to those of the NDP, although the NDP included one extra area -- community participation.

However, due to speakers at the convention who stressed the community aspect, a sixth workshop dealing with this subject was established. Very little policy was forthcoming from the convention and what did come out was not binding on any of the 48 municipal ICEC candidates.

Little or no time was ever spent by the ICEC on attempting to discuss the one-city concept, the role of citizens and resident advisors, the community committee concept and its potential or the potential of the 50 man Council to deal with the large urban problems looming on the horizon.

From their early campaigning and from their convention, it became apparent that the Independent Citizens' Election Committee was a loose coalition of Liberals and Conservatives designed to keep the NDP party from getting control of local government. The election cry was one of "People before Party" with very little mention of what the 'people' believed in.

The real Unicity Council campaigning took place only in the six weeks prior to election day. The NDP attempted to run on policies while the ICEC attempted to run on personalities, on an anti-NDP, anti-party platform, using the slogan "People before Party". This anti-campaign was very successful, especially in the middle class suburban areas where fear of socialism was widespread.
All campaigns were fairly quiet even though a total of 164 candidates were seeking election to the 50 seats. Interestingly enough, the ICEC, which claimed to be the organization of independent candidates, ran 48 candidates, while 69 other true independents also ran. The battle between these two camps then came down to one of 'who was the more independent'. The ICEC, with "free-enterprise" backing, was the more successful electing 37 candidates. Of the 64 independents who had not the backing of a political machine, only five were elected, two in the suburban community of Transcona, one in the inner city area of Lord Selkirk, one in the suburban area of East Kildonan, and one in the inner city area of St. John's. The NDP elected only seven councillors, four of them in the inner city community of Centennial, two in the inner city area of St. John's and one in the inner city area of Fort Rouge.

The Labour Election Committee which ran eight candidates saw only one elected, in the inner city area of Lord Selkirk.

The ICEC, with 37 successful candidates, had effective control of the new City Council, with the greater part of their power lying with the suburban areas.

Running concurrently with the City Council campaign, was the mayoralty campaign. In its original form, the bill creating the new city called for the election of the mayor from among the councillors. There was, however, much opposition to this concept of a council-elected mayor. It was felt by many people that the bill created a framework for an efficient city administration but that without a strong mayor elected by the voting public, the city's civil servants could end up running the
city instead of the elected politicians. One of the strongest proponents for the area wide election of the mayor was Winnipeg's mayor, Stephen Juba. Juba felt that a council-elected mayor would be "a little puppy dog to the majority of council" who would be able to "do things for fear of being thrown out of the next council meeting". A further argument on this part was that "the public have indicated that they want to elect the mayor".

As mentioned earlier, Winnipeg had a history of being governed by Anglo-Saxon businessmen, but in 1956 the City witnessed a change in the ethnicity of the power structure. Stephen Juba, a third generation Canadian of Ukrainian origin, defeated G. E. Sharpe, the incumbent, for the position of mayor of the City of Winnipeg. Only two non Anglo-Saxon candidates had run for mayor prior to World War I, and Juba himself had been unsuccessful in 1952 and 1954 when he lost by 15,000 votes. In 1956, however, Juba was presented with an issue concerning alleged misuse of public money and this gave him enough "good government" votes, combined with his ethnic support to defeat Sharpe. The major issue in the campaign was Juba's ethnic origin, with the Winnipeg Free Press believing that "Juba would be a larger risk than the citizens of Winnipeg should wisely take" and the ethnic papers were all behind him. In Ward I, which had a majority of Anglo-Saxons, 64.5% turned out and Sharpe received twice as

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
many votes as Juba, but in Ward 3, where Slavic groups predominate, Juba won by nearly 11,000 votes. Since 1956, Juba has become almost a folk hero to many ethnic citizens and this, combined with his political skill and conservative outlook (thus insuring that the business community did not mass against him), has made him unbeatable. Juba has expanded his political appeal beyond his ethnic base but it is his strength in the north end which has made him the most powerful politician in Metro Winnipeg.

His political skill was also evident during and prior to the Unicity elections. He was constantly equivocating on whether or not he would run for the post of "super mayor" and he held back his announcement until he generated much public discussion and until it was too late for new political figures, who would have emerged had he not run, to emerge.

When Steve Juba finally announced his intention of running for the position of super mayor he became the third mayoralty candidate.

The first mayoralty candidate had been former Metro Councillor Bill Hutton and the second candidate was former Metro Chairman Jack Willis.

Then at the end of August, Steve Juba in his usual flamboyant manner announced at the sodturning ceremony at the Holiday Inn site his intention to run. Almost a month had elapsed between the first two declarations and that of Steve Juba. A politically astute move, it kept the two former Metro candidates wondering about the strength of any opposition to them.

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30. Ethnicity may also affect turnout. In 1956 about 58% of the electorate went to the polls, the largest turnout since 1938, when an ethnic candidate had also run. In 1960 when Juba was elected by acclamation the turnout fell to 38% but rose in 1962 when another candidate appeared (even though Juba was in no trouble). In 1971, when a real contest appeared to be threatening Juba's position, the turnout rose to a record 60%.
In early September, a fourth candidate declared. Gordon Anderson, a real estate agent, was running on the issue of pollution and was never considered a serious threat to either Mr. Willis or Mr. Juba who were obviously the only real contenders.

A fifth candidate announced but withdrew his name before election day.

The only real contest was between Juba and Willis, with Willis running on a comprehensive policy platform and Juba running as always, as the voice of the working man. After the votes were counted, it looked like no contest with Juba winning by over 90,000 votes.

The voter turnout of this election set a Manitoba record of 199,713 votes being cast -- 60.7% of the total eligible voters.

The reason for the large voter turnout in the Unicity elections was not due to relevant policies or burning issues, but rather to two factors. The first was the area-wide election of the mayor and the candidacy of the very popular City of Winnipeg Mayor, Stephen Juba. The second factor was, as recognized and propagated by the anti-NDP forces, the strong fear of a NDP takeover of the city.
SECTION III

A PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW

PART A. OVERALL PERFORMANCE

PART B. COUNCIL PERFORMANCE
* COUNCIL CHARACTERISTICS
* COUNCIL LEADERSHIP
* DECISION MAKING

PART C. ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE
* THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
* THE PROCESS OF CENTRALIZATION
* EXPENDITURE PATTERNS AND NEW BUDGETING TECHNIQUES
* PPBS IN WINNIPEG

PART D. COMMUNITY COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE

PART E. RESIDENT ADVISORY GROUP PERFORMANCE
* STRUCTURE OF RESIDENT ADVISORY GROUPS
* OPERATION OF RAGS
* ACT AND THE FUTURE OF RAGS
In the following sections, different aspects of the system's performance will be described and assessed. The data used for this is drawn from documents, council records, newspaper accounts, interviews, in part from a survey questionnaire administered to councillors, municipal and provincial officials, and a telephone survey of Winnipeg residents using a sample size of 300. It should be noted that this survey represents under 1% of the total Winnipeg population. Its results should be treated as indicative only.
A. OVERALL PERFORMANCE

With little exception, the prevailing view of both decision-makers involved in the system and citizens alike is that the new system has as yet brought little change or improvement in the performance of city government. If anything, there is a feeling that thus far the new system is not performing as well. Among the councillors, only seven (14%) out of the 49 interviewed believe there has been an improvement in service, while 12 (24%) believe there has been a deterioration and 25 (50%) believe services have remained the same. There was a slight difference in the views between suburban or inner city councillors, with more of the former seeing a deterioration and a small difference between councillors who previously were in favour of the scheme against those who were opposed, the latter having no-one among their ranks who see improvement, not an inspiring result.

Table 1
Councillors' Perceptions of Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Inner City</td>
<td>In Favour</td>
<td>Not In Favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>7(14%)</td>
<td>4(13%)</td>
<td>3(15%)</td>
<td>5(20%)</td>
<td>0(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deteriorated</td>
<td>12(24%)</td>
<td>8(28%)</td>
<td>4(16%)</td>
<td>4(16%)</td>
<td>5(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>25(50%)</td>
<td>12(42%)</td>
<td>13(62%)</td>
<td>13(52%)</td>
<td>9(53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A./D.K.</td>
<td>6(12%)</td>
<td>5(17%)</td>
<td>1(5%)</td>
<td>3(12%)</td>
<td>3(18%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This feeling of the deterioration of services, illustrated in Table 1, is not shared by the commissioners and by others in the municipal administration. They feel that most of the service levels have remained constant and that following the transition period those levels will rise.

This view was generally shared by the media people who were interviewed.

As the following table illustrates, a random public opinion survey indicates that most citizens also share the view that services have not changed. This table also illustrates the large degree to which people are unaware of the service level because of these services being so taken for granted that they are never thought about.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Improved</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Deteriorated</th>
<th>N.A./D.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garbage Collection</td>
<td>21(7%)</td>
<td>186(62%)</td>
<td>0(0%)</td>
<td>93(31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streets</td>
<td>66(22%)</td>
<td>132(44%)</td>
<td>9(3%)</td>
<td>93(31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>33(11%)</td>
<td>132(44%)</td>
<td>0(0%)</td>
<td>135(45%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of service areas where specific views were held, seven councillors saw improvement in personnel against two who saw changes for the worse. On the other hand, six councillors commented negatively on
zoning procedures while none saw any improvement. In other areas, there were no significant comments.

When asked about specific services, however, the view was a much more positive sense of improvement, as can be seen in Table 3.

### Table 3

**Councillors' Perceptions of Changes in Specific Services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage Collection</td>
<td>3(6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streets</td>
<td>9(18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>5(10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is reinforced by the citizen perception table, and the conclusion that must be drawn from the difference in councillors' attitudes towards services in general, in which they see a fair amount of deterioration, and services in more specific terms which they feel have generally remained the same, is that many councillors have a tendency towards generalization built on old prejudices.

One specific area of distinct improvement mentioned by both the civic administrators interviewed and provincial officials, but unmentioned by both the politicians and public, was the achievement of a uniform tax base. This is an expected dichotomy, however, as one can expect
administrators to appreciate the significance of this particular achievement from a planning, administrative, economic development point of view, while its value would not be as important at this stage to the public or the politician.

On the question of whether the new system was more successful in running the city than the old system, our public opinion survey showed the following results:

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions of Whether New System is More Successful Than Old</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>66(22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>21(7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>72(24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>141(48%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On this question of the success of the new system, most provincial people, municipal administration people and media people felt that it was really too early to make generalized assessments, and most felt that things would eventually sort themselves out.

Generally, in terms of an overall assessment, the views of those involved are not too severe, considering this to be a transition period when numerous problems could be expected. While there is no significant approval, there is limited criticism of performance in the service fields. The same cannot be said, however, for the views on the organization and operation of Council, the administrative system, and the Community Committee-Resident Advisory System.
B. PERFORMANCE OF COUNCIL

Council Characteristics

The new Council, which formally took office on January 1, 1972, was composed of 37 ICEC councillors, 7 NDP councillors, 5 Independents, and 1 Labour Election Committee councillor. In total, 21 councillors are from the inner city area, 2 are Independents, 1 is Labour Election Committee, 7 are NDP and 11 are ICEC. This gives the ICEC caucus control of the Council and gives the suburbs control of the ICEC caucus.

The other characteristics of the Council are all factors which, in part, can be sometimes used to explain behaviour and attitudes, but not with any real degree of accuracy. These characteristics have been divided into the following categories and many will have some significance at a later point in the discussion.

Residency in Ward: About two-thirds of the councillors or 66% live in the ward they represent while 32% did not and 2% offered no answer. The 32% figure runs a little high for a political office where closeness to the elected officials is considered more important than on provincial and federal politics. This is abated by several councillors reporting living just off the edge of the constituency they represent.

Political Experience: Most of the councillors have had some previous political experience. Thirty-two or 64% had office previously, while 17 or 34% had not and there was no answer from 1 or 2%.
Reason for Being in Politics: In response to the question as to why the councillors sought election, 18 or 36% indicated that they had previous political experience and felt they could make a contribution, 13 or 26% said they were involved before (mostly as local councillors) and wanted to continue, 10 or 20% indicated that they ran on a particular issue, 6 or 12% because they had a "desire to be in politics", while 3 or 6% offered other reasons. When asked whether they had fulfilled their reason for being involved as councillors, 18 or 37% said no, 15 or 30% partially, and 13 or 26% yes, while 4 or 8% didn't know or offered no answer.

Amount of Time Spent in Duties as Councillors: Councillors devote varying amounts of time to their office of councillor, depending on their committee responsibilities, their available time and their interest in the office. They were asked to estimate how many 8 hour days they serve as councillors. Of course, they sometimes serve 12 to 15 hours in a day, which works out to 1 1/2 to 2 days. Their responses were as follows:
- 24 or 48% reported spending over 3 1/2 days a week. This category included retired councillors, housewives, and busy committee chairmen, as well as some with an active interest in local affairs.
- 13 or 26% spend 3 to 3 1/2 days a week, 8 or 16% spend 2 to 3 days a week, while only 4 or 8% work at it for less than 2 days a week.

Had Councillors Appeared as a Delegation before any Council Committee:
The intent of this question was to determine how active they were in representing the interests of their ward and in community with one another. Forty-two or 84% said they had appeared as a delegation. Seven or 14% had not and 1 or 2% did not reply. Forty-six or 92% of the councillors are men, while 4 or 8% are women.
In terms of age: Twenty-five or 50% of the councillors are between 36 and 50 years of age, 13 or 26% are between 26 and 35 years, 7 or 14% are between 51 and 65 years, 3 or 6% are over 65, and there was no answer for one.

In terms of profession: Seventeen or 34% described themselves as businessmen of one kind or another, 16 or 32% as professional men, 4 or 8% as salesmen, 4 or 8% as retired, 3 or 6% as housewives, 3 or 6% as technical and tradesmen, 1 or 2% full time politicians, and 2 or 4% offered no reply.

Education: Twenty-six or 52% reported having high school education, 14 or 28% as being university or near university graduates, 4 or 8% as having professional university degrees, 2 or 4% had technical training, while 1 or 2% said he was self-educated and 3 or 6% did not reply.

Income: Councillors appear to have incomes much higher than average people. Most councillors were modest and underestimated their income. In some cases they were probably not including their Council stipends. Accordingly no appropriate guess was used by the interviewer.

Fourteen or 28% reported incomes of $12,001-$18,000, 10 or 20% reported $25,001-$50,000, 9 or 18% of $18,001-$25,000, 2 or 4% reported incomes of over $50,000 a year, and 8 or 16% did not answer the question.

Political Affiliation: Eighteen or 36% reported belonging to the Conservative Party, 13 or 26% as being Independent and in other categories, 9 or 18% as belonging to the Liberal Party, 5 or 10% as being NDP and 5 or 10% gave no answer.
Had Councillors Favoured Amalgamation Prior to the Passage of the Act:
Seventeen or 34% said no, 25 or 50% said yes and 13 or 16% were unsure as to what effect it would have.

As mentioned, the initial composition of Executive Policy and the three standing committees was completely ICEC, but with the amendment to the Act, three NDP and four Independent councillors were added to the standing committees.

As they are now constructed, Executive Policy Committee is composed of ten councillors plus the mayor. All of these councillors belong to the ICEC caucus, and eight are from the suburbs, while two are from the inner city.

The three standing committees, Finance, Works and Operations, and Environment are each composed of eleven councillors.

Finance Committee has nine ICEC members, one NDP and one Independent member. Works and Operations has the same proportion, while Environment has eight ICEC members, one NDP and two Independents.

In terms of inner city-suburban distribution, Finance Committee has six suburban ICEC members plus a suburban Independent. The Committee on Environment has six suburban ICEC members plus two suburban Independents. The suburbs then have a great deal of weight on all of the committees, with the suburban ICEC councillors having a clear majority on all but one committee.

This will prove at a later point in the discussion to be a factor in explaining the behaviour of attitudes of the Council.

In assessing the performance of Council, there have been strong expressions of dissatisfaction with the new government's capacity to make decisions and operate efficiently. Councillors are critical of the size
of Council, the lack of leadership in Council, the role of Community Committees, and the independence of commissioners. On the issue of the size of Council, out of the 49 councillors interviewed, 24 thought it was too large, while only 14 thought it to be the right size, the other 8 complaining of miscellaneous faults. In this view there was a slight difference between councillors from the suburbs or the inner city, or from those who had previously been in favour of the system or not, but not a wide variance.

Table 5
Councillors' Perceptions of Present Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council Size</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Inner City</td>
<td>In Favour</td>
<td>Not in Favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too large</td>
<td>24(48%)</td>
<td>15(52%)</td>
<td>9(43%)</td>
<td>24(56%)</td>
<td>9(53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Size</td>
<td>14(28%)</td>
<td>7(24%)</td>
<td>7(33%)</td>
<td>7(28%)</td>
<td>3(18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Comments: too split; too much politics.</td>
<td>8(16%)</td>
<td>5(17%)</td>
<td>5(24%)</td>
<td>3(12%)</td>
<td>4(24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>4(8%)</td>
<td>2(7%)</td>
<td>0(0%)</td>
<td>1(4%)</td>
<td>1(5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the councillors were evenly split on whether the Council can work without changing Council size. Twenty-five thought it could; 24 thought there should be a change. Table 6 shows the preference of councillors for the size of Council.

Table 6
Councillors' Perception of Council Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>0-18</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-35</th>
<th>36-50</th>
<th>N.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right Size of Council</td>
<td>1(2%)</td>
<td>19(38%)</td>
<td>5(10%)</td>
<td>15(30%)</td>
<td>10(20%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other groups interviewed expressed a less definite attitude towards the size of Council. The senior officials of the provincial government thought that size was no problem at all. Among senior officials of the city government views were evenly split, two saying it was too large; two saying that size was not a problem. Of the eight department heads of city government interviewed, five thought Council was too large one thought it not an issue, and two didn't know. It is important to note, however, that most department heads generally expressed a lack of close knowledge of Council affairs. As for the five media people who report on Council matters, three felt the present size was acceptable; two felt it was too large.

The one question that emerges from the attitudes toward the issue of Council size is whether the number of councillors is really a root cause of poor decision-making, or whether the fault is a lack of leadership or organization to discipline councillors into cohesive alignments or coalitions on issues. A fifty person Council may only be a problem when there are not integrative structures to pull the individual members into blocs, or when the structures that do exist are not able to meld the cleavages existing in Council so that there can be a consensus on decision-making.

Undoubtedly, a small Council can be more efficient, but as Charles Adrian points out, you sacrifice representation and closer contact with citizens once you reduce the size of Council. And, seeing as one of the major objectives of the reform in local government was to improve the representativeness of the system, it would be a questionable step to

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revise that part of the structure which provides it, especially when it is not certain that it is the size of Council that is at fault. Perhaps a more useful step is to determine what is presently missing in the Winnipeg system which accounts for the problems in policy-making.

**Council Leadership**

One of the major concerns of Councillors expressed in the interview is the lack of leadership. Twenty-two of the councillors or 44% felt that no-one provided leadership. Eighteen or 36% saw leadership coming from the chairmen of the committees, and two or 4% considered it to be coming from the mayor. It should be pointed out, though, that a significant number of councillors (23) believed that the Act does not give the mayor sufficient power to exercise leadership.

There was an equally strong feeling that the Executive Policy Committee was not doing its job. When asked to make an assessment, 29 councillors or 58% felt that E.P.C. was not acting as a central policy-making unit, another 10 (20%) felt it was not decisive, and 9 (18%) felt it had a poor relationship with commissioners.

The councillors also felt that the one organization that might have provided a basis for unity or cohesion, the ICEC caucus, didn't work that way, and was not the place where leadership would derive from. Twenty councillors (40%) felt it was not working as a party, another 4 (8%) thought it too parochial, and another 3 (6%) thought it a waste of time. Five councillors (10%) thought the caucus served as a good information centre, and another 6 (12%) that it saved Council some time.
As Table 7 indicates, there was no major difference in opinion between inner city and outer city councillors, nor between ICEC or NDP councillors.

Table 7

Councillors’ Perception of Provision of Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>37</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who Provides Leadership</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Inner City</td>
<td>ICEC</td>
<td>NDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman of Committee</td>
<td>18(36%)</td>
<td>11(38%)</td>
<td>7(33%)</td>
<td>15(40%)</td>
<td>2(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain Councillors</td>
<td>5(10%)</td>
<td>2(8%)</td>
<td>3(14%)</td>
<td>4(12%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>2(4%)</td>
<td>3(10%)</td>
<td>3(14%)</td>
<td>1(3%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-one</td>
<td>22(44%)</td>
<td>11(38%)</td>
<td>7(32%)</td>
<td>15(40%)</td>
<td>2(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends on Issue</td>
<td>3(6%)</td>
<td>2(4%)</td>
<td>1(7%)</td>
<td>2(5%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The views of leadership expressed by councillors were echoed by the other participants in the system. The press generally see a lack of leadership. They see the mayor as a loner, the Executive Policy Committee as being indecisive, and the ICEC caucus as of no significance in a policy sense. The administrators make close to the same judgement. They are split on the leadership of the mayor, unanimous in their feeling that the E.P.C. is not functioning.
What is interesting is the various proposals for solution. As our research indicates, the two favourite schemes are to introduce party politics and to add to the power of the mayor. But, somewhat paradoxically, there is a feeling on the part of some councillors that the introduction of party politics would increase splits in Council, and result in poorer candidates. This feeling shows some basic underlying difference in value orientations of councillors. For example, as Table 8 shows, there is a much stronger feeling on the part of inner city councillors that party politics is necessary, as compared to suburban councillors. There is also an obvious split between NDP and ICEC councillors. And there is a significant cleavage in attitude towards party politics from those who were in favour of Unicity to those who were opposed. What this suggests is that the cleavage in Council is based on different value orientations and herein may lie the source of conflict and indecision, as much as a weakness in structure.

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Councillors' Views on Political Parties in Local Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favour Parties In Local Elections</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the general public the view of 31.6% is that there shouldn't be party politics, as opposed to 19.3% who are in favour, with 49% not expressing an opinion. The media people interviewed were in favour four to one of having party politics, seeing it as the only way to make Council work. This view is also shared by provincial officials, but the opinion of civic civil servants is split.

The view of administrators is more strongly focused on other aspects of malfunctioning on Council. They see the problem arising from the poor relations between the Executive Policy Committee and Council, the propensity of councillors to worry about details and not become involved in policy discussion, the poor relationship and lack of rapport between Council and the Board of Commissioners. In other words, they view the poor operation of Council as stemming from an improper definition of political and administrative roles and the inability to develop a well defined process of policy-making between Council and administration.

The office of mayor and the Executive Policy Committee were originally designed to fulfill those functions, but obviously are not perceived as doing so. One major reason for this can be traced to the provincial decision to provide for direct election of the mayor. Under the original design, the mayor would have been elected by Council and would have to maintain the confidence of a majority on Council -- in effect creating a form of Cabinet system, with the mayor performing a role analogous to the Prime Minister and the Executive Policy Committee being the Cabinet. However, once you have direct election of the mayor, you create in effect a presidential system, where the chief executive does not have to develop
majority support. The difficulty with introducing such a system in the Winnipeg context is that there is no accompanying party system to provide the discipline necessary for congressional-parliamentary style systems to operate.

Is this an insurmountable problem and are the views of the councillors and administrators correct in stating that the decision-making is difficult and at times inoperative? A case from the earliest period of Council offers some illumination on the way that Council makes decisions.

**Decision-Making**

**Council Indemnities:** The issue of Council raises began on January 4, 1972, three days after Council officially took office. Throughout January, there was much discussion of this question with a decision to have no raise at the time, but to have a review of the situation in six months time. There was at this time much public and media opposition to the idea and the question was buried, but only for three months when the ICEC caucus apparently held secret meetings on the question. Some councillors have attested that at this time the ICEC approved the pay increase package, but the only formal announcement that was forthcoming was that a salary review board would be set up.

On July 19, 1972, City Council voted themselves raise increases of up to 79%, retroactive to January 1, 1972.
The Council had no problem dealing with this issue -- their size did not seem to have had any effect on the ease with which they passed the motion. The ICEC caucus was able to agree on the issue and the Council accepted the recommendations of their Committee and of the Review Board. The mayor did not play any noticeable role, but leadership on this question was forthcoming from within the Council itself. There was an ICEC-NDP split in the voting but that was to be expected and there was no real suburban-inner city split in the voting. Seven councillors were absent from this meeting and therefore did not vote on this question.

There is no doubt but that this issue was a controversial one among the public and one which most of the public was opposed to. Yet, the entire issue was resolved quickly, in terms of actual Council time spent on it. The Committee that was set up to examine the question, did so efficiently and effectively. Council leadership emerged primarily from the Chairman of the Finance Committee.

This was one of the first major issues dealt with by Council, and if one ignores the obvious vested interest of the councillors in passing this motion, and if one looks at the process which was gone through, it did at the time look as though Council could work efficiently and effectively and could make major decisions.

It was an issue where there was an underlying consensus among Council and where there were no underlying political cleavages to impede decision-making.

This suggests that the degree of conflict is the determining factor in whether decisions are made or not. All the varied interests and outlooks that are part of the local politics of Winnipeg must now
parlay within one Council Chamber, where before there were fourteen. Thus, the probability of conflict is high and that of consensus is low. Most of the councillors and administrators who worked in the old municipalities have been used to systems where the probability of consensus was high and conflict was low. Their expressions of frustration are a consequence then of having to work within a new system which has not yet developed accepted ways of dealing with conflict-laden decisions.

The question is whether the mechanisms for resolving conflict are at hand. Without a strong executive centered system or without the discipline of party control, conflict resolution is more difficult, requiring almost a form of diplomatic bargaining akin to a series of individual nation states trying to arrive at positions of mutual self interest. 32

Thus, one of the important areas of research analysis for this system is how the process of conflict resolution can be improved. If there is to be any change in structure it should be aimed at that problem, as opposed to picking something like the size of Council and assuming that it is the cause.

It is quite likely, though, that as the system matures it will evolve various procedures and informal processes of handling contentious issues. The concern in this case would be whether such procedures and processes would produce "good" decisions. As Harold Kaplan has shown in his study of the Metro structure in Toronto, the decision-making system

that has evolved there is one that produced decisions on physical
development issues but that ignores social issues, because there is no
integrative structures that can mold majorities around social problems.
The same situation could well occur in the Winnipeg context.

Civic Employees' Organization - The Case of the Urwick-Currie Report:

Another area where the new city system ran into a conflict of
differing points of view of Council, and into major opposition from
their own employees was in the case of the Urwick-Currie Report.

In February, 1972, City Council decided to hire consultants to
study the functions performed by the city departments.

In November the consultants, Urwick, Currie and Partners, Ltd.,
and Underwood, McLellan and Associates, Ltd., submitted their report to
City Council.

Their report was in five sections:

1. collection of information,
2. recommendations on the contracting-out of public works operations,
3. general organizational structures,
4. detailed organizational structure, and
5. plan of implementation.

When they submitted their report in November, it only contained
the first three sections. Before they could complete the final sections
they needed an indication of direction from Council on the question of

33. See Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, Columbia University Press,
1967, Ch. 7.
contracting-out public works operations and they needed agreement in principle on the recommendations for administrative reorganization.

Their first recommendation was to disband the various city departments which duplicated work done by the private sector. City departments should continue to provide only those services which are not practical to contract out or which the private sector was not interested in. According to the consultants, the private sector could do all of the city's street, watermain and sewer construction at a lower cost than the city could continue to operate at.

Their second major recommendation was that the city be divided, for the purposes of public works administration, into six districts. This six district concept was well received by both Council and administration and in February 1973, Council adopted the proposal for the six districts but with the rider that it would not be implemented until Council resolved the question of whether the city will contract out its public works operations.

There was throughout this period much debate and opposition to the report from city employees and their union representatives. The Commissioner of Works and Operations stated that a maximum of 500 permanent employees would be displaced but the union claimed that about 2,000 people would be affected. The Commissioner immediately gave a moral, if not legal, guarantee to all city jobs.

Along with the unions, opposition came from the city's engineering department, who began to question the accuracy and method of comparison between the city's department and the private sector.

The unions then began a fairly extensive publicity campaign to present their case and their objections to the recommendations. They took out full page newspaper ads and called upon the public to support their position.

City Council itself was divided on the question. The division was very clearly an inner city-suburban split with inner city councillors opposing contracting-out of public works. The mayor also came out publicly opposed to the idea of contracting-out.

The Works and Operations Committee held a series of meetings to hear both sides of the contracting-out question. Besides the consultants, other groups which made presentations included the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the Lord Selkirk Community Committee, the Chambers of Commerce, and individual citizens.

Works and Operations Committee endorsed the consultants' recommendations by a vote of six to five and then Executive Policy Committee endorsed them by a vote of five to four.

In March, 1973, the question went before City Council. Over 2,000 people jammed the Council galleries and saw Council refer the question, by a vote of 27 to 23, back to the Works and Operations Committee for further study and comparison of cost and efficiency between the two systems.

The issue was stalled another two times before City Council in April asked Urwick, Currie, Ltd., to proceed with detailed plans for implementation of the contracting-out idea.

As of September, 1973, no further decision has been made on this question.
The table below shows how this issue is illustrative of the inner city-suburban split and the suburban control of the committees which endorsed the report. It also illustrates the ICEC-NDP split.

Table 9
Councillors' Attitude on Urwick-Currie Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>37</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urwick-Currie Report</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Inner City</td>
<td>ICEC</td>
<td>NDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14(28%)</td>
<td>13(45%)</td>
<td>1(5%)</td>
<td>13(35%)</td>
<td>0(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18(36%)</td>
<td>3(10%)</td>
<td>15(71%)</td>
<td>11(30%)</td>
<td>6(86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>18(36%)</td>
<td>13(45%)</td>
<td>5(24%)</td>
<td>13(35%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Urwick-Currie issue was important for a reason other than the contracting-out of services concept. It also brought up and endorsed an idea which Unicity opponents found very useful. That was the six district idea. Originally, the six districts were proposed for purely administrative reasons and strictly for the administration of public works. But, many councillors saw the adoption of the six districts for public works as the first move to reduce the number of Community Committees and hence the number of councillors, a move which many of them favoured.

In July, 1973, Environment recommended that the thirteen Community Committees be reduced to six to coincide with the six public works districts. This recommendation has found favour and opposition among City councillors,
C. ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE

The Administrative Structure

The administrative structure of the new city was to consist of three administrative committees of Council, an Executive Policy Committee of Council and a Board of Commissioners.

The administrative committees would act as the vehicles through which the three major administrative departments of Environment, Finance and Works and Operations, would report to the Council.

The Executive Policy Committee was to have a coordinating function bringing together the information from the civil service, the recommendations of the other committees, and the leadership of Council, in order to arrive at appropriate legislative proposals.

The Board of Commissioners, consisting of a Chief Commissioner, a Commissioner of Finance, a Commissioner of Works and Operations, a Commissioner of Environment and the mayor ex-officio was to provide the administrative leadership. There are a number of theoretical linkages built into this system.

As mentioned, Executive Policy Committee would provide a linkage between the committees and Council; between Council and the Board of Commissioners. Also the Chief Commissioner would act as a liaison between the Executive Policy Committee and the Board of Commissioners, and the mayor would be a further link between the Executive Policy Committee and Council, between Executive Policy Committee and the Commissioners and between the Board of Commissioners and Council.
Structurally, the framers of the new City Act provided what appears to be adequate linkages between the Council and the civil service.

However, the original Act had intended the mayor to be chosen from Council and, therefore, enjoying the support of the majority of Council members. When this was amended to allow for the area-wide election of a mayor, no corresponding changes were made in the linking structures.

Also, the framers of the Act saw the Executive Policy Committee as the Cabinet of Council and, as such, it would be the body to coordinate the activities of the Board of Commissioners and the Council. But, in reality, the Executive Policy Committee has failed to provide this coordinating role.

Although the Executive Policy Committee is representative of the Council, being composed entirely of ICEC members, many ICEC members of Council have expressed concern over the way in which the Committee has been functioning and claimed that the Committee has taken a dictatorial rather than a coordinating function. ICEC councillors claim that the best example of this behaviour occurred when EPC added $1.5 million to the city's capital budget against the expressed wishes of the ICEC caucus.

Executive Policy members in turn reply that they are disliked because they form the cabinet or status committee and other councillors are envious of this. However, even members of E.P.C. strongly criticized the committee. One St. James councillor called EPC "a real flop...they have the power but they fail to use it...they are not competent". A St. Vital councillor criticized it for "sending back issues to committees"
too often. Another Midland councillor said E.P.C. had "little trust in the work of standing committees and deals with trivia...it is overloaded with municipal representatives". A Fort Rouge councillor said E.P.C. is "not accepted by Council because they don't trust the work of committees". While some were criticizing it for trivial discussions, some realized that E.P.C. "is fearful of tackling issues...it is afraid to make decisions because of a critical press".

Councillor George Munro echoed the above, saying "executive policy committee is afraid to make decisions...it's afraid of stepping on the toes of other study committees or the community committees....they only rehash what other committees have rehashed". Councillor Roy Parkhill was E.P.C. as "politically oriented".

Some councillors expressed hope for E.P.C. and see signs of improvement. Councillor Olga Fuga reports that E.P.C. "is slowly beginning to function, acting as a co-ordinating councillor. Prior to this it was wasting a lot of time on trivial issues".

With E.P.C. not performing any coordinating or linkage function and with the mayor not providing his share of the linkage functions, the linkage function between the administration and the Council had to be performed by the Council itself. The administration was not designed to be dealt with directly by the Council and in doing so Council created a great many problems for themselves and for the administrative departments. Too much of Council's time is spent on administrative details and the Council does not spend enough time on policy development, leaving the administration without a framework in many areas within which to work.
The criticism of the operation of council in its avoidance of policy discussion in favour of detailed discussion has been made by many people—councillors, commissioners and media people. This weakness of council is both a factor of and a result of other weaknesses such as council's lack of linkage functions, lack of leadership, its indecisiveness and problems with the Commissioners. While several councillors were aware of the problem and mentioned it, it was the administrators and media personnel that raised the issue strongly and with criticism. The administrators and media agreed very closely on what they saw as a major reason for detail instead of issue discussion.

The main factor responsible for the council's apparent avoidance of policy in favour of detail is the background of the councillors. Many of the councillors sat previously on municipal councils where their main responsibility was "small-time" administration and very close scrutiny of budgets. The municipal council worked very closely with the administration and rarely had to make policy decisions. These municipality-oriented councillors, juxtaposed to a council trying to govern a city of more than half a million that requires decisions on large policy matters, just can't cope with their new responsibilities.

A policy maker must be aware of city problems and issues and various approaches to these problems and issues. He must be able to conceive of a city government as an active solver of problems. Most councillors, however, lack the above ability. They contend that the role of government must be as small as possible, providing only for basic services. They just have not had experience with policy issues in development, transportation, recreation or administrative and service delivery.
According to the deputy minister of Urban Affairs, the problem as he sees it is due to a poor integration of politicians and city administration. Politicians want to make both policy and handle administrative details. The result is that they get hung up with administration and never make policy. The commissioner then makes policy recommendations and Council feels that their policy role is usurped. In the service instance, because councillors do not develop policies or guidelines for administration to follow, the administration then feels it must refer many administrative details to councillors for approval or decisions. This is still very true of the operation of community committees of the old municipalities where councillors dwelled on the most minute detail of water bills, etc.

The problems created by ineffectual linkages between the politicians and the administrators have been compounded by the antagonism that has developed between administrators and politicians. Some of these problems can be traced back to December 1971 when the first three commissioners were appointed.

Mr. D. I. MacDonald, the former Executive Director of Metro, was appointed Chief Commissioner; Mr. Robert McLean, the former Finance Director of the City of Winnipeg, was appointed Finance Commissioner; and Mr. W. D. Hurst, the former Chief Engineer for the City of Winnipeg, was appointed Commissioner of Works and Operations. Because he was due to retire, Mr. Hurst was appointed for only a six month period.

There was, however, a good deal of dissension on the appointments, both from Council and from the ICEC caucus. Some councillors wanted MacDonald for Commissioner of Environment, McLean for the Chief Commissioner,
and a suburban official for the post of Finance Commissioner. There was apparently even more dissension regarding the appointment of the fourth commissioner, the Commissioner of Environment. The question was not settled for over four months, and during the course of this time, there was much debate and disagreement among Council members and among members of the ICEC caucus. The issue centered around questions of personalities, political leanings and the question of the role that the Commissioner should perform. Some councillors wanted an administrator, some wanted a planner and some wanted a combination of the two. The debate dragged on for months but finally, on April 19, 1972, four months after Council took office and seven months after it had been elected, the decision was made and David G. Henderson became the Commissioner of the Environment. The other major contender for the position had been Earl Levin, the former Director of Planning for Metro and a very popular planner with many councillors. The appointment of Henderson did not sit well with many councillors and this feeling is still causing some of the problems today.

Councillors offer primarily negative responses regarding the commissioners and their role. Their comments ranged from "they run the city" to "they are qualified professional men". Several of the councillors made reference to the commissioners being "politically appointed" and this appears to be partly responsible for the love/hate relationship that some councillors described. Many councillors feel that the commissioners are "too powerful and independent" of Council. These councillors apparently feel that they aren't in control of the commissioners.
Some councillors feel that commissioners became powerful when they started offering the leadership that Council was lacking when attempting to make policy decisions. Several inner city councillors who previously sat on the City of Winnipeg Council and had a direct relationship with administrative department heads, feel that the old system was superior and would like to return to it by "scrapping the commissioner system". One inner city councillor alarmed with their exercise of power urged that "their role should be restricted and defined by amendments. They tend to interfere in certain areas and they are taking their authority of E.P.C.". Another councillor found that the introduction of the Board of Commissioners merely added on another unnecessary step in the decision-making process causing further delays.

Few councillors feel that the commissioner system was working well. Councillors are quite divided on their opinions of the commissioners and their role. Some feel that until Council and E.P.C. start to make decisions, the commissioners provide desirable leadership and guidelines. Other councillors really balk at this leadership, however, saying "councillors really rubber stamp commissioners' recommendations with little or no complaints".

There seems to have been at times a definite Council/commissioner split in evidence at City Hall. This has been evidenced by councillors' lack of faith in the commissioners and by their distrust of them. The commissioners on their part, feel that the present system of local government is virtually inoperative and almost paralyzed. The basic problem is that the decision-making function of Council is not being performed. Commissioners are divided on the reason for this--some say that it is just a phenomena of the transition period and that it will work itself out, while others claim that Council is administratively inclined and that they refuse to
delegate authority. One commissioner advanced another theory—that this failure to make decisions is due not to people or individuals in the system, but to the different and dispersed decision-making structure.

The Board of Commissioners in itself is an interesting aspect of the structure. Before the bill was passed the debate and discussion over the Board of Commissioners saw this body as a Super Board of 'Five Bosses'. Many fears were expressed about the Board becoming "above city council" in power and influence. For their part the Provincial Government felt that these were needless fears as the Executive Policy Committee was designed to act as a check on the Board of Commissioners, as was the mayor who is also a member of the Board and of Executive Policy Committee.

In a city where the structure has changed, but where most of the same people are doing the same jobs as before, it becomes very difficult to determine if the Board of Commissioners indeed has any overwhelming power and influence.

If one of the criteria for the determination of this is the attitude of the majority of councillors, then the Board of Commissioners does have a good deal of power and influence. Comments from councillors reflect mostly the concern that Commissioners are setting policy, but as explained above this is due more to the weak mayor and Executive Policy Committee than it is to the structure itself.

"They are too powerful, their role should be defined and restricted by amendments. They tend to interfere in certain areas. Are taking authority of E.P.C."; "The commissioners have great power and they have the policy power because councillors aren't bothering to make policy. It is always the commissioners' report that guides the decisions of standing committees"; "Board of Commissioners is the worst feature of the
ACT - created another powerful level of government -- everything has to go to the Board of Commissioners first”; "Not directing the city properly tend to interfere in trivial issues. Could be scrapped. Too tough and are running the city. Councillors rubber stamp their decisions with little or no complaints"; "Trying to run city due to weakness of E.P.C. Overlapping powers. They are setting policy while council rubber stamp. Should be abolished"; "Too powerful. No need for chief commissioner. The mayor should replace him. Commissioners are too independent".

One major area of dissension between the commissioners and the councillors has been in the area of budgets. There was great outcry from Community Committees when their budget estimates were cut by the Board of Commissioners. This could have been avoided if ongoing consultation and coordination between the two groups had been established during the period of budget preparation. This could have been accomplished through the vehicle of the Budget Bureau. The Act calls for the establishment of a Budget Bureau responsible to the Board of Commissioners for determining the form and manner of presentation of the annual estimates of revenues and expenditures of all departments, services, boards, commissions and the Community Committees. If the Budget Bureau working under guidelines from the Board of Commissioners, had worked with Community Committees while budget were being prepared then perhaps much antagonism against arbitrary appearing budget cuts may have been avoided. Also a rapport established between the Budget Bureau and the Community Committees would have been useful for general linkages between the Commissioners and the Community Committees.
The Process of Centralization

In terms of the administrative centralization called for in the Act, there were three major areas in which this was to occur. These areas were the amalgamation of all administrative and public works staff, the unification of all police services and the unification of all fire services.

The easiest and smoothest unification was that of all municipal personnel. Under the Unicity Act all municipal personnel whose positions either become redundant or are eliminated must be offered a job at an equal level and at equal pay in the new city administration.

When unification took place there were some 7,200 employees of former municipalities and of Metro and all but five of these went to work for the new city. The former City of Winnipeg had some 4,600 established positions and they had properly prepared establishment charts where every position was charted and identified. Metro also had these charts but the former small municipalities did not and therefore all of their employees had to be hired first and sorted out later.

In January, 1973, one year after unification had begun, the job still had not been completed. Charts were being prepared department by department and in a number of cases were being held up awaiting a Council decision on a question of policy.

It is at this stage a virtually impossible task to attempt to determine where former employees now are, how many these are exactly, and how they are structured. This is something that is going to take time and the introduction of new techniques such as a centralized payroll.
The personnel situation is still fluid and the accounting procedures are always behind the shifts in departments and between departments.

However, according to city officials, most employees are in the same place and are doing the same job and everything on the output side of the administration is happening the way it should. Externally the new civic service is functioning well and with almost no discernible change from the former operation but internally the period of transition for the civic service is not yet over.

The Unicity Act called for the creation of a single police force for the new City of Winnipeg. This was, however, to be treated as the establishment of a new force rather than as an amalgamation of existing municipal police services.

The Board of Commissioners took this matter under advisement and in April, 1972, produced a series of recommendations which were approved by the Executive Policy Committee and then by Council. They recommended the establishment of a four member citizen committee to begin a comprehensive study to determine the way in which the police forces of the city should be organized in order to provide the public with the most economical, efficient and affective system of police protection. They were also to look at the manner in which any reorganization should be carried out and the manner in which the new force should be administered.

However, the city had begun during this period from January to April to experience some problems with the policemen themselves. The Winnipeg Police Association became unified and asked the Provincial Department of Labour for certification as a bargaining unit. Some councillors
saw this as a move by the Police Association to force an early amalgamation. Council asked the Manitoba Labour Board for an extension of time on the deadline for objecting to the Association's application. Having gotten the extension, the matter was turned over to Executive Policy Committee, who recommended that the city file a notice of intervention with the Manitoba Labour Board. The Manitoba Labour Board ruled that until such time as new agreements were negotiated the agreements between the various Police Associations and their respective municipalities would remain in force. This served to allay some of the fears of the Council as this meant that there would not be a sudden coordinated demand for parity from all former municipalities.

The special inquiry committee did not produce a report until February of 1973. The report recommended the creation of six police districts and a total force of 958 men. The six districts were essentially the same six districts as the Urwick-Currie report had recommended for Public Works the previous November. Even though these districts were created for administrative purposes as were those in Urwick-Currie, they also have been used as a rationale for having six political districts -- an argument which has no basis in reality.

The report was presented to Executive Policy Committee and was then referred to the Community Committees for their opinions and comments. The report also went to Finance Committee which will present recommendations on the amalgamation procedure.

The response from the Community Committees was primarily positive, with several suggested amendments aimed at more local control of the unified police force. Only the Community Committee of East Kildonan
objected to the citizen's police committee as the overseer of the police commission made up of citizens and councillors. The move toward amalgamation is now underway and, according to Finance Committee Chairman Bernie Wolfe, the proposed amalgamation will be completed by July, 1974.

The other amalgamation that the Act calls for is that of the fire services. This amalgamation was considered much earlier than any of the others. Six months before Unicity came into being, Winnipeg City Council asked the Winnipeg Fire Chief to make an informal study of how fire services could be amalgamated. However, this report was for aldermen's eyes only, and has never been made public.

Then, on February 2, 1972, Council recommended that the Commissioner of Finance initiate an in depth study on the feasibility of amalgamating the various fire departments. A special committee was to be struck and the Community Committees would be requested to submit their views on the matter to the Commissioner of Finance.

This ten member committee consisted of the Fire Commissioner, the Chief Engineer of the Canadian Underwriter's Association, the President of the Manitoba Professional Fire Fighters Association, the Chiefs of St. Boniface, St. James-Assiniboia, St. Vital and the Inner City Fire Departments, the Director of Personnel and the Deputy City Treasurer of the City of Winnipeg, plus the Administrative Assistant of the Inner City Community Fire Department.

The first meeting of this committee was held on March 16, 1972, and three sub-committees were established — Fire Station Locations and Apparatus Distribution; Manning; and Communications.
During the life of this Committee, the Commissioner of Finance received only four submissions which were referred to the Committee for its information and consideration. These were:

- the West Kildonan Community Advisory Committee,
- the West Kildonan Community Committee,
- Mr. A. Phillippe Roy,
- the East Kildonan Community Committee.

The fact that formal submissions came from only two Community Committees is surprising in light of the fears of amalgamation which had been expressed up to this time. It is also somewhat indicative of the parochialism of Community Committees, evident in their attitudes towards city-wide questions.

In spite of limited input from the Community Committees, the Committee in June of 1972 presented its recommendations to the Commissioner of Finance.

Their basic conclusion was that it is feasible to amalgamate the Fire Departments within the City of Winnipeg. If their recommendations were implemented, they maintained that they would provide a higher level of fire service than at present to the majority of communities in the City of Winnipeg, without immediate additional cost to the taxpayer.

Their report recommended the establishment of five firefighting districts, each with a number of stations under the direction of a district chief. These districts do not correspond to those selected for Public Works or for Police services, and indeed, there is no rational reason why they should. Fire services are different from the other two services and
therefore should be organized in the manner best suited to the delivery of fire services. However, City Council's reluctance to deal with this question may stem in part from the desire of a number of councillors to see a six district fire department organization coincident with that of Works and Operations and Police, thereby strengthening the push for the establishment of only six Community Committees.

On July 19, 1972, City Council received the report of the Special Committee on the In-Depth Study of the Feasibility of Amalgamating the Fire Department and referred it to the Committee on Finance and to the various Community Committees.

Finance Committee, on October 14, 1972, refused to recommend the adoption of the report. Many councillors were against the closing down of seven fire stations and against the idea of fire-rescue units no longer being used for ambulance service. However, Finance Committee on November 28, 1972, finally passed the recommendations and sent it to Executive Policy Committee who were to arrange an information session on the report for the benefit of councillors before they had to deal with it in Council as a whole.

In February of 1972, Council approved the merger and passed an amendment that Finance Committee be delegated the authority to implement the plan. At that time it was thought that amalgamation of fire services would take place by July 1, 1973.

On May 17, 1973, at a meeting of the Finance Committee, problems regarding the unification began to appear. The Committee began to have difficulty resolving the guidelines passed by Council as the basis of the plan for amalgamation.
The holdup in the Finance Committee continued throughout the summer and when agreement finally was reached, the question went to City Council in September of 1973. At this time Council attempted to pass a motion in favour of waiving a statutory ninety day waiting period for new bylaws as set out in the Act. The motion was defeated and nothing further occurred until November when Council finally approved the amalgamation. However, another problem had risen and at this time still has not been resolved. A St. James-Assiniboia firefighter had brought a court action against the City. Even though this has not been resolved, Fire Department unification was to go ahead on January 7, 1974.  

The length of time required to pass this amalgamation was due to the nature of the subject matter, not to any ICEC-NDP split or to any suburban-urban split, as the following table shows. In fact, Council wanted it; the people wanted it; and most of the firemen wanted it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>37</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amalgamation of Fire Service</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Inner City</td>
<td>ICEC</td>
<td>NDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42(84%)</td>
<td>24(83%)</td>
<td>18(85%)</td>
<td>32(86%)</td>
<td>5(72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3(6%)</td>
<td>2(7%)</td>
<td>1(5%)</td>
<td>3(8%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>5(10%)</td>
<td>3(15%)</td>
<td>2(10%)</td>
<td>2(6%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. At the time of publication, fire services were finally and officially amalgamated.
One of the strongest arguments advanced in favour of area wide unification was that it would create fiscal equity -- no longer would Tuxedo residents be able to enjoy the advantages of the central city while not paying for its problems. The new system is undoubtedly fairer than the old.

But what about the expenditure side of the ledger? The priorities and allocations of the municipal budget should be a fundamental target of analysis in an attempt to give even preliminary answers to the question--has Unicity made a difference? Expenditure analysis is now one of the main areas of inquiry for social scientists interested in evaluating the impact of structural change. This is so because budgets, whatever their particular goals, are concerned with the translation of financial resources into human purposes. As Aron Wildavsky has put it, budgets are a series of goals with the price tags attached. And it is the attaching of the price tag which is important. Any politician can give lip service to a variety of competing goals, but it is the allocation of resources which shows how serious he is. A budget, then, is a mechanism for making choices among alternative expenditures. Herbert Balls, a former comptroller of the


Federal Treasury Board, writes that a budget "is essentially a method of assigning priorities to competing demands, of complementing programs with resources, a device for matching ends with means". Changes in expenditure patterns offer the most concrete demonstration that something different is occurring.

Budget figures can, however, be as misleading as they are informative. First, the money allocated may not be spent (a la Richard Nixon impounding funds) or may not be spent wisely. Throwing money at a problem does not in itself ensure a solution. What it does demonstrate is a real change in attitude. Second, budgets may hide as much as they reveal. In the budget figures presented below, for example, in order to arrive at an area-wide figure prior to Unicity, the expenditures of the thirteen separate local governments had to be combined and classified and some municipalities used different forms of accounting. Personnel costs would be lumped under administration in one municipality but divided between various departments in another. There is an unusually large margin of error in an expenditure analysis. Third, only current account figures are presented and municipalities often finance much of their program by capital account. In evaluating the impact of the Metropolitan Corporation, for instance, an analysis of current figures would show little change from the pre-metro situation, but capital expenditures were very large and financed a score of bridges, sewage treatment plants, etc. Lastly, in examining a lower tier government, the actions of the senior levels must always be taken into account. A large drop in welfare

expenditure may be a result of a deliberate shift in Council policy, but it may also reflect a simple shift of function upwards.

Expenditure analysis, then, is hazardous, but if the above difficulties are noted it still offers a useful source of concrete data.

Among the various objectives proposed for the new structure of the provincial government, three can be measured by expenditure analysis. It is, of course, too early to authoritatively give a value pronouncement about any aspect of the system. Only one full budget for 1972 has been passed and the estimates for 1973 prepared -- two budgets do not a system make! But, as in other areas discussed in this paper, some trends are now appearing.

Implicit in the objective of unification was the desire for uniformity of key services. Transcona should have the same high level of police protection as Winnipeg or St. James. The improved quality of service rather than cost was a favourite theme of the provincial government. Opponents of Unicity believed that equal services (particularly fire and police protection) would force a major increase in expenditure. Second, in the government's White Paper much eloquence was devoted to the plight of the inner city and particularly the condition of Winnipeg's native peoples. There was a hope that, given increased resources, more effort might be expanded in this direction. Third, the government proposed the municipal innovation of a budget bureau. Section 57 established the bureau, whose duties included "the budget bureau shall provide the Board of Commissioners with an analysis and evaluation in relation to city policies, programs and management of the annual capital and current budgets"
(Section 57(51)). Ultimately it was hoped that the budget bureau would establish a PPBS system of municipal budgeting.

Data which could illuminate whether these objectives are being achieved includes the following:

- The overall similarity between the progress and general allocations of the present and past Unicity budgets can reveal how incremental Winnipeg's budget practices have been and thus the potential of PPBS system.
- The amount of increase in present and past Unicity budgets can reveal whether the new system has been responsible for drastic budget increases.
- Changes in percentage of budget allocation from present and past Unicity budgets can give some indication whether services are being equalized and if more is being spent on the inner core, or anywhere else.

Two sets of figures have been provided.39 Table 11 compares the five year average from 1966 to 1970 with the two Unicity budgets and Table 12 shows the corresponding figures from 1970 to 1973.

39. The IUS is indebted to Tom Axworthy for providing the above figures. They form part of a larger study of Winnipeg's municipal finances from 1955 to 1973 which makes up a section of the author's forthcoming Ph.D. thesis.
Table II
1966-70 Average and Unicity Budget 1972, 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>1966-70</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Persons and Property</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social Development</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation and Community Service</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transit Subsidy</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

N.B.: Percentages do not total 100.0%, as all functions are not listed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget</td>
<td>130,288,570</td>
<td></td>
<td>140,299,249</td>
<td></td>
<td>153,078,775</td>
<td></td>
<td>164,786,803</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36.91</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,044,509</td>
<td>35.67</td>
<td>57,939,312</td>
<td>37.85</td>
<td>59,830,455</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal Spending</td>
<td>82,203,628</td>
<td>63.09</td>
<td>90,254,746</td>
<td>64.33</td>
<td>93,334,845</td>
<td>60.97</td>
<td>104,956,348</td>
<td>63.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functions</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Debt Charges</td>
<td>13,960,799</td>
<td>10.72</td>
<td>15,269,269</td>
<td>10.88</td>
<td>15,556,713</td>
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<td>Public Works</td>
<td>10,766,312</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>10,530,627</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>10,895,097</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>12,861,381</td>
<td>7.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of Persons and Property</td>
<td>18,128,249</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>20,145,475</td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td>24,077,167</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>26,151,432</td>
<td>15.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health and Social Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,250,894</td>
<td>6.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Sanitation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,938,543</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>3,925,456</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>4,313,545</td>
<td>2.62</td>
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<td>ii. Health</td>
<td>3,051,166</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>3,062,440</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1,547,454</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1,629,669</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Welfare</td>
<td>5,595,454</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>5,209,420</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>5,180,565</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>4,852,320</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
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<td>Recreation and Community Service</td>
<td>8,874,513</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>9,330,067</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>11,022,809</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>12,613,918</td>
<td>7.65</td>
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<td>General Government</td>
<td>8,323,018</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>9,711,747</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>8,054,675</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>9,613,834</td>
<td>5.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Administration</td>
<td>5,780,781</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>6,911,366</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5,955,893</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>6,778,939</td>
<td>4.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>ii. Planning</td>
<td>2,542,237</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2,800,381</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2,098,782</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>2,234,895</td>
<td>1.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transit Subsidy</td>
<td>5,927,000</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>6,856,416</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>6,580,532</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>6,364,772</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12
Expenditures — Greater Winnipeg Area
1966 - 1973
Table 12 shows that the increase in budget expenditure under Unicity has been slightly higher than in preceding years. In 1972 the budget rose 13 million, the second highest increase in a decade (in 1968 spending jumped 17 million). This reflected the inevitable transition costs. The projected 11 million dollar increase for 1973 is similar to the budget increases that have occurred since 1969 and is not an unusually high figure. The rapid rate of inflation in the last two years may have had more to do with the increase under Unicity than any factor of policy. The issue is still in doubt whether the new structure has been a large factor in increased municipal expenditure.

There have been few changes in budget allocation. As the discussion below illustrates, budget making at the local level has largely been an incremental exercise. As Table 12 indicates, the percentages of the budget allocated to education, debit charges, public works, sanitation, and the transit subsidy have held steady. General government has also received the same percentage of money, although different classification procedures under the new system makes this difficult to quantify. In general, these functions have also received the same percentage on a five year average since 1966. Two expenditure categories have risen noticeably. Protection of persons and property from 1966-1970 received 13.5% of the budget; under Unicity this has increased to 15.7 and 15.8 respectively. This has been due to an area-wide wage agreement with the police which may be the forerunner of service unification. Recreation and Community Service has taken a

40. In the pre-Unicity figures, the administration costs of metro were grouped under a single category, now under Unicity personnel costs for departments like engineering are grouped under Works and Operations, thus showing an artificial decline.
corresponding jump from 5.7 in the five year average to 7.2 in 1972 and 7.6 in 1973. The tendency of councillors to support each other's requests for new skating rinks, etc., has been noted elsewhere in this paper. This "log-rolling" aspect of the new Council was not foreseen by the new structure's creators. Contrary to hopes, spending on Health and Social Development has actually declined from 1971 levels. This may be due to the provincial policy of erasing medical premiums (formerly the city paid for indigents) but certainly the Council has not been as inclined to spend money on the inner city as they have on arenas.

Some priorities then, may be changing but the overall impression is one of ingrained incrementalism. Budgets reveal the innate conservatism of government better than any other function. "Once enacted, a budget becomes a precedent. Often the fact that something has been done once vastly increases the chances that it will be done again. Since only substantial departures from the previous year's budget are normally given intensive scrutiny, any item that remains unchanged will probably be continued the following year as a matter of course."41 The largest determining factor of the size and content of this year's estimates is last year's estimates. Municipal budgets may change, but the dominant impression is that this only occurs after a senior government has lifted a function or increased a grant. In general, Winnipeg under Unicity appears to be undertaking the same functions -- often with the same programs -- that it was even before Metro. If the budget bureau is to have any hope of introducing a PPBS system to Winnipeg, it must consciously make a departure from twenty years of incrementalism.

The impact of Unicity on spending patterns at this early date is not nearly as marked as its effect on tax equity. But certain trends which are beginning to develop should be closely monitored in the future. If the city unifies the police and fire service, will that budget allocation continue to rise? Will "hardware" items like arenas and rinks continue to be favoured while "software" items like welfare languish? (If so, Winnipeg will be repeating a pattern set by Metro Toronto in its first years.) Will the new structure be a forerunner of sharply rising costs? Lastly, and most importantly, in its management of the 100 million dollar civic current budget, will the administration continue its incremental tradition or will imagination and new budgeting techniques take hold? As the government's White Paper recognized, Winnipeg is no longer a frontier town. City government must administer 100 million dollars in current account and over 50 million in capital. The imaginative spending of even a fraction of that figure could have major results on the lives of Winnipeggers.

**PPBS In Winnipeg**

As noted in the previous section, Winnipeg has traditionally used an incrementalist approach to budgeting, where the largest determining factor of the size and content of each year's budget has been the previous year's budget. But along with the side sweeping boundary reforms of the 1971 "Unicity" Act, came reforms for the city's budgeting activities.

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42. This section is based on the work of Robert Bamburak in an unpublished paper titled, "Winnipeg's Budgetary Process".

43. Manitoba, Manitoba Statutes: The City of Winnipeg Act (1971). The pertinent section and subsection has been noted (i.e., S57(3)) where this information has been supplied from the Act.
Under the previous urban organization of twelve city and municipal governments and a metropolitan government, a line-item budget format was used. As a consequence, such items as personnel cost would be lumped under administration costs in one municipality, but divided between various departments in another. The highly centralized administrative structure, provided by the Act, necessitated a more organized and efficient way of preparing a budget for the entire metropolitan area. Basically the Act provides for a PPB system approach to budgeting.

The following outlines the basic civic structure and administrative organization involved in preparing Winnipeg's budget.

Board of Commissioners: The Board of Commissioners (BofC) is at the top of the administrative hierarchy. Its members are the Chief Commissioner, Commissioner of the Environment, Commissioner of Finance, Commissioner of Works and Operations, and the Mayor, ex officio S43. The Board is responsible for the supervision of all departments and services and for the implementation of Council's policies and programs S49.

As well, the Board is to cause the annual current and capital budgets to be prepared and to review and present these estimates to the Executive Policy Committee S50(1). In addition, to aid in the preparation of the budget, the Chief Commissioner is to direct and supervise the Budget Bureau S54(3).

Budget Bureau: The Unicity Act provided for the establishment of a Budget Bureau (BB) under the BofC. Together, the Bureau and the Board act much like the Treasury Board at the Canadian Federal Government level in the preparation of the budget.
A quick review of the major responsibilities of the Bureau reveals that the provincial advisors who drew up the Act, must have had the PPB approach to budgeting in mind. The BB is responsible for determining the form and presentation of the annual estimates of revenues and expenditures of all departments, services, boards and commissions, and the community committees s57(2). The BB is to provide the BofC with an analysis and evaluation in relation to city policies, programs, and management of the annual estimates s57(3). The BB is to advise the BofC on the format and manner of presentation of the annual capital and current budgets and long term capital works forecasts s57(4). Finally, the BB is to provide the BofC with an analysis and evaluation, in relation to city policies, and management, of the annual capital and current budgets s57(5).

These responsibilities of the Bureau provide the basis for a PPB system in Winnipeg. The Bureau has control over how a department prepares its budget in terms of a statement of objectives, a postulation of alternatives, and a program structure. The BB is also responsible for analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed and completed budgets. The provision for a multi-year plan is also made, but only in terms of capital projects.

Departments: The majority of Winnipeg's budget estimates come from its departments, which range in activity from parks and recreation to finance and from streets and traffic to library. Beginning in August, departments and other civic agencies are notified by the BB as directed by the BofC to begin preparation of their budget estimates.

The format and preparation of their current estimates, which forms over two-thirds of the annual expenditures, has now been carefully outlined for all departments.
An interesting point is to be noted about this new standard procedure for the preparation of departmental estimates. Unlike the previous budgetary system, where departments just added increments without any real forethought, this new system has the departments estimate the costs of maintaining operations as they were the previous year. Any increase in estimates above this must be specified as service improvements, the costs of upgrading a service, costs of a capital nature, or changes due to re-organization. As well, the supporting information to justify both existing operations and service improvements must be stated.

A priority rating system has been developed for capital expenditures, such as street pavement, sewage treatment facilities, and water reservoirs. The higher the judged priority of a project, the larger its number. A capital expenditure rated "5" is considered a vital service; "3", essential service; "2", standard service; "1", desirable service. Besides the main number rating is a sub-group rating of 1 to 4, with "4" indicating the greatest necessity; could cause a serious disruption of service if not implemented without undue delay.

Community Committees: Early in November, the preliminary estimates are to be sent to the Budget Bureau for pre-audit and assembly. From there, the culture and recreation estimates are to be reviewed by the Community Committees (CC). Originally the CC were to review the estimates of public works and operations, protection of persons and property, and health and social development, for their respective areas S27(1). But City Council, in an attempt to improve the delivery of services, has decided to rationalize these services into six area districts.
The complete budget is now completely reviewed by the Board of Commissioners, who make recommendations for changes in the estimates. About the middle of December, the budget goes from the Commissioners to the Standing Committees for their review.

The Standing Committees: Winnipeg's three Standing Committees (SC), composed of councillors, are Environment, Finance, and Works and Operations. The SC are to ensure the implementation of city policies and programs S336. The duties of the Environment Committee include planning (transportation, open space and parks) housing, urban renewal, pollution regulation and control, and health and social development S338(2). The duties of the Finance Committee are assessment, finance, personnel, purchasing, and protection of persons and property S339(2). Meanwhile, the duties of Works and Operations include transit, streets, traffic control, utilities, waste collection and disposal, engineering and design, parks and recreation, and cultural facilities S340(2).

Understandably, some duplication or overlap of policy jurisdiction occurs among the Standing Committees, as is required by certain services. Each SC is to review those annual estimates which fall into their sphere of duties. After making their recommendations, near the end of January, the estimates proceed to the Executive Policy Committee.

Executive Policy Committee: The Executive Policy Committee (EPC), also composed of City Councillors, serves to formulate policies for recommendation by Council and to co-ordinate the implementation of city policies S330. The EPC reviews the current and capital budget estimates, makes recommendations and will probably send them back to the Board of Commissioners. Sending the estimates to the Board allows the civic servants one final chance at making an input into the proposed budget.
The EPC once again considers the estimates, and then about the middle of March, will pass the estimates on to City Council, with its final recommendations and those of the Board of Commissioners, as well.

**City Council:** Winnipeg's City Council, generally makes short work of adopting the budget as much councillor input into the estimates are made at Standing Committees and the Executive Policy Committee levels. The large input by councillors in Winnipeg's budgetary process may prove to be determined to efforts of PPB.

**General Comments About Winnipeg's Budgetary Process:** Winnipeg is definitely implementing a PPB system, although its timetable for completion is at least two years away.

People involved in the Budget Bureau feel that it will take time for this new budgetary system to really become effective. It is especially hard for people, who have been preparing the budget in the same way for the last twenty years, to be suddenly faced with a new set of rules and regulations. Hopefully too, councillors will give PPBS a chance and not expect immediate results in the way of improved services and tax savings.

Analysis of present and future programs appears to be one of the largest and most difficult tasks standing in the way of Winnipeg's successful implementation of PPBS. The Budget Bureau is in the process of hiring two analysts to begin evaluating expenditure. Although these men (or women) may have the requisite intelligence of wisdom, imagination, ability, and judgement for the job, two men will provide a token analytical effort at cost.
Finally, the effect of both the federal and provincial governments on the urban scene should not be underplayed. Unfortunately for cities, the financial support from these two levels of government have generally been insufficient for the needs of city services. Furthermore, programs such as urban renewal, low rental housing, and mortgage financing by CMHC, have almost no rational criteria for allocating funds to cities.

If Winnipeg is to solve its financial problems, PPBS alone cannot be relied upon. At best, Winnipeg may be able to make better use of what little is available to the city.

If Winnipeg is to make the most out of the PPB system, it will have to put a more concentrated effort into PPB. Presently the plans for an analytical staff of two, do not indicate a high priority being given to the introduction of a new budgeting system, which is unfortunate, as this was an area of innovation that could be of major importance to the city.
Throughout the provincial government's white paper on Local Government Reorganization, there was a good deal of emphasis on, and concern with, the concept of citizens' involvement and the importance of ensuring that it would not suffer as a result of the administrative and political consolidation. It wanted to decentralize government and "bring it as close as possible to the people"\textsuperscript{44} and to provide "a structure and climate which citizens could communicate and interact with their councillors".\textsuperscript{45}

The vehicles by which this was intended to be done was the Community Committee, made up of:

- 3 to 6 wards each containing approximately 10,000 people, and each represented by one councillor;

- A Residents Advisory Group which would work on its own and with the Community Committee.

The Community Committees, according to the government's white paper, were designed to "overcome public apathy, and to overcome the new prevalent 'leave-politics-to-the-politicians' attitude of ordinary citizens. The Community Committee is "to provide ready access by the people to the local system".

Along with the purpose of decentralizing the decision-making process, the Community Committees were also to be a guarantee of the retention of local autonomy and identity for the previously separate municipalities. In this regard, the Act gave them the responsibility of supervising the delivery of local services. However, the meaning of the word 'supervise' soon required qualification in the summer of 1972.

\textsuperscript{44} Government of Manitoba, \textit{Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area.}

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
Up until that time, some suburban Community Committees had continued to operate their administration in the same style as when they were municipalities exercising hiring and firing responsibility. The qualification made it clear that the intentions of the Manitoba Government were for the central council and administration to have this power and not Community Committees. The redefinition of 'supervise' became "to watch, observe, and make qualitative assessment". This made it clear that Community Committees have no real power and that the system is to centralize as intended.

The following diagram gives an illustration of the structural relationship between the Council, the Committees and the Community Committees. 46

![Diagram showing the structural relationship between Council, Executive Committee, Committees, Departments, and Community Committees.]

The Act which set up the new system did not specify a particular structure for the Community Committees. As a result, the operational structures are as varied as the areas in which they exist.

The Community Committees which correspond to the former independent municipalities are in some ways fortunate, and in some ways restrained, by having access to the former municipal facilities. Having taken over a former City Hall tends to give them immediate legitimacy, easy public recognition and a sense of local autonomy and identity, as well as a comfortable, spacious and fitting facility in which to conduct their business. However, this same facility also has the tendency to encourage traditional patterns of work and of thought, and the retention of former city staff leads to traditional administrative functions with very little desire for innovation to suit the changed situation. It must be remembered, however, that the physical surroundings are only one factor and indeed a small factor in the explanation of Community Committee behaviour. A much larger and more important factor is the councillor himself, his background, his attitude toward the entire Unicity concept, and his influence on Council.

There are as many Community Committee organizational structures as there are Community Committees. However, these structures can be classified into:

1. Community Committees with traditional subcommittees such as Public Works, Culture and Recreation, Health and Social Development, Protection of Persons and Property, Planning. These committees involve only the councillors and meetings are held at the call of the chair. This category would include the Community Committees of St. James-Assiniboia, West Kildonan, and Lord Selkirk.
2. This second category is the same as above but with subcommittees having a standing committee aspect with regularly scheduled and advertised meetings. Community Committees in this category include Midland, St. John's, St. Vital.

3. The third category is Community Committees which have traditional subcommittees such as #1 and #2, but which have included new subcommittees designed to deal with the new functions and responsibilities of Community Committees. These new subcommittees include ones such as Pollution and Environment, Communications, Information and Zoning. These Community Committees are Transcona, Fort Rouge, Assiniboine Park, Centennial.

4. The fourth category is the same as #3 but with subcommittees having standing committee status with regularly scheduled and advertised meetings. Fort Garry is the only Community Committee which fits this category.

5. This final category is the same as #4 but with citizen involvement on the same committees as councillors. Councillors head the committee, but membership includes citizens. There are two Community Committees in this category -- St. Boniface and East Kildonan.
**Table 13**

**Community Committees Organizational Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Meetings per Month</th>
<th>Resources and Facilities</th>
<th>Inner City Joint Community Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assiniboine Park</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>former municipal offices and staff.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>new office, basic staff. reliance on City Hall.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kildonan</td>
<td>1 and special</td>
<td>former municipal offices and staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>meetings.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>former municipal offices and staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rouge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>new office, basic staff. Reliance on City Hall.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Selkirk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>new office, basic staff. reliance on City Hall.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>new office, basic staff, reliance on City Hall.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Boniface</td>
<td>2 and special</td>
<td>former municipal offices and staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>meetings.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>new office, basic staff, reliance on City Hall.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James-Assiniboia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>former municipal offices and staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vital</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>former municipal offices and staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>former municipal offices and staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>former municipal offices and staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>No. of Committees</td>
<td>Traditional Committees</td>
<td>Innovative Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assiniboine Park</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rouge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Selkirk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>St. Boniface</td>
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<td></td>
<td>16 subcommittees</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vital</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kildonan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Committee</td>
<td>No. of Councillors</td>
<td>No. With Previous Experience</td>
<td>No. With No Previous Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assiniboine Park</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kildonan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rouge</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Selkirk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Boniface</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James-Assiniboia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vital</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kildonan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most Time Consuming Matters On Community Committees</td>
<td>Committees To Deal With These Matters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zoning</td>
<td>Receiving Communications</td>
<td>Zoning Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assiniboine Park</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kildonan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rouge</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Selkirk</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Boniface</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James-Assiniboia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vital</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kildonan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 17

**Community Committee Linkages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Close Relations With Administration</th>
<th>Some Former Councillors</th>
<th>Working Out Of Former Municipal Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assiniboine Park</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kildonan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rouge</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3/5</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Selkirk</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Boniface</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>4/6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
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<td>2/3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kildonan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The functions of the Community Committee, are to watch, observe and make qualitative assessment of employees in the delivery of all services previously supplied by the individual municipalities. For purposes of the administration of these services, the Inner City area would be the responsibility of the Inner City Joint Community Committee which is made up of the six Community Committees which comprise the former City of Winnipeg. For supervision of services and for purposes of preparing the annual capital and current budget estimates, the six inner city Community Committees would function as one.

Recently there has been a move to the ICJCC disbanded. It is felt that this structure is cumbersome and inefficient. It has also come about because of a growing feeling of local area identification. The people in these six Community Committees are now developing a feeling of community and with it a desire to achieve and maintain local autonomy and identity. This development of local autonomy and identity by communities which did not formally exist before 1972 is in contrast to the fear expressed prior to 1972 by the suburbs who felt that they would lose their local autonomy and identity.

The Community Committees basically look after five major areas:

- Culture and Recreation
- Public Works and Operations
- Police and Fire Services
- Health and Social Development
- Planning
Of these five, the one which Community Committees spend the greatest deal of time on is the area of planning. But only a small aspect of the planning function has to date been performed by any Community Committee, and that is the zoning function. This has in the first years of transition shown itself to be the prime function of nearly all Community Committees, and certainly of all suburban Community Committees.

There have been many cries of anguish over the zoning procedures that must be followed and the length of time that they require. However, this problem was recognized even before Unicity became a reality and again several times during the first few months of operation.

The framers of the Act recognized the problems inherent in their zoning procedures as laid down in the Act and they provided an answer -- in the District Area and Action Area Plan Concept. To date only a handful of Community Committees have begun work on these plans and none have been completed. So zonings must receive individual attention on their merits; on the persuasiveness of developers; and on the success of citizen opposition. Citizens have no idea what the vacant land next to them is slated to be used for, developers who own the land are not certain as to what uses it can be put and councillors do not seem to be concerned until the individual question comes before them.

The present zoning rules are nothing short of ridiculous -- there are more exceptions than there are rules. Having a completed District Area Plan would update all zoning rules in that area and these rules could be adhered to in the majority of cases with variations occurring only in very special circumstances. In this way developers would be cognizant of what the residents of an area wanted their area to look like; the residents would
feel secure in their knowledge of the way in which their community would develop; and councillors would not have to contend with a deluge of requests for zoning changes and variations.

Most of any Community Committee's time is taken up with matters of zoning and yet only 3 of 13 Community Committees have established subcommittees to deal exclusively with matters of zoning.

In terms of actual operation, the Community Committee is the first step a developer must take in seeking a re-zoning. When a developer makes application for a zoning variation, a public meeting must be held by the Community Committee to hear the developer, see his plans and get the opinions of the City Engineering Staff and of residents. These public meetings are, except in the case of East Kildonan, merely segments of a regular Community Committee meeting.

Developers, frustrated by the procedure and by resident opposition, have in some cases begun to deal privately with councillors before a public meeting is called. This type of activity has in at least one case, in St. James-Assiniboia, resulted in a court action being initiated to have the zoning decision quashed.

In some Community Committees, Resident Advisory Groups have the opportunity to discuss the proposals before the public hearing and to offer their opinions at the public hearing. In other cases Resident Advisory Groups hear the proposal at the public meeting and have the opportunity to comment upon it at that time.

Notices of public hearings must be advertised and citizens invited to attend and register their support or opposition to the proposals.
The Community Committee reaches a decision and the matter is then forwarded to Environment Committee where citizens and/or councillors may appear either in favour or in opposition to the Community Committee decision.

After the Environment Committee has reached a decision, the matter is forwarded to City Council where the decision is ratified or reversed. There are no delegations allowed to speak at the Council level. However, a decision of Council can be appealed to the Manitoba Municipal Board and a decision from there can be appealed directly to the Minister of Urban Affairs.

However, citizens can also very effectively halt developments at a much earlier stage, simply by filing a court action against a zoning decision. This has been done in a number of cases, notably against Safeway in Fort Rouge, and against Unicity Mall in St. James-Assiniboia.

With zoning being the major function of the Community Committee and the unusual amount of citizen involvement in zoning matters (and in all types of zoning matters -- signs, parking lots, etc., as well as large developments and subdivision, and these activities have occurred in all types of Community Committees) the function of the Community Committee to decentralize decision-making and to involve area residents seems to have been a success. According to this experience, legislated citizen participation can be a reality.

Aside from the responsibility to supervise local planning and development, the Community Committees were assigned other purposes. According to the Act, Community Committees should:
(1) Develop and implement techniques to maintain the closest possible communication with local citizens of the area in order to provide them with access to the regional government to express ideas, suggestions, problems, grievances, etc.;

(2) Develop and implement techniques to provide residents with information concerning existing and potential policies, programs and budgets so as to facilitate residents in discussing and developing views concerning these matters.

As for the first function, that of developing techniques for communication between the city and the residents of a community, it is unclear whether or not this has been done. Certainly there have been no innovative and exciting new communication techniques established vis-a-vis this problem. One thing is obvious though, in the absence of a local autonomous municipal authority, the Community Committee is the link between the regional council and the average citizen.

To the area resident, dealing with his local authority, nothing has changed. Nothing, however, until the resident wishes to oppose some policy or decision that is coming from his local representatives -- then in that case he does indeed have a greater degree of access to the decision-making authority than before. He can state his views at the lower Community Committee level, i.e., the RAG group, who will hopefully back him up when he makes his view known to the Community Committee level. That resident can then follow the decision through to one of the standing committees and then to Council itself.

It is not the access per se which is the important factor for the resident, but rather the kind of access which allows a resident to influence the decision-maker. In this system, the potential for influencing a decision at each stage of its development is an important one for the concept of participation.
It would appear then that in this instance, the system itself, even though councillors did not follow through with its spirit, was such that structural change alone made the difference and achieved its objective.

To say that citizen participation is not working is wrong, because it is working and it was stimulated and is presently being maintained by the structure alone.

This leads into the second function of the Community Committee -- the development and implementation of techniques to provide residents with information about city matters that might concern them. Only 3 Community Committees have committees specially set up to deal with the problems of information.

This would definitely appear to have been a failure. The failure in this case cannot be blamed on the structure because as has been stated, the structure seems to have worked in spite of the councillors inability to carry out any functions related to citizen participation. This failure on the councillors part is due, in the main, to their overall attitudes towards citizen involvement.

Only slightly over half of councillors believe that citizen participation is necessary and of the ones that do believe this, most feel that participation means attending Community Committee meetings and turning out on election day.

This reluctance to develop any new channels of communication between himself and the citizen regarding city policies and indeed the reluctance to give any information if those channels of communication exist, leads to the conclusion that councillors once elected find no further usefulness in the concept of citizen participation.
This is supported by some recent research done in Thunder Bay where "No alderman felt that it was necessary to establish any formal communication link with his constituents between elections and none seemed to go further in the assessment of public opinion on important (important, that is, in the perception of the alderman himself) issues than informal and chance contact with individuals in his own professional and social group". This study also found "that councillors were overwhelmingly anti-pathetic to the introduction of any devices into the municipal arena which would interfere with their freedom to decide upon issues in light of their individual view of what was best for the community and of what the electorate wanted." This will become very much more evident during the later discussion of the Resident Advisory Group system.

The whole question of development of techniques for two-way information flow is a very important one. In most areas the Community Committees have done nothing about this question. Only one area attempted anything innovative -- the Centennial Community Committee started putting out an eight page newspaper explaining who the resident advisors were, and what they were doing -- community conferences, district plans, important meetings. Councillors explained city plans and programs and asked for citizen views on what was happening in their area.


Councillors who have no faith in the concept of citizen participation are working to have the Community Committee system disbanded as soon as possible. They realize that it takes much longer than two years to generate in the overall citizenry the realization of the potential for citizen involvement and for the structure provided for it and therefore are moving now to have the structure disbanded.

Whatever the facts are, and they are clouded, it is apparent that there are serious doubts about the performance of the Community Committees. A majority of councillors expressed dissatisfaction with the Community Committees. This feeling was especially strong among suburban councillors who felt that the Community Committees did not have enough power. They were opposed in this opinion by inner city councillors who in fact thought that the Community Committees were too parochial.

Table 18

Councillors view of Role of Community Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Aggregate</th>
<th>Suburban</th>
<th>Inner City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied With the Role of Community Committees?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15 (30%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>9 (43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25 (50%)</td>
<td>17 (58%)</td>
<td>8 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>10 (20%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough power</td>
<td>14 (28%)</td>
<td>11 (38%)</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need more local control</td>
<td>12 (24%)</td>
<td>7 (24%)</td>
<td>5 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present supervisor role is enough</td>
<td>18 (36%)</td>
<td>11 (38%)</td>
<td>7 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA/DK</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 19
Councillors Views on Unification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Aggregate</th>
<th>Suburban</th>
<th>Inner City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has Unification Resulted In A More Efficient Administration?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16 (32%)</td>
<td>5 (18%)</td>
<td>11 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16 (32%)</td>
<td>12 (41%)</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>18 (36%)</td>
<td>12 (41%)</td>
<td>6 (29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The attitude of city officials towards community committees is a natural one -- they don't really like them and would be very much against giving them any more authority or power. As administrators, they can be expected to support the principle of centralized administration, and to view with suspicion any effort to decentralize the administrative structure. The view of the media people is that the community committees are not of much use. But, again these views are to be expected, from those whose beat is city hall and who reflect the orientation of the central organization.
E. RESIDENT ADVISORY GROUP PERFORMANCE

The Structure of Resident Advisory Groups

The Resident Advisory Group System built into the new local government structure was perhaps the most innovative aspect of the entire reorganization. It was an attempt to provide a legislated framework for citizen involvement. Interestingly enough, this concept which has been one of the most controversial and most discussed aspects of the entire legislation is presented in one small section of the Act.

Residents' advisory group.
21 (1) A residents' advisory group may be elected at any community conference referred to in subsection (1) of section 24, by the residents of the community who are present, from their number.

Manner of election etc.
21 (2) The number of members of the residents' advisory group, the manner of their election and the period for which they are to serve, may be determined by the residents present at the community conference during which the group is elected.

Recall of member.
21 (3) Any member of a residents' advisory group may be recalled by the residents present at a community conference for the community at any time.

Role of residents' advisory group.
21 (4) The role of a residents' advisory group is to advise and assist the members of the community committee for the community at whose conference they were elected, as to the performance of their functions under this Act.

Another interesting note is that at the time of the introduction of the legislation, most public discussion centered on the regional council administrative structures and the community committee structure, but there was very little mention of Resident Advisory Groups as such and very little elaboration of them and their role even in the Government's
White Papers. It was almost as though there was a very low level of expectation for these groups. All references to citizen participation are more within the concept of the community committees and not the Resident Advisory Groups. There is in fact only a passing reference to Resident Advisory Groups:

"There is provision also for residents of a community to have a group of local citizens whose task it would be to assist, advise and keep in close touch with the Community Committee....It was felt that these advisory groups could be another means of getting the community's message across strong and clear to the regional government."\(^{49}\)

Since that time, however, there has been much discussion of RAGs and much criticism of them. They have been referred to as 'ineffectual', as a 'failure', as 'meaningless' and press reports have tended to emphasize their problems.\(^{50}\) But if one looks at the number of volunteers organized on a constant and concerted basis and if one compares that with the rather low level of expectation held for these groups it becomes obvious that a number of citizens of Winnipeg are responding to the opportunity for participation opened by the Resident Advisory system. There are approximately 410 citizens who are registered as resident advisors in the various

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\(^{50}\) See Bob Lisoway, "Confused, Frustrated and Alienated", Winnipeg Free Press, November 18, 1972.
community committees in the city. The average rate of participation is approximately two-thirds or about 220 citizens (see Table 20).

On the other hand, if one is to measure the effectiveness of the RAG's by the number of people they reach then the picture is different. In 1971, 300 households were interviewed regarding their awareness of and their contact with their local RAG group and Community Committee. In 1973, 300 households again were interviewed regarding these questions. Of those 300 households, 190 were the same ones which had been interviewed in 1971. A comparison of these 190 households indicates that in 1971, 17% of the respondents had had contact with their alderman under the old system and in 1973, 12% had had contact with councillors under the new system. Taking the full sample of 300 households interviewed in the summer of 1973, 10.6% had some contact with a councillor, and only 5.6% knew a resident advisor from their area.

The absence of guidelines has also meant that the advisors have had to develop their own style of work and develop their own role and structure. In the first year of operation and the above mentioned qualification to the City of Winnipeg Act tended to limit the role of community committees to supervision of local services and Resident Advisory Groups to an advisory capacity. But within that definition, the various Resident Advisory Groups have taken the initiative in defining a role for private citizens to play in the structure of government on the neighbourhood level. So, there is both variety and experimentation in the present activity of the

51. Community Welfare Planning Council, Residents Advisory Groups, a compilation of Resident Advisors, meeting dates, etc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>No. of Wards</th>
<th>Advisors Per Ward</th>
<th>Total Advisors Per Ward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assiniboine Park</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kildonan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rouge</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Selkirk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Boniface</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vital</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kildonan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>579</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Resident Advisory groups; one that would establish a closer relationship between citizens and their elected representatives and also place in the hands of the people the opportunity to take a more active part in urban affairs.

When the framework was provided there were very good indications that the citizens would want to, and would in fact, become involved in the new institutions. These indications are based on the Winnipeg tradition of volunteerism and private citizen activism and in the recent and forceful activity of citizen groups in the lower income areas.

But the difference between becoming involved in your community and remaining involved in your community is a major one. The attitudes of the local councillors, the local administration and indeed, the local community per se, play a large role in the determination of the continuance of involvement. People will contribute only if they feel that their contribution is important, is being listened to, and is being considered in the act of decision-making.

The concept of participation appears to have been taken seriously only by the resident advisors and some senior provincial government Ministers and civil servants. By and large the administration, press and councillors were skeptical if not amused by the whole business of citizen participation. Saul Cherniack, the Minister responsible for the City of Winnipeg Act while it was being piloted through the legislature, said that the key to making Unicity work is an "aware and involved citizenry". For participation to work, several pre-requisites must be present, one of the most important being a climate for participation.
The climate for participation that the White Paper emphasized does not appear to be present. Most of the key participants such as councillors and senior administrators and even the press just do not believe in the concept. They see little value in citizen involvement. It becomes a "waste of time". One commissioner called citizen involvement "pious god-damned theory in the extreme". Councillors who have had to live with resident advisory groups for almost two years had more tolerant views. While the majority of councillors appear to believe that citizen participation is necessary to the functioning of local government, the reasons for their beliefs are varied.

There seem to be various theories of participation amongst the councillors. One councillor said that "educated and affluent people aren't interested in participation...only the people with lots of time to do nothing...and the radicals." Another councillor complained about "bickering at meetings...Resident Advisors are there for personal interest. They try to push the councillors around." Other councillors, such as Morris Kauffman, expressed a respect for participation, saying, "it's the spirit of local government...you need it."

Councillor Zuken remarked that "participation is curtailed by a negative approach by councillors. Advisors should raise questions and challenge councillors.....they can provide some leadership". Councillor George Munro continued in the same theme saying that citizens and advisors "should light fires under their councillors.....grill them on their activities and accomplishments and express the needs of the area".
While citizens turned out in large numbers in the initial rounds of electing resident advisory groups, interest seems to be diminishing now. Its at the level that it always was according to some suburban councillors. "Citizens have always participated in politics when there was something to talk about, to protest or to complain". Interestingly, councillors Wankling and Hallonquist noted that "participation is more successful in poorer areas and not affluent ones." This serves to support their theory of involvement being hinged upon the need to protest. (See Table 21.)

Another element that contributes to the climate of involvement is the work that citizens and advisors are offered in their attempts to participate.

If they were provided with interesting work then they would become involved. But many advisors complained about being given "a lot of detail and not policies" to discuss. The councillors reply that the problem is that "the role of advisors should be clarified" and that local politics often involves a lot of administrative drudgery and if they want to be involved they must be involved in everything.

Many resident advisors have taken the opportunity to be involved in local affairs very seriously and they have tested the limits of involvement. Some RAGs have been fortunate to get assistance and support either from professional members on the group or from various service agencies, and community development and research organizations. Fort Rouge and St. John's are two community committees that have had this support. There has been a movement lately by many of the groups to secure funding to begin to play a better role in their community. Meetings have been held by delegates of the various RAGs to form a central association of RAGs that could get funding and offer assistance in research and communication.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Attendance By Residents</th>
<th>Level of Communication with Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assiniboine Park</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(depends on issue)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kildonan</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(depends on issue)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rouge</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Selkirk</td>
<td>fair</td>
<td>fair (because of ward structure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Boniface</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vital</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kildonan</td>
<td>poor</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The difference between the councillors' views of the RAGs problems and the Resident Advisors' views illustrate a major problem between the two groups -- a communication problem. The problems of RAGs as seen by the councillors are difficulty in relating to the entire system and the lack of any clearly defined role for RAGs. These problems are beyond the scope of the councillors and therefore the blame can be attached to the provincial government rather than the Council.

However, the Resident Advisors say that their problems are due to their lack of power and lack of information. If blame were to be attached to these problems, it would fall upon the City Council and the respective Community Committees.

However, if the role of the RAGs is accepted as an advisory one, based on community outreach and feedback techniques, and if it is accepted that they have not been overwhelmingly successful, as indicated by Resident Advisory Group surveys and our second Public Opinion Survey, then the blame, if such is to be attached, must be attached to all parties -- the provincial government, the City Council, the Community Committees and the Resident Advisory Groups themselves.

The provincial government created the Community Committee and the Resident Advisory Group system and they prognosticated great things for them, but they provided for none of the back-up services which have proven so necessary. However, the hands-off stance of the provincial government, at least during the transition period, would probably be the most correct one. However, the provincial government would have been correct in providing some form of incentive and encouragement, such as plans which would have provided provincial financial assistance only if the Community Committees
and Resident Advisory Groups were included in the planning and implementation of these programs.

City Council has not proven itself dedicated to the concept of citizen participation. The first attempt by councillors to provide resources to RAGs was "shelved", according to one of the daily newspapers. The proposal by Councillor Morris Kaufman was to establish an information service for citizens and resident advisors to assist them in obtaining technical information. The Deputy Mayor in Executive Policy Committee said to the proposal, "I would like to see it put back in the trash can where it belongs." Other executive policy councillors feared that giving the RAGs support could result in a two-tier system of government that amalgamation was designed to overcome. In addition, they feared that it could encourage political activism amongst Resident Advisory Groups who are expected to advise and not agitate.

As the accompanying table indicates, the Councillors generally think that the RAGs have had limited success in their first year of operation. But, when asked if they think RAGs require additional support - a request made by many citizen members of the Resident Advisory Groups - nearly half the councillors are against such a move. However, of these councillors, most of them came from the suburban area, and also come from those who were against Unicity.

Table 22
Councillors' Views on Resident Advisory Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Have Resident Advisory Groups Been Successful?</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Inner City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25(50%)</td>
<td>14(48%)</td>
<td>11(53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11(22%)</td>
<td>5(17%)</td>
<td>6(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K.</td>
<td>7(28%)</td>
<td>10(35%)</td>
<td>4(18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do Resident Advisory Groups Require Additional Support?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17(34%)</td>
<td>8(28%)</td>
<td>9(43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24(48%)</td>
<td>16(55%)</td>
<td>8(38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K.</td>
<td>9(18%)</td>
<td>5(17%)</td>
<td>4(19%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this discussion, it appears that many councillors feel that the role of the citizen in decision-making is through the "partial participation" approach. However, one can question the validity of applying this term to the present situation, as RAGs often do not have sufficient information to make an effective suggestion. If Council is not releasing information on issues until it has made a decision, regardless of whether it was made in one of the Council Committees or by one of the City commissioners, the role of the citizen is then reduced to "pseudo-participation".
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Type of Office</th>
<th>Support Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assiniboine Park</td>
<td>old civic office</td>
<td>previous civic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>separate office</td>
<td>some from OFY projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Kildonan</td>
<td>old civic office</td>
<td>previous civic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>old civic office</td>
<td>previous civic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Rouge</td>
<td>new office</td>
<td>LIP and STEP, CYC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Selkirk</td>
<td>new office</td>
<td>project unicity, Robertson House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>new office</td>
<td>hired secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Boniface</td>
<td>old civic office</td>
<td>previous civic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James</td>
<td>old civic office</td>
<td>previous civic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
<td>new office</td>
<td>project unicity, Robertson House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vital</td>
<td>old civic office</td>
<td>previous civic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
<td>old civic office</td>
<td>previous civic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kildonan</td>
<td>old civic office</td>
<td>previous civic staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At present there is a great deal of ambivalence and indetermination in the attitudes of city councillors towards the concepts of citizen participation and involvement. What is needed is a demonstration of the ability and capacity of RAGs to aid the councillors in the formulation of their ideas. It can also be seen that RAGs are somewhat weak in this area and that a central resource group could greatly aid them in the achievement of their objectives.

It is also important to note that the apparent lack of attention given by councillors to the role of the Resident Advisory Group is also due to the pressure of other pressing city problems. When one looks at many minor squabbles and the plethora of details which councillors find themselves immersed in, the present difficulties faced in council-administration relationships, one can understand the limited concern about Resident Advisory Groups.

The Community Committees, for their part, have tended to relegate many of their functions such as communication with and involvement of the general citizenry to the RAGs but they have not given them any resources or direction. They have also in many cases enveloped the RAGs into very formal and procedural situations with parliamentary rules, which has seemed to stifle some degree of involvement and interest.

Indeed, even the physical surroundings have an effect on the behaviour and attitude of citizens wishing to become involved. (See Table 23). It has been observed that citizen participation operating out of former municipal council chambers tends to be much more restrained and sparse than citizen participation operating out of less formal and foreboding environments. Then these councillors hold at the local level the same beliefs which they express only at the Council level.
The RAGs themselves must accept a good deal of the fault of not fostering citizen involvement. Because of the formality of RAG elections and meetings and because of the closed-group atmosphere of many of them, the advisors in many cases tend to view themselves as an elite group elected to represent the people and not to work with them. The chairman of the St. James-Assiniboia RAG remarked "the people elected me to act for them and if they don't like what I do they can elect someone else next year". This attitude does not exactly foster citizen participation.

RAGs also tend to become involved in many trivial administrative details and thus frustrate and alienate many people who wish to contribute to the larger policy discussions which face any urban center.

Operation of RAGs

The following observations can be made concerning the present Resident Advisory Group operation:

1) Most people who are working actively on the groups are people who care about their community and who have particular interests either in recreation, planning or even business interests. Our research indicates that approximately 80% of all advisors had been previously involved in community affairs. The types of community involvement

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53. Interviews.

54. In this respect, Resident Advisors conform very closely to the description of "community actors" used by Scott Greer. See Scott Greer, The Urbane View, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, Chapter 9.
indicated range from political involvement, to community clubs, school boards and church groups. (For a further elaboration, see Table 24.)

This is in keeping with the study of Verba and Nie, who found that activists tended to feel very civic minded. 55

2) The ways that the advisors have structured themselves show much diversity. There are varying numbers of advisors per group: ranging from twelve in St. Vital (4 for each of 3 wards) to about fifty in St. Boniface. The forms of election vary with some groups electing a fixed limited number of representatives while other groups elect all interested people regardless of numbers. The total number of advisors per community committee ranges from 200 in St. Boniface to 15 in West Kildonan and the manner of elections varies from Fort Rouge where all interested and concerned residents present at a Community Conference may become members of the Resident Advisory Group; to St. James-Assiniboia where the number of advisors allowed per ward is fixed and where each ward under the leadership of a councillor chooses a slate of candidates to be endorsed at the Community Conference. (For a further explanation, see Table 20.

In the first year, some groups, like Fort Garry, were organized in committees on planning, public works, recreation, only and never met as a whole, while others, such as Lord Selkirk, were organized on the ward level in committees and also met as a whole. After the first year, the groups have restructured themselves to include co-ordinating committees

Table 24
Leadership Search RAG Sample
of Three Active Indigenous Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Been Involved in Community Before</th>
<th>Type of Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSINIBOINE PARK</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Community Club, Civic Organizations politically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>politically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTENNIAL</td>
<td>yes no no</td>
<td>self-help groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST KILDONAN</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Parks and Library Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT GARRY</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Private Clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>social groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT ROUGE</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Community Planning Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School Board, politically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>politically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORD SELKIRK</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>politically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>politically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDLAND</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Union, politically involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ran as Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. BONIFACE</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>politically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JAMES</td>
<td>no yes yes</td>
<td>YMCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>politically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JOHN'S</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Tenants Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School Assoc./ Homeowners Assoc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. VITAL</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Community Club, Community Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School Board, home and school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANScona</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>civic organization - Jaycees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Church, community volunteer work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Church, Community Club, School Trustee, Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST KILDONAN</td>
<td>yes yes yes</td>
<td>Civic Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>politically active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and executives to handle detail work and improve the operation of the regular committees. Some groups have only two committees, as in Midland, while others in St. Vital and St. Boniface, have upwards of ten committees. Some Community Committees, like East Kildonan, have the RAG group organized in committees which are chaired by councillors. These committees are specific standing-type committees which very rarely get together to meet with all other committees.

Both Lord Selkirk and St. Boniface have executive committees which deal with much of the administrative detail before it reaches the level of the entire RAG group or the appropriate committee, whichever may be the case. Eleven out of the thirteen RAGs meet as a whole and all of them have some type of committee structure although four have primarily ad-hoc committees. (See Table 25).

3) There is also much diversity in their agenda and discussion areas.

Some, like St. Boniface, consider a lot of administrative details and have over ten committees working in various areas. Others have only two or three standing committees as in Midland, while others establish ad hoc committees struck off for a special purpose such as Lord Selkirk. Some concern themselves with the most minute details and operate in a very Parliamentary, formal style while others are more informal and discuss planning and policies and longer range issues.

St. James seems to be the only RAG whose style of operation has become more formal than before. In the other twelve there has been a
### Table 25

**Resident Advisory Group Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Meets As A Whole</th>
<th>Meet In Wards</th>
<th>Committee Structure</th>
<th>No. of Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSINIBOINE PARK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTENNIAL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>ad hoc committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST KILDONAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT GARRY</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT ROUGE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>ad hoc committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORD SELKIRK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
<td>ad hoc committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDLAND</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. BONIFACE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JAMES</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JOHN'S</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. VITAL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Committees</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSCONA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST KILDONAN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>ad hoc committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tendency to move towards a more open casual style. (See Table 26).

Some of the suburban areas, like Assiniboine Park, St. James and Fort Garry are flooded with zoning variations and zoning changes while other inner city resident advisory groups, like Centennial, Midland and Lord Selkirk, deal more with broader issues such as District Area Planning.

From our research, it seems evident that those RAGs which represent old suburban municipalities are for the most part more concerned with administrative details, while those in the inner-city are more concerned with the larger, more policy oriented issues. This fact is explained primarily in terms of areas where previous councils performed basically caretaker functions and where this mentality has been propagated. Resident Advisors who spend a great deal of time discussing curb cuts, placement of stop signs and snow removal would seem in many cases to be doing so because that is all they are given to discuss. A matter of initiative then becomes the major difference between those RAGs immersed in administrative detail and those actually working on issues which may shape the future face of the city. (See Table 27).

These suburban activists do not fit completely into Verba and Nie's classification of Complete Activists but fit more in some cases into their classification of 'Parochial Participants' to some degree mainly with their narrow vision and low degree of issue extremity. They are also to a degree what Verba calls 'Communalists' a term most of them would violently object to. But according to Verba and Nie 'Communalists' "engage in activity requiring a high degree of initiative -

56. Sydney Verba and Norman Nie, Ibid., p. 87. See accompanying table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Participator</th>
<th>Main Characteristics of Activity Pattern</th>
<th>Skill and Competence</th>
<th>Involvement in Conflict and Cleavage</th>
<th>Civic Mindedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inactives</td>
<td>No activity.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting specialists</td>
<td>Act requiring little initiative but performed against counterparticipants.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parochial participants</td>
<td>Act requiring initiative but with a narrow, personal outcome. Probably little conflict involved.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communalists</td>
<td>Act requiring initiative, and with a broad social outcome, but relatively nonconflictual.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan activists</td>
<td>Act requiring moderate initiative; broad social outcome; relatively conflictual.</td>
<td>Medium/ High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High/ Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete activists</td>
<td>All activities.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 27
Resident Advisory Group Style of Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formal, Parliamentary Style</th>
<th>Informal, More Casual Style</th>
<th>Attendance by Councillors</th>
<th>Frequency of Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSINIBOINE PARK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTENNIAL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST KILDONAN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT GARRY</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT ROUGE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORD SELKIRK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDLAND</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. BONIFACE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JAMES</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JOHN'S</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. VITAL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Twice a Month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANScona</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Twice a Month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST KILDONAN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>Kinds of Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSINIBOINE PARK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>zoning, storm sewers, parking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTENNIAL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST KILDONAN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>police and fire amalgamation, public works, recreation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT GARRY</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>zoning, budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT ROUGE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>zoning, welfare, development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORD SELKIRK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDLAND</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Irwick-Currie, Downtown Development, WATS.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. BONIFACE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>zoning, signs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JAMES</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>zoning, recreation, public housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JOHN'S</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>zoning, signs, recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. VITAL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>planning, rail study</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSCONA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>planning, policy decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST KILDONAN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>zoning, public housing, overpass</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
activity that seems to involve general communal goals rather than overt conflict among contending parties. Thus we expect them to be high in their psychological involvement in politics, in their skill and competence, and in their sense of community contribution. They ought to be particularly low in their involvement in conflict, cleavage, and issue orientation.57

There are of course many major differences between this study, and the one done by Verba and Nie but there are also many parallels which can be drawn and done so with a good deal of validity.

4) Many groups have good relationships with their councillors where councillors listen to the views of advisors, give them support and assistance and have a healthy respect and appreciation for citizen participation. Other groups, however, have poorer relationships where the councillors are still unconvinced about the value of citizen advisors. The result is an inattentive ear by councillors and a sense of frustration on the part of advisors. There have been some disappointments on zoning questions where citizens and advisors were against proposals but they went through anyway, such as in Ft. Rouge over the Safeway Development proposal.58

57. Verba and Nie, Ibid., p. 86.
58. This was an application for rezoning by Safeway Limited for a new shopping center which would have resulted in the tearing down of several units of older housing. Petitions were signed by upwards of 800 residents, but the community was itself divided on the nature of the project.
5) There are also differences in the resources and assistance available to advisory groups. Some inner city groups were a long time in finding a community committee office and in receiving secretarial assistance. All of the suburban community committees, which correspond to the older suburban municipalities, have technical assistance from the various departments and these experts, like the city engineers and planners, attend meetings of the Resident Advisory Groups and subcommittee meetings while inner city Resident Advisory Groups and even their community committees have difficulty in getting planning help from the administration except for zoning matters. But this inequality is being eroded through amalgamation as staff are being transferred from the old municipal offices into central administrative positions.

6) Some groups show initiative in doing their own research, meeting frequently, debating large issues, trying to reach out into the general community, while others play a more passive role, merely responding to matters referred to them by central council and the community committee and concerning themselves with the administrative work of the old municipal councils.

This is a consequence of some resident advisors interpreting the role of RAGs to be limited to consultation, while others see a more expansive role.

Some groups have been left to work on their own with the support of their councillors while others have had research and resource people helping them in their work. The result has been better communication, more discussion of issues and larger participation by the ordinary residents in the areas like Fort Rouge, Lord Selkirk and St. Johns.
Recently there have been efforts to extend resources to all the resident advisors who need them. The minimum needs for all groups are clerical assistance in typing, taking minutes, filing, copying and preparing mailings. Each group needs this as a minimum and at the date of this writing, these minimum services are being supplied by every community committee with varying degrees of satisfaction to advisors.

**Act and the Future of RAGs**

As a result of discussions held by certain Resident Advisors in various groups, it was decided to call a conference of all RAGs. A meeting of the RAGs occurred, June 15, 1972, to share and discuss progress and problems. At that meeting a steering committee was struck off composed of those Resident Advisors present as well as resource people from the Community Welfare Planning Council, YMCA, CYC, Neighborhood Service Centres, Robertson House, etc. The steering committee met October 2, 1972 to discuss alternative ways of improving RAGs. The feeling at this meeting was that some action should be taken to pull together a resource group. It was decided to develop a proposal for an organization and to approach each individual RAG with it. The expectation was that each RAG would respond to the proposal by accepting the idea of an association and appointing a delegate to a steering committee to plan the association.

By the winter of 1972-73, the delegates began to meet to work out the nature of the association. The first meeting of ACT delegates involved representatives from ten of the thirteen Resident Advisory Groups. The meetings continued through the winter in 1973 when it was decided to approach the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs for funding for an association.
ACT was composed of ten official delegates from the Resident Advisory Groups but the other three RAGs have been represented by an advisor at the meetings and they continue to observe, report back to their groups and participate in the discussions and planning.

Stated very simply, the basic objective of the proposed organization was to provide a needed resource base for all Resident Advisory Groups. In more specific terms, the ACT delegates were able to agree upon the following objectives for an organization:

1) collect and co-ordinate information presently unavailable in the community;
2) devise ways of getting needed information which is not currently available through a technical resource pool;
3) provide resources for RAGs to reach out into their communities and gain an understanding of their needs;
4) assist RAGs in developing their internal structure, aims and methods of working;
5) maintain an on-going interchange between RAGs so that they can continue to learn from their fellow RAGs and to share common concerns and new techniques;
6) to strengthen RAGs to the point where they form a tight coalition for action with their councillors and develop an information based forum so that RAGs and other community groups can work together on city-wide concerns.

The association, as it was then called, would be governed by a co-ordinating council or board composed of representatives from each RAG. The organization would have staff to perform clerical and administrative functions, research and fact pool building functions, and communication
resources with and between RAGs. Added to this would be a resource pool of community organizations and resource organizations.

Based on these objectives, the ACT organization submitted to the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, a submission for funds to support such an organization.

The submission was held up by the city in the Tri-Level Committee and the idea was rejected by the City Executive Policy Committee. It was thought for awhile that the idea was dead but on October 17, Winnipeg City Council in a surprise turn around, agreed to accept the Federal Government's offer of $230,000 over two years.

Included in this package from the Federal Government was $25,000 for the City to establish the position of Information Officer to aid the City in getting information out. This decision of the city was a surprising one after the fears expressed previously by many councillors -- but the reason for the change of heart may have had something to do with the joint strength that the RAG groups were showing and with the accountability which councillors were suddenly faced with.

At this writing, however, the Federal Government has not yet approved the proposal and the RAGs are continuing much as before. Legislated citizen participation, as the RAG system has been referred to, is not the panacea for all of the ills of our urban systems.

The transition period for new Council structure will probably be much shorter than that for the Resident Advisory Group structure. The new Council is not a radical departure from tradition; the Resident Advisory Group structure is, and as such will require a longer period of
gestation before its potential will be realized.

And, the system does have potential. An easily recognizable vehicle for involvement on the community level is there and, though it has to date drawn only the activists, that is to be expected, especially in the transition period. But, as case studies in the following section will demonstrate, when an issue of some concern appears, then the average citizen can use the RAGs to express his feeling, gain information, and mobilize support for one position or another.

The RAG system has led people to become more involved on a more constant level than has been the case in the past. The RAG system started off with great expectations, became bogged down in bureaucracy and parochialism and has in some areas lost all drive. The creation of ACT added a new dimension to the RAGs and the federal money could, if approved, reinforce them even further. On an overall assessment, their performance during the initial period has been, as compared to what traditionally it was, very encouraging and they deserve the opportunity to complete the very difficult transition from yesterday to tomorrow.

But, there must be some major changes. To begin with, City Council must take a far more active role in defining the position of RAGs. For many politicians, the RAGs were a new idea and many saw them basically as a source of opposition. At the same time, because RAGs were populated by activists who often tended to be critics, they reinforced the negative image councillors held of RAGs.

To overcome this, Council could set up a special committee to develop a policy of Council on RAGs and citizen involvement, and to work
with RAG members to define responsibilities. The possibility of federal support for research and information services for RAGs provides an opportunity for joint consultation between councillors and RAG members. Council should move soon to deal with the problem of RAGs.

The provincial government could also assist by providing assistance to the city to provide support services for RAGs and to set out in amendments to the City of Winnipeg a clear description of the function RAGs should perform in the overall structure of city government. In other words, as is true with other aspects of the new city structure, things were left incomplete. The idea of RACs was a good one. But, there was not much followthrough to insure that they would become viable institutions. The transition period shows that in respect to RAGs, the job of creating a new vehicle for citizen involvement in Winnipeg has really just begun.
SECTION IV

THE TRANSITION ISSUES

* ISSUE ORIENTATION
* DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT
* TRIZEC
* NEW DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES
* METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN
* ZONING AND LAND USE
* PUBLIC HOUSING
* TRANSPORTATION CASE STUDY
This section of the report will examine the way Council dealt with issues in its first two years of operation. To begin with, there will be an overview of voting patterns to see if there are any basic alignments in the new system of government. Then, there will be a series of case studies in the areas of housing, planning, and of development in an effort to determine the process that was followed and to determine patterns in the operation of the new system. From these two approaches, there should be some indication of whether the new system has made a difference in the treatment of issues.

**Issue Orientation**

The pattern of councillor support on issues shows an initial trend on Council in favour of policies of growth and development. This trend is most pronounced in the ICEC caucus, and among suburban councillors. For example, Table 28 shows voting patterns on four issues that can be viewed as development issues: the building of the convention centre, the support of a grant to the Industrial Development Board, the re-zoning of Unicity Mall (a major shopping centre complex in Assiniboia opposed by the Commissioner of Environment) and support for the Trizec proposal (a major complex to be built on the corner of Portage and Main).

On these issues there is a tendency for the Council as a whole to strongly support the pro-development position, reflecting the very strong support coming from ICEC members, particularly those from the outer city or suburban wards. NDP support is generally opposed to the development
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>37</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Inner City</td>
<td>ICEC</td>
<td>NDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Building Convention Centre</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>10(20%)</td>
<td>3(10%)</td>
<td>7(33%)</td>
<td>4(11%)</td>
<td>6(57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>5(10%)</td>
<td>4(14%)</td>
<td>1(5%)</td>
<td>4(11%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grant to IDB</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20(40%)</td>
<td>12(41%)</td>
<td>8(38%)</td>
<td>18(49%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>21(42%)</td>
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<td>10(48%)</td>
<td>14(38%)</td>
<td>4(58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>9(18%)</td>
<td>6(21%)</td>
<td>3(14%)</td>
<td>5(13%)</td>
<td>2(28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unicity Mall</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33(66%)</td>
<td>23(80%)</td>
<td>10(48%)</td>
<td>28(74%)</td>
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<td>3(10%)</td>
<td>9(43%)</td>
<td>5(13%)</td>
<td>5(72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>5(10%)</td>
<td>3(10%)</td>
<td>2(9%)</td>
<td>5(13%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trizec</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36(72%)</td>
<td>24(82%)</td>
<td>12(57%)</td>
<td>30(81%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8(16%)</td>
<td>1(3%)</td>
<td>7(33%)</td>
<td>2(5%)</td>
<td>5(72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>6(12%)</td>
<td>4(15%)</td>
<td>2(10%)</td>
<td>5(14%)</td>
<td>1(14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
issues, with the exception of one councillor. This pattern is not noticeably different from the previous orientation of the old Metro Council or previous municipalities. The structural change has not, therefore, resulted in a policy shift. However, where the institutional change appears to have had an impact is in giving outer city political forces increasing control of the city government apparatus. Because of the shift in population, political power has shifted to the suburbs and the councillors representing these areas reflect the views of this middle income, property owning group who are very conscious and supportive of programs that appear to generate revenue and keep taxes down. It would be far more difficult for a reform, anti-development group to gain a majority in Winnipeg than in Toronto, because Winnipeg's unified system gives the suburban politicians power for the whole system, while in Toronto the suburbs and the central city are separate jurisdictions and the power is divided. Equally, the objective laid out in the provincial government's White Paper of insuring that the enlarged city could better tackle inner city social problems may in fact be more frustrated under re-organization than before, because of the new political alignments. The pre-eminence of suburban interests is not likely to lead to a priority being placed on social issues. This can be seen in examining voting patterns on the cluster of issues that constitute approaches toward social initiatives of city government. The pattern of cleavage between inner and outer city councillors, or ICEC and NDP, is not sharp, indicating a lack of clear focus or leadership in these issues. In a series of questions asked relating to councillors' stands on the following "social" issues: support
Table 29
Councillors' Views on Selected Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>37</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>Inner City</td>
<td>ICEC</td>
<td>NDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Versus Private Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3(6%)</td>
<td>2(7%)</td>
<td>1(5%)</td>
<td>1(3%)</td>
<td>1(17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14(28%)</td>
<td>9(31%)</td>
<td>5(24%)</td>
<td>11(30%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>33(66%)</td>
<td>16(55%)</td>
<td>15(71%)</td>
<td>24(65%)</td>
<td>5(83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Staff for Home Inspection</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>13(45%)</td>
<td>13(62%)</td>
<td>19(51%)</td>
<td>4(67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6(21%)</td>
<td>3(14%)</td>
<td>7(19%)</td>
<td>1(17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>10(35%)</td>
<td>5(24%)</td>
<td>10(27%)</td>
<td>1(17%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant to Mount Carmel Clinic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16(32%)</td>
<td>9(31%)</td>
<td>7(33%)</td>
<td>9(24%)</td>
<td>4(17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16(32%)</td>
<td>6(21%)</td>
<td>10(48%)</td>
<td>14(38%)</td>
<td>1(17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>14(48%)</td>
<td>4(19%)</td>
<td>1(3%)</td>
<td>1(17%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Power to RAGs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10(20%)</td>
<td>7(24%)</td>
<td>3(14%)</td>
<td>6(16%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>26(52%)</td>
<td>15(52%)</td>
<td>11(52%)</td>
<td>22(60%)</td>
<td>2(33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K./N.A.</td>
<td>7(24%)</td>
<td>7(33%)</td>
<td>9(24%)</td>
<td>4(67%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of public housing, increasing staff for public health home inspections, a grant to the Mount Carmel Clinic, and giving more assistance to Resident Advisory Groups, the voting patterns show closer similarities in support.

This pattern of pro-development decision-making and limited initiatives on social issues should not be surprising. Other authors, particularly Harold Kaplan in his examination of the Metro system of Toronto, have observed how the politics of regional government support physical development projects, while ignoring social issues. The fact is that capital works and development projects can be accepted by most councillors because they fit the conventional wisdom of municipal government that growth is good because it contributes increased tax revenue and contributes to a thriving city.

On the other hand, programs to tackle such problems as inner city poverty, reform of social assistance, demands for low cost housing, protection of the urban environment engender strong conflicts and require some degree of leadership to carry them forward. As recent studies have shown, local government systems that have some degree of partisan politics are more likely to deal with such issues. Here the weaknesses of the present political arrangements are most evident, and have little to do with the structure or form of the system.

The situation in Winnipeg, however, is not static. As the case studies will show, there are forces emerging which take issue with a one-sided development approach and which are having some influence on the


politics of Council. The new structure of city government gives these new political forces an arena in which to operate; namely, through the system of the RAGs and Community Committees, as will be seen in the study of the dispute over railway relocation. Therefore, the structure is having some impact on the character of politics, but it will be a long term impact and still in a state of limited animation.

Also of importance is the manner in which the changes in the system have affected the overall development process. Bill 36 included a number of provisions on the procedures to be followed in processing building applications and zoning changes. These have been the cause of controversy with the housebuilders in the city claiming, in particular, that this is a major cause of the severe shortage of land, the low number of housing starts, and the escalating rise in housing prices. 61

To more fully assess this relationship between the new structure of government and the politics and process of development, a series of events related to development issues are reviewed in the following section. From these cases, one can begin to develop a better sense of what has happened over the past two years.

Downtown Development

When the majority group (ICEC) of Council took office, it had no development policy for Winnipeg's downtown area. The major initiative on the books was the Downtown Development Plan which had been approved by the former City of Winnipeg Council and the Manitoba Legislature. The

Downtown Development Plan was a program to encourage $126 million of private investment in the city centre through the public spending of $46 million on parks, parking facilities and public buildings. This plan included the Winnipeg Convention Centre, the central library at Graham Avenue between Donald and Smith, and the Trizec Development, while not specifically mentioned in the plan, suited the general objectives of the Downtown Development Plan. Although Council continued with the Convention Centre and with the central library and although it initiated the Trizec arrangement, it has never officially endorsed the plan.

The Downtown Development Plan, which originated under Metro, had allotted $15 million of public money for the construction of the Convention Centre. Following the commencement of excavation for this, developers announced that they were ready to go ahead with the construction of hotels, apartment buildings and office towers.

It would appear that the Convention Centre did indeed provide the catalyst for intensive private enterprise building activity in the downtown. This activity includes a twenty storey apartment tower and the Lakeview Square development consisting of a nineteen storey hotel, two 250 suite apartment buildings, an office tower and a second hotel or office tower. The buildings of Lakeview Square are to be woven together by a Japanese Garden financed by the City, the Province and the Japanese Government. This activity in turn has spawned the development of numerous small specialty restaurants and the prospect of future major initiatives in the downtown area is imminent.

When the new Council came into office, they had to face the reality that construction had begun on the Convention Centre, that private activity dependent on the completion of the Convention Centre was in process, so they had no real choice but to agree with and continue the project. This the Council did in February of 1972, when it delegated to the subcommittees on the Convention Centre the authority to make and implement decisions regarding the design and construction of the Convention Centre.

In 1971, before the Convention Centre construction got under way, the cost was set at $15 million, half of which would be paid by the Province. But costs continued rising and by November of 1972, City Council had to vote for an increase in cost of over $8 million, bringing the total cost to over $23 million. The Province, however, said they were committed to paying only $7.5 million and that the increase of over $8 million would have to be born by the City alone.

What was never documented, at least publicly, was whether the increase in public expenditure of $8 million would be balanced in terms of increments in property revenue and revenue generated from the new commercial establishments. While the Convention Centre undoubtedly sparked growth, the question still is open on whether it was a good economic deal. Indications are that revenue from the property and business taxes on new construction already committed will be over $3 million, which would cover amortization costs of the Convention Centre. A proper economic assessment of Convention Centre impact, however, would be worthwhile.
Many councillors recognize this lack of information, but Council dealt with this issue with little questioning and little expressed disagreement, although it is difficult to determine what might have been said behind closed doors or in the corridors. It reveals how the easy acceptance of development proposals with little questioning at the time of decision can lead to unintended results and increases in costs at a later date.

The new Council acted no differently from its predecessors in this respect. Proposals for "growth" projects were championed by a few key councillors who possessed what appeared to be irrefutable arguments to back up their case. There were not councillors of an anti-growth attitude who possessed equal information or influence. Thus, the debate on such projects, at least in the public forums, was very limited. And the new system of government has done little to change this state of affairs. Decisions on development projects are still basically unexamined in terms of the full range of costs and benefits that should be explored. City government does not employ a rational system of decision-making on development issues, which lays out the full equation of return for major public investments. If jobs, economic growth and increased municipal revenue are major objectives of city government, the issue of how to best solve them is rarely asked. It is assumed that large scale development is the answer, although evidence is beginning to mount that such is not the case.63

63. While a full assessment of the cost-benefit of Winnipeg downtown development is not available, other studies have been done that show how city governments rarely estimate real costs, and often inflate expected revenue. For example, see Robert Kessler, Chester Hartman, "The Illusion and Reality of Urban Renewal: Case Study of San Francisco's Yerba Buena Center", *Land Economics*, November 1973, Vol. XLIX, No. 4.
The careless manner with which development proposals are treated is most apparent in the example of the Trizec agreement.

As mentioned previously, the Downtown Development Plan called for the stimulation of private construction in the downtown by a variety of methods. One of these was City financed parking structures.

In 1971 there were informal discussions about a Bank of Nova Scotia development at the corner of Portage and Main and in 1972 when the new Council took office there were no formal binding development agreements covering this project.

During the spring and summer of 1972, the City entered into formal discussions with Trizec Holdings Ltd., the largest landlord in Canada. The City and Trizec controlled most of the land on the west side of Main Street between Portage Avenue and Graham Avenue. It seemed, therefore, to the new Council to be an excellent opportunity to jointly develop this corner in accordance with the Downtown Development Plan.

The proposal called for a $65 to $80 million development, with the city building a 1,000 car parking structure and leasing the air rights to Trizec which would build a Bank of Nova Scotia building and two office towers. The city would lease the air rights for 99 years at 7% a year of 50% of the total land acquisition costs. This was agreed to in principle by the City Council in June 1972.

64. Because this study has set a limit of looking at the first two years of the system, some of these cases are superseded by recent events. In the case of Trizec, Council made final decisions on the proposal in January of 1973 and development is now beginning on the city parking structure.
The public announcement of the proposal was accompanied by very impressive and exciting information about the benefits this new project would provide. The newspaper reports of that month spoke glowingly of the excellent deal the city was getting in this instance.

It would cost the city $8 million to build the parking structure. Amortized over 20 years this would cost the city $935,000 a year. But, the revenue to the city would be $1,510,000 a year, thereby giving the city a profit of $575,000 compared to its past tax revenue of $90,000 a year for that site.

However, as discussions progressed, it became more questionable as to how sound the arrangement really would be. Environment Committee, in their discussion of the arrangement, came up with four points which they felt were essential for Trizec to agree with:

1. The agreement committed the city to building the parking garage but did not commit Trizec to build the forty storey office tower above it.
2. The agreement did not have any time limit during which Trizec had to enter into a proper development agreement. Without this, Trizec could have, in effect, a ninety-nine year option on the air rights.
3. The company established to build and manage the complex should have some assets. The company Trizec planned to establish would have no assets other than its lease on the air rights.
4. The agreement did not prevent Trizec from assigning the lease to someone else. This would mean Trizec would have no obligation to build and neither would the new company holding the lease.

In other words, Trizec was having to commit very little; the City a great deal -- a questionable situation for the City to be in.
The entire question by this time was becoming an item of public discussion, but City Council acted quickly to ensure that a decision was made. Trizec, Executive Policy Committee and Environment Committee met in a closed meeting and the agreement was approved with no changes in Trizec's position. City Council then, operating primarily through the committee system which is closed to the public and the press, with no real debate in full Council, quickly approved the agreement.

This issue well demonstrates Council's capacity to quickly decide on issues and its willingness to make concessions for fear of losing development. It also demonstrates a continuing pattern of unquestioning acceptance of development projects based on limited information.

This would seem to indicate that the 50 man Council structure and the standing committees can indeed work efficiently; and when the ICEC wants to, it can operate as a party. The key role in this process is played by the committees where the ICEC is dominant and where the chairman of each of the committees, each of whom is from a suburban seat, has particular influence. In fact, after the first year of Council, there was a mini purge on the committees with the result that during 1972 the crucial Environment Committee had no NDP members and only two independents out of a total of eleven members. The reason it works well for development issues is primarily due to strong pro-development attitudes of many suburban ICEC councillors who have a majority on Council and in the committees and who occupy the crucial positions of Standing Committee Chairmen. It does not work on social issues because no one group is strong enough and concerned enough to make a concerted effort to sell their
ideas in these areas. When decisions cannot be reached on these issues, the blame is put on the structure. But if the structure can function efficiently on some issues then it has the potential to be able to do so on other issues. There was after all only a period of three weeks of decision-making process for the initial decision on the Trizec issue.

Following the settlement of an agreement, Councillors who had voted in favour of the issue began to say, as they had following the Convention Centre question, that they had been misled and that they voted on the basis of very little of the available information.

This would seem, however, simply an attempt to rationalize their real voting motivations. Trizec came up again briefly in October of 1973, over a year later. The question was regarding demolition of the Portage and Main site. The deadline for tenders had been the beginning of September, but Trizec waited until a few hours before a City Council meeting six weeks later to submit tenders to City Hall. In this case, the mayor acted as the salesman when he brought the issue up five minutes before the Council was due to adjourn. He claimed that if an immediate decision was made on the tender the City could save $20,000. Some opposition to the quick decision began to become apparent so the mayor quickly suggested that the Executive Policy Committee be delegated authority to deal with the tenders on the following morning. The Executive Policy Committee, a very pro-development body, made the decision with the help of the mayor, who is the chairman of the Committee.

A further indication of the present Council's ability to decide efficiently is the ready acceptance of a walkway connecting the Richardson
complex on one side of Portage and Main with Trizec and commercial ventures on the other side. A $60,000 feasibility study was commissioned. Its findings for an underground system were disregarded as being too expensive but a $2.4 million budget was set aside to build some form of connecting link. This was a further public subsidy to the benefit of commercial downtown groups, again approved with little discussion or debate.65

**New Downtown Development Guidelines**

In October of 1972 the Environment Committee discussed and approved the Downtown Development Plan. The Plan was then forwarded to Executive Policy Committee, which referred it back to the Committees on Finance and Works and Operations.

The question of the Downtown Development Plan did not come up again until March of 1973 when the City administration prepared a report on development which stated that the guidelines for future development in the plans presently covering the Winnipeg area were outdated and should be revised. This report not only referred to the Downtown Development Plan, but also to the Metropolitan Development Plan which will be discussed at a later point.

The following month, City Council held a special seminar to discuss the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study, the Metropolitan Development Plan and the Downtown Development Plan. At this seminar the administration urged the councillors to make up their minds on policy decisions concerning

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65. It should be noted that in most other cities such linkages are paid for by the private developer of such projects. However, the City Council, in the case of walkways, tunnels and pedestrian corridors, is taking the position that these amenities are local improvements in the same category as sidewalks and should be financed in the same way. This policy is supported by the Board of Commissioners but no firm Council policy has yet been agreed upon.
these issues. The Commissioners were hoping for the Council to either endorse these plans or make changes in them so that the administration could get on with the job of implementing policy.

The councillors, however, saw this seminar as an informational and discussion meeting and not as a decision-making meeting.

No decisions were reached at the seminar but following the seminar the Executive Policy Committee was to send video tapes of the explanations of these plans and printed material containing opinions expressed during the discussions to all community committees. However, these video tapes of the meetings were not available due to technical difficulties arising from lack of adequate planning in the set up and facilities available for the seminar. Recommendations which originated with the community committee and its local residents were then to be considered by the councillors in various committee meetings.

There was very little followthrough to the community committee level and very few community committees had any meaningful discussions regarding the Downtown Development Plan or the Metropolitan Development Plan. This was due to several factors: the lack of cooperation and information from the City Council and the Administration; the parochialism of many of the suburban community committees; and the overshadowing of these issues by the Railway Relocation and WATS issues. This latter issue, discussed at length elsewhere in this report, demonstrates the way in which a planning issue can go through City Council and go to the Community Committees for meaningful discussions with citizens before any Council decision is made.

66. This issue is dealt with at length in the section on Community Committees.
However, Executive Policy Committee was criticized by councillors
and residents alike for sending the plans to the Community Committees
for discussion before EPC had made any recommendations on the plans. In
EPC decision would have given the Community Committees a point from which
their discussion could begin.

Three months after Executive Policy had given the Downtown and
Metropolitan Development Plans to the Community Committee, City Council
on the recommendations of the Executive Policy Committee approved a major
development policy. This policy was primarily a set of guidelines concerning
development in the Downtown and in the entire Winnipeg area. During this
three month period, very few Community Committees had an opportunity
to discuss development and to refer their recommendations back to EPC or
City Council. However, many did do so on the question of transportation
which was also included in this development policy.

As it affected the Downtown Development Plan, this policy endorsed:
Improvement of the environment in the central core of the city through the
establishment of climate controlled walkways and malls; increased open
space and the removal of unnecessary vehicle traffic; a continuing program
of land acquisition for public use, including riverbanks. This policy for
the downtown was simply a re-affirmation of the basic concepts contained in
the Downtown Development Plan.

Metro's Downtown Development Plan envisaged a series of interconnected
weather-protected pedestrian walkways sixteen feet above ground level
throughout the downtown area. This type of structure had been proposed
from the Trizec complex heading west, where it would be a matter of only
three blocks before it would connect to the Northstar Inn from which
there is already an enclosed connection with the Eatons Store.
While present development under the downtown plan is concentrated on the Convention Centre to the south and west of the Trizac development, a series of pedestrian walkways and a start on the proposed concourse would represent at least a moral victory of Metro planners and backers of the development plan. What these development guidelines do not include however is any real control over spot building or development in the downtown area. The whole idea of downtown development is to have an integrated pattern of office buildings, apartment blocks, open spaces, transportation routes and walkways. Under the present City of Winnipeg Act, however, if any one builder who owns property fulfills the zoning requirements, any kind of building can be erected. Thus on Smith Street there is now a jumble of high rise buildings with no open space. Obviously there must be a different set of powers available to the city if they are to exercise a controlled plan of downtown growth. This is something that still has not been squarely faced by Council.

It has taken City Council one and one-half years to come up with basic policy guidelines for the development of the downtown, although much actual development had been approved and begun during that time. The period of transition was a difficult time for City Council to make long range policy decisions but not for them to make the ad hoc decisions which ultimately add up to a policy statement. There is no reason to conclude, however, that the length of time it took to make decisions or the manner in which decisions were made was a direct consequence of the new structure of government. Certainly, the decision-making process on downtown development prior to 1971 was not noticeably more efficient, more open, more rational in approach. But, the first two years of operation of the new system
demonstrated that there still are many deficiencies in the way that planning and implementation of downtown development takes place. It still suffers from a fragmentation of responsibility, and a lack of clear overall direction.

Part of this can be attributed to the committee system of Council. The three standing committees have become the source of policy initiatives and relate most directly to administrative staff. The Executive Policy Committee, which was supposed to be the body where central policy making and planning was to occur, has not fulfilled this role. This is partially explained by the complete lack of staff serving the Executive Policy Committee or in the mayor's office. They are forced, therefore, to react to initiatives coming from the separate committees and do not set overall guidelines within which the separate committees should work. This problem becomes even more apparent in the following case dealing with the overall development plan.

**Metropolitan Development Plan**

Downtown development was only one aspect of the development question. There were major questions related to development on the suburban fringe of the city and out of this major differences emerged between Council and Commissioners and between the City and the Province.

The City's Commissioner of Environment, David Henderson, two months after his appointment, presented Environment Committee with a document containing policies relating to housing, the Downtown Development Plan, Advisory Services to Community Committees, Planned Building Groups, Zoning Bylaws and District Plans.
The major points contained in the document were:

- The city should not continue to be in the housing business.
- City inspections of rental residential properties.
- Minimum fines for housing code violations.
- Development agreements to assure adequate public open space, landscaping and recreation facilities.
- Uniform housing bylaws.
- No subsidies from the city for housing construction.
- The provision of advisory services to Community Committees.
- Some authority for approval of development plans should be delegated to Environment Committee.
- Following the development of district plans, Community Committees should undertake a review of zoning bylaws.

City Council accepted the report and adopted it as a set of policy guidelines. They did, however, make one small wording change which in effect changed an area of policy direction. An amendment was proposed to remove the word 'not' from the phrase "the City should not continue to be in the public housing business". The amendment was passed by one vote and this in essence meant that the City would continue to remain in the public housing business. However, when interviewed two months earlier, only nine councillors had been in favour of the City remaining in the public housing business and again since that time Council has repeatedly expressed its wish to get out of the public housing business. In May of 1973 City Council voted to sell the majority of its interest in public housing to the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation.
One explanation for the voting in August of 1972 to remain in the public housing business has been that, faced with the large package of policy guidelines, some councillors failed to notice the significance of the removal of one word in the phrasing.

The Commissioner of Environment has throughout the transition period been the major source of policy proposals for the City of Winnipeg, and this has been a source of recurring differences between the Commissioner and Council and its committees.

This was most obvious on the question of whether or not the city should follow the development plan it had endorsed or whether it should, in the traditional way, amend it to suit the needs of large developers.

A case in point was the request by two development firms for re-zoning in order to construct two large shopping centres in the St. James-Assiniboia area. This request not only would require amendments to the Metropolitan Development Plan, which saw the area as low density with a preponderance of accommodations for families with school age children and requirements of open space for recreational facilities, but would also tend to promote development in the additional zone, an area beyond the Perimeter Road, in order to increase their markets -- a move which City Council had steadfastly refused to do, at least overtly.

The Commissioner prepared a policy report on shopping centre development which recommended that the Development Plan be amended to include only one shopping centre and that east, not west, of the Red River. This would effectively stop any shopping centre construction in St. James-Assiniboia.
There was an immediate outcry from the developers about this proposal of the Commissioner of Environment. They went so far as to say that all development would stop if developers continued to be harassed. They felt that the city should simply be concerned with the best use of land and that they should leave development decisions to the private sector. They claimed to have the people on their side, and to have consulted residents and shaped their plans accordingly.

Three days later the two developers got together and announced that only one shopping centre would be built, but that the other site should be re-zoned for other commercial or residential development. The one which they thought should go ahead was the Unicity Mall which would require the re-zoning of 33.6 acres. The re-zoning was approved by the civic Environment Committee the same day.

The Unicity Mall's resident support was mostly ethereal it appeared later, when some 400 residents started an action in the Court of Queen's Bench to have the development stopped. The question is at present still before the Courts.

Four months after the re-zoning approval, the Committee on Environment produced a report which was accepted by City Council. The report recommended amending the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan to provide for a minimum of six major shopping centres in the city during the next twenty-five years. The amendment justified the Unicity Mall complex. Environment Committee recommended that the City Council approve the amendment to allow "the greatest possible flexibility and freedom from restriction for those who would choose to compete in the market place".
Another source of conflict between the Commissioners and the private sector and, therefore, with the Council as well, has been the whole question of development in the fringe areas of Winnipeg. Development in the additional zone which surrounds Winnipeg has been frozen and developers suggest that increasing land and housing costs will result, as this will limit the supply of land. This is somewhat the same argument as they used to sway Council from the shopping centre policy. However, although some councillors are in favour of allowing development in the additional zone, the Commissioner of Environment and the Environment Committee in the summer of 1973 endorsed the establishment of a buffer zone which would control urban expansion around the city. Lengthy hearings have been held on the issue and it now rests with the provincial government. This buffer zone would contain minimum lot sizes to control haphazard and spot development and would protect the additional zone from these same development problems.

The very fact of the Commissioner of Environment taking some initiatives in the area of policy development has, according to councillors, caused some friction between councillors and the Commissioner, and this feeling has been reinforced by the friction between the Commissioner and representatives of the building industry.

These differences between councillor, Commissioner and industry are compounded by even more serious difficulties faced in the area of zoning and land use.
Zoning and Land Use

Development to a great degree depends on the zoning and re-zoning process. Six days after Council took office, it was predicted that re-zonings under the new system would take a much longer period of time. 67 Council at this time took no noticeable recognition of this problem and, in fact, it was over four months before they appointed a Commissioner of Environment, whose department is responsible for processing zoning and development applications. This delay in getting the machinery started would prove very costly.

Zoning has been the major problem in the development of the Winnipeg area during the transition period. The new Community Committee structure has given citizens much more opportunity to raise their voices against changes in zoning in their areas. Developers have criticized the entire process, saying that a zoning application is holding up their developments and costing everyone money. 68 They do not like the system because of the large number of re-zoning applications that can be held up by citizen representatives at four or five stages of consideration. Hearings are held at the Community Committee level, Environment Committee, and Council, and if there are still objections, the Minister of Urban Affairs can refer the issue to the Municipal Board. In fact, it has been estimated that over ninety steps are required to gain approval on subdivisions.


68. Just recently a report prepared for the House Builders has documented the process that is required and the costs that this involves. See Winnipeg Tribune, February 21, 1974.
These difficulties in zoning and the procedures for subdivision approval have been a major if not exclusive cause for the increasing shortage of land that began to plague Winnipeg beginning in the spring of 1973. Developers claimed that the shortage of land is due to the hold-up in processing development plans, and to the fact that they cannot begin to subdivide land in the additional zone. On the other hand, the City Environment Commission claims that some builders are deliberately withholding land from development that has already been approved.

What is apparent is that there is a severe shortage of both industrial and residential land. A report from the city administration in November of 1973, claimed that within two years the City of Winnipeg would have little utilisable industrial park land left and that would mean the end of one of the major attractions for industry. This shortage was blamed on the slow decision and policy-making processes of the City Council. 69 This would appear to have been accurate, at least in part -- the previous October the Commissioner of Environment had recommended that guidelines should be established in assigning priorities for servicing and developing land to the city's expanding requirements. The report also recommended that in order to keep land prices down, land throughout the city and not just in one area, should be earmarked for future development. City Council had also been told in January of 1973 that the city could only supply small lots to industry and that steps should be taken to alleviate this problem.

Another important question is the impact that the long process of zoning and the additional zone freeze has also had on rising land costs. Research 70 has shown that during this period land costs rose about 15% to 20%, both within the Perimeter route of Winnipeg and in surrounding rural municipalities. These are figures in line with the figures in other cities. However, Winnipeg itself has a slow rate of population growth — and should therefore not feel the same pressures as other urban areas. While the purpose of the freeze on the additional zone, limiting development to specific zones, and then only for large lots, is laudable, in the absence of other programs to ensure an adequate supply of land, it is quite possible that it is a factor in boosting land costs. 71

It would be wrong, however, to place the onus entirely on government. It would appear that most developers were not interested in adapting to the new system by doing things such as aiding communities in developing district plans which would greatly simplify the process of zoning within a community, or more seriously, not anticipating the need to adapt to new procedures. Developers could have become more involved in helping the new system work than they have been, and therefore must share responsibility for its malfunctioning.

This points to an important aspect of transition: the difficulties encountered by private interests who are closely related to city government in making their own adjustments to a changed situation. The system for making decisions and implementing public policy is not confined to politicians

71. Ibid.
or civil servants. It is a system that involves both public and private sectors. This fact was given little countenance when the new system was introduced. There was no effort to consult with different private groups to work out means of overcoming the problems encountered due to a change in systems. In a crucial area such as land development and housing, one might have expected close co-operation between provincial, municipal authorities and private organizations. This did not happen, nor has it yet happened. The result -- a major problem and continuing confusion.

Winnipeg is not alone in facing the ever increasing inflation in land costs; nor has its performance in dealing with this issue been noticeably worse. But, this is no excuse, because unless some definite action is taken the inflation will accelerate. Action, however, will require more than introducing a simple panacea. The House Builders claim that if city procedures are changed, the problem will be over. The city and provincial leaders, like Mr. Schreyer, suggest that it is the fault of the developers withholding land.

The fact is that the issue of land development needs attacks on a broad range of fronts, by all levels of government. Inflation in land, and poor development in land is a consequence of tax policies that encourage land speculation; zoning and subdivision approval procedures that are outmoded; a shortage of municipal capital for servicing; development guidelines and transportation policies that encourage low density and scattered development; a non-existent urban growth policy in the province; and previous omission by public authorities in banking land. It all adds up to the fact that neither the city nor the province has even paid much
attention to the need for a policy on urban land, but have acted only in an ad hoc way, relying on the market to order priorities on the use of urban space.

This omission cannot be blamed on any structural defect or institutional weakness, but to a lack of urban policies on both levels of government. It shows that almost too much attention is being paid to issues of institutional reform and not nearly enough to real hard case substantive policy decisions.

In one area where there was a major policy initiative taken by the provincial government, however, major conflict and eventual stalemate ensued.

**Public Housing**

In 1970, the Manitoba government launched a major program of public housing to meet the need for low cost accommodation. They set forward a target of 3,600 units in 1971, 4,000 in 1972, and 4,400 in 1973, with an overall target in five years of 21,800 units. 72

An unstated, but obvious part of this program, was the need to build many of these units in the middle income residential suburbs of the city, as there was not sufficient land available in the inner city, nor was it desirable from a social point of view.

Thus, at the very time of the creation of the new city system, there was to be a major push on public housing in the city of Winnipeg. This

72. Actual production has fallen short of these targets. The number of units built are as follows: 1971-72 - 3,600 units; 1972-73 - 3,600 units; 1973-74 - less than 500 units. The total built over four years - 7,500 units.
was to engender strong negative reactions from suburban residents, typical of the reactions that have taken place in almost every urban area where public housing has been located in the suburbs. 73

What was strange about provincial action at this time was that under the new City of Winnipeg Act, the province had surrendered its rights to do as it wished on provincial owned land and subsumed all its actions to the regulatory control of the City of Winnipeg. Thus, it gave up a major advantage it would normally have had just on the verge of a very tough battle to introduce public housing in the suburban areas. A major conflict between the City of Winnipeg and the Province of Manitoba thus arose over public housing as the Province became frustrated at the reluctance of the City to speedily process its proposals for public housing projects. In effect, the Province was forced, much to the chagrin of its officials, to live by the rules they had set.

The disagreement between the City and the Province also has a political overtone. There has always been antagonism between the suburban Liberals and Conservatives who control Council and the NDP Provincial Government. This City-Province split becomes very evident in the area of province-initiated low cost housing developments.

The problem has its roots in developments which occurred prior to Unicity. The large public housing complexes built in the early sixties by the city, the province and the federal government were very bad examples of public housing. They involved large scale relocation of residents, the creation of a defined low income enclave and isolation of low income tenants.

Then came the federal government's freeze on urban renewal, the concern for the development of new concepts in public housing and the formation of the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation. Throughout the 1960's, private apartment dwelling development was slow and steady, and public housing development was virtually nonexistent. Beginning in 1969, however, private apartment construction suddenly increased more than threefold and MHRC also began to develop public housing. Both the private sector and the public sector made mistakes at this time. The private sector overbuilt and had in some cases vacancy rates of up to 43%. Some of the blame for these high vacancy rates was attached to competition from MHRC low income housing and to the location of MHRC sites which made areas less desirable for high income residents. Accordingly, developers began putting pressure on the city to have them slow down the public housing development.

The provincial government, for its part, made many mistakes in the beginning. It had seen a great need for public housing and it reacted quickly, perhaps too quickly. Many of MHRC's projects were poorly planned, being too large and poorly located. The location question especially was a crucial one. Because of cheaper land costs, many of these projects were located in the suburbs, and had been placed there with little or no consultation with area residents or with municipal governments, or with developers who were building or planning developments adjacent.

This poor planning led to the city being besieged by requests for both new and improved bus routes, for more recreation space, more schools, etc. There was concern over increasing tax rates, and, underlying it all, a general apprehension and at time strong bias against locating low income
people in these areas. Very little was done to appease these fears. As a result, the suburban residents, who had never been strong supporters of the provincial government, reacted strongly.

They began accusing the NDP government of playing political games -- of trying to upset the affluent suburban communities by locating low income residents in high income areas. The NDP government reacted by saying that suburban residents were just supporting private enterprise against the NDP government and had strong prejudices against people who were not of similar socio-economic status.

The political differences between City Council and the provincial government grew throughout 1972 and 1973 and each side began to become more and more dogmatic. The City Council began to wave the flag of private enterprise and Ken Galanchuk, ICEC councillor, summed up their feeling, "If a private developer puts in 30 units, the city isn't presented with the same problems as if MHRC was putting in 30 units. The residents of that private development are going to have money for memberships in the community club. They are going to have their own cars. They're a different caliber of person than occupies MHRC accommodation. These people need assistance. Maybe they don't have cars and they can't contribute the same towards the cost of their services. They have to be subsidized".

Reaction in the suburbs became very intense and some ugly prejudice began to show. St. James-Assiniboia went so far as to propose caveats for development agreements to ensure that the developer will not be providing homes for low income people. These caveats call for high rents in all apartment complexes and high purchase prices for all single family and row dwellings.
Engineered Homes Ltd., a large building firm, who were to build a public housing project in St. James-Assiniboia, abandoned the project even after Council approval for construction had been given. The company was afraid of the bad publicity affecting their ability to develop higher income developments in the suburbs. Each side felt persecuted by the other side and when MHRC began applying to the city for building permits and zoning variations to build more housing complexes, City Council began to stall their programs, requesting further details. MHRC aggravated the situation by trying to ignore the Act which it had created and by beginning construction of office and government buildings without city building permits.

The situation reached a head over the question of a washroom in Memorial Park. The provincial government wished to build the washroom and required the usual building permit. While there was no apparent legal or technical reason to oppose the permit, the permit was held up for months. Because there seemed to be no valid reason for the city to withhold the permit, the province went ahead with the construction without a permit. Councillors became very irate and attempted to use public opinion and the anti-socialist feeling widened the gap further between the city and the province. Most councillors recognized the entire issue as a trivial and silly move and thought that some of their colleagues were simply making it a political issue to discredit the provincial government.

Mayor Juba, with his usual flamboyance, entered the fray. He rose to speak on the question in the Provincial Legislature and had to be ejected. Outside the Legislature he had a portable washroom erected and
he tacked on a sign proclaiming the washroom as the proper office of the Provincial Minister of Public Works.

The issue, and in particular, the object of the construction, made the whole question and the Council almost a laughing matter. Finally, when the reaction of the public began to penetrate to the Council Chambers, councillors began to change their minds and eventually issued the permit.

The solving of this problem paved the way for some relaxation of dogmatic positions on the public housing question. As well, the province appointed as Chairman of the MHRC Board the Deputy Minister of Urban Affairs, who was a former commissioner of Parks in the old Metro system, and he was able to strike a more cordial and conciliatory relationship with city officials than those adopted by other MHRC spokesmen who had been very strident in their dealings with the city.

The province agreed to consult communities before projects were planned in those communities and to abide by their own rules. The city, for its part, agreed to send to the province a copy of all proposed development proposals to determine whether there would be a possibility of including some public housing units. However, the detente is still a very shaky one and if the public wish is to prevail, a solution, if one is possible, will have to await the next Council election. The last provincial election returned the NDP government and only time will determine if the ICEC can survive another municipal election.

The larger issue of what kind of low income housing program to have in the city has never been seriously dealt with by Council. They have passed, with inadvertence, a resolution stating that the city will
stay in the public housing business, although they passed another resolution stating that they will attempt to sell the public housing they now own, and there have been some general references to the possibility of using re-claimed land in the Midland railway for low income housing. But, city government has as yet not established concrete objectives or programs relating to need, location and city involvement in low income housing. The province for its part has also seemed to lose heart. In 1973, it built less than 500 public housing units throughout the whole province. In part, they blame city recalcitrance for this, but this is only a partial explanation. MHRC has sites in the city it has not built upon, even though they are approved. More germane is the political fear of voter reaction. In the 1972 Federal election, a federal NDP member came within a few votes of losing the riding of Selkirk, where there had been strong anti-public housing feeling, and Premier Schreyer in 1973 won his riding by a little over 500 votes in the same area. Unfortunately, no new programs have emerged to replace public housing, even though a strong demand is there.

From the standpoint of examining the impact of the new city government structure on this issue, any assessments must be only tentative. One assessment is that a unified city government, dominated by politicians representing suburban, property owning interests can exercise strong leverage against the senior government. The provincial government is no longer dealing with fourteen municipalities which could be played off against each other. There is now only one and it is run by people who are not favourable to the provincial government.
At the same time, the new structure did not bring into existence any alignment of political forces that would be committed to developing an aggressive city attack upon low income housing. Suburban politicians will not look kindly upon efforts to build low cost housing in their areas. The initiative will more than likely have to come from the provincial government. The stage is thus set for a long and continuing conflict between the two levels of government. Unless of course the issue of low income is just dropped, proceeded with on a very limited scale, or a different political group emerges on City Council, which is more sympathetic to the low income housing need.

While the situation in relation to major progress in the field of housing looks dim, there is some hope in the area of transportation where some re-thinking of conventional practices seems to be taking place. How this came about will be examined in the following case study.

Transportation Case Study

This case study\textsuperscript{74} describes a process of citizen advocacy planning which saw an independent citizen organization making use of the new framework of city government.

Although the group, its formation and activities, were all separate from the Resident Advisory Group and Community Committee structure, this case study is illustrative of the way in which groups can use these aspects of the structure to participate in the planning and decision-making processes of the city.

\textsuperscript{74} This case study is a revised version of Chapter 4 in the study,\textit{ Transportation Advocacy Planning}, written by Terry J. Partridge for IUS in 1973. Thanks go to the author for this revised version.
This group was known as C.O.S.T. (Coalition on Sensible Transport) and it was formed in reaction to the Railway Relocation Plan being considered by Winnipeg City Council in 1972.

The subjects of the debate were the freeway proposals contained in W.A.T.S. (Winnipeg Area Transportation Study) and a plan to relocate the major Trans Canada railways that currently pass through the city centre to new routes passing through suburban locations.

The W.A.T.S. plan was first published in 1968, and perhaps due to its long range nature, received comparatively little public attention. The railway study was published in mid 1972. This time, the proposals to move lines into the suburban locations, and to re-use vacated routes for freeways appeared to pose an immediate threat. Protest immediately sprung up in the suburbs, and uncertainty began to emerge in the central areas. By the end of 1972 the railway study had moved to the forefront of public discussion, much of it occurring in the community committees and resident advisory groups. A number of community organizations in the central area were being asked questions by concerned local residents, but they had little information to go on.

Responding to the need for more information, Neighbourhood Service Centres (N.S.C.) called a meeting of about a dozen social agencies and interested community groups for December 20, 1972. Each group reported its concerns and knowledge of the railway and road plans. Various individuals undertook to circulate information they had available before a further meeting called for January 17, 1973. The Institute of Urban Studies (I.U.S.)
was to be publishing a special newspaper on Transport Planning in Winnipeg on January 12, and this would be distributed. 75

On January 9, members of IUS and the University of Manitoba School of Social Work appeared on a television panel show to discuss transport problems and to introduce the IUS publication. This began a media campaign to promote public awareness of the issues. On January 12, the newspaper itself was released, beginning a direct mail phase of the campaign. After the initial mailing to resident advisors, community groups, and municipal, provincial and federal politicians and administrators, the response from others quickly depleted all available copies.

By the time of the second N.S.C. meeting, the material had been digested by the participating groups, and discussion quickly got down to the issues. Did those attending really feel there was a problem and, if so, what role could or should they play? Although reactions were very ad hoc, there was a growing consensus that the link between W.A.T.S. and Railway Relocation was the key issue. At these initial meetings there were no suburban representatives present, and views on removing the central yards and tracks were quite neutral, although it was felt that local people should have a say in planning the re-use of any lands released. The chief concern was that released land would be used for freeways, creating a greater degree of blight than existed at present. The first goal was to point out this danger and, if possible, to remove the W.A.T.S. threat.

The discussion then turned to the question of action. Representatives from the Community Welfare Planning Council (C.W.P.C.) suggested holding some form of well advertised public panel discussion or forum, with the aim of attracting media coverage and stimulating public debate. A subcommittee of the main group was formed to pursue this idea, with C.W.P.C. undertaking to act as co-ordinator. A meeting was then called for the following week to discuss content and approach. It was also decided to invite representation from Resident Advisory Groups (RAG) and suburban communities to participate in the planning, as the issues were area wide and a broadly based approach would be more effective.

In the week before the first forum meeting, two events transpired that helped to crystallize the action plan. First of all, a series of articles on rail relocation by Val Werier in the Winnipeg Tribune explained the proposals, the advantages argued by the planners, and the problems outlined by the critics. He interviewed the planners about the charge that freeway routes were the basis for the rail relocation proposals and reported their denials that this was the case.

Second, the city held a public meeting on rail relocation at R. B. Russell School on January 22, sponsored by four central area Community Committees. Advertised at public expense, the meeting drew a capacity crowd of 175 people. In this community, where rails were to be removed, the Railway Study Committee expected quite a different response from that in the suburbs. As it was, the meeting was quite subdued, debate was stifled, and little was said to ease the frustration of many present.

The chairman of the meeting kept to an information format. The initial presentation by the Rail Study Committee took two hours, with the
four alternative plans being presented in tedious confusion. Neighbourhood benefits were described at length, but roads were never mentioned. The response to questions from critics was to dismiss freeways as only one remote possibility in a wide range of options for re-use, and one which would not take much land in any case. The Rail Committee urged that a decision on railways should be made first, and then consideration of road needs could follow. The presentation using slides was, however, very professional and served as a powerful propaganda technique.

By the time of the first N.S.C. subcommittee meeting on January 24 to discuss forums, some opinions and ideas had begun to take shape. First, the city's meetings were too well controlled and the public had too little initial information on which to base their questions. The Rail Study Committee presentations were stressing the positive aspects and selling the package they felt was worthwhile. They would be contacting residents throughout the city in a series of meetings. The alternative, a couple of large forum meetings, would have a one-shot effect rather than a continuous impact. The group felt it would be better to plug into the city meetings, if possible, and generate debate by posing well prepared questions.

If this could be done, it had several advantages. It would give the group greater exposure; it would present the public with two points of view at the same time, with an opportunity to cross-examine either party; and it would be easier to get people out to one rather than two meetings. Besides, it would be organizationally and financially preferable to take advantage of the city's advertising and hall arrangements.

It was also obvious that, if this were to be done, the group's contributions would have to be kept short to allow time for questions and for full expression of citizen views. It would be necessary to concentrate
on basic issues and to have clear, sophisticated and well substantiated arguments to counter the carefully prepared slide show of the Railway Committee.

It was, therefore, decided that the group would prepare their own slide show. After several modifications, agreement was reached on an outline prepared by IUS which illustrated the connection between released railway mainlines and the proposed radial freeways of the W.A.T.S. plan.

Finally, the subcommittee turned to an immediate problem. The Executive Policy Committee would be presenting a resolution to City Council that same evening asking for approval to appoint consultants to conduct a series of public rail meetings at all thirteen Community Committees. The expressed purpose was to give the subject a full airing, after which a decision would be made to adopt the most acceptable program or modified program and then proceed to design and implementation of phases of the study. The group was concerned, based on the R.B. Russell School experience, that this would not result in a full discussion of community views and that, with consultants in control, they would be frozen out.

That afternoon, several members of the group phoned their councillors and expressed these concerns. As it happened, some councillors who had attended the earlier meeting were of the same view, and that night Council adopted instead a resolution calling for the Community Committees to arrange their own meetings, and for the city administration to make staff resources available on request. A deadline of May 1 was set for the meetings to be completed. The door was open, but time was running short.

The following week, a meeting of the main group was called at N.S.C. for progress reports. General agreement was reached on the forum strategy.
Other members would provide feedback of residents' responses and notify the forum planners of questions that people wanted investigated.

February was a hectic month of preparation on two fronts, with IUS and Pollution Probe developing the content of the slide presentation and the Community Welfare Planning Council (C.W.P.C.) refining and directing the organizational strategy.

Events were changing quickly, and with new information becoming available almost daily, attempts were made to incorporate this into the group's presentation. Val Werier of the Winnipeg Tribune, continuing his series of articles on the railway issue, reported that the C.N.R. could vacate the massive East Yard area at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers without moving the mainlines. In earlier Rail Committee presentations, it was argued that the release of this area would result from rail relocation and this was presented as a major benefit of the program. The critics could now argue that this benefit could be achieved without moving the mainlines.

On February 15, a meeting of the forum subcommittee was held, with several members of the parent group in attendance, as well as RAG members from a few Community Committees, and representatives of ACT, an embryo central association of the RAG groups. The aim agreed upon was to be included on the program at each of the Community Committee rail meetings. The desired format would include presentations by the city and the forum group, considerable time for questions and expression of views by local residents, and an independent chairman such as the chairman of the Community Committee. It was suggested that this could be achieved through official
channels, beginning with the RAGs, which had been incorporated into the new Unicity structure, largely with the idea of creating a vehicle for local participation.

The idea was to approach the RAGs, explain the aims of the forum group, and ask them to adopt a resolution calling for the Community Committee to hold public rail meetings of the form suggested prior to the May 1 deadline set by Council. They would also be asked to assist in publicizing the meetings to get the widest possible participation. Ultimately, success would depend on whether the Community Committee councillors accepted the RAG resolutions.

This general approach was agreed upon, with some flexibility, depending on the situations in different Community Committees. In some cases the newly formed RAGs were heavily involved with detailed work passed down to them by the councillors, and would not feel like taking the responsibility for such an initiative themselves. Other groups hardly existed, and in some cases the RAGs would simply not be interested. For these reasons, and partly because of the tight time schedule, it was agreed that the forum subcommittee would, where necessary, approach the Community Committee chairman either directly or through the RAG chairman, or would appear as delegations at Community Committee meetings. In the end, all of the approaches were tried in different areas.

Some members of the parent group who had not been involved in the forum subcommittee were concerned that the whole action program was being put together far too quickly, allowing too little time for a wider degree of public participation in its planning. With a May 1 deadline, there
seemed little alternative and it was decided to proceed nonetheless, with
the hope that the groups' contribution would at least give local people
a point of reference from which to begin.

In order to establish initial contact, ACT sent a letter to the
chairmen of all RAG groups, introducing the advocates and describing their
aims. The task of contacting RAGs and Community Committees was then
divided among several members of the group, and over the next couple of
weeks a number of contacts were made and the process set in motion. During
this period no firm dates or agreements on approach were reached, although
there was evidence of interest and a few tentative meetings were scheduled.

On February 27, a final meeting of the forum group was called to
wind up the month of preparation before launching into the public campaign.
The slide show had been completed and was presented to the group for the
first time by members of IUS and Pollution Probe. It received enthusiastic
support, some suggestions for changes, and general agreement that it should
remain as objective as possible, concentrating on the main issues decided
on earlier.

Finally, members who had been contacting the Community Committees
reported various experiences and degrees of success. It had become
obvious that some name would be necessary to identify the group, and this
had been specifically requested by some Community Committees for the purpose
of advertising meetings. After some discussion, the name Coalition On
Sensible Transport was decided on as a reflection of the group's composition
and the subject. The monogram, COST, aptly illustrated a major and
important concern. A letterhead was designed on the spot and arrangements
were made to have stationery printed. The group was now formally in business.
During the February preparations, things had been fairly quiet elsewhere, except for one railway meeting in East St. Paul, where one hundred residents turned out to protest relocation through their area. A few suburban candidates, getting an early start for the anticipated provincial elections, had also begun to voice opposition.

On March 1, the COST presentation received its first public airing at a Manitoba Environment Council seminar. The sparsely attended meeting nonetheless received widespread coverage in the major newspapers and on radio the following day. Later that week, the COST presentation was shown at a panel discussion of the Central Area Council and by the Winnipeg Citizens Transit Committee at a public meeting in St. James. On March 26, the Railway Study Committee had their say before the Manitoba Environment Council, and a different approach to that at R. B. Russell was taken. This time the consultants stated quite openly that the railway study had assumed that the freeway plan would be implemented. Although the presentation was limited to the Railway Committee, a representative of COST was allowed a few minutes to make a statement from the floor. Although the COST objective to share a platform with the Railway Committee had still not been achieved, the meeting did stir considerable discussion, and again the COST issues received newspaper coverage.

While these meetings were taking place, work continued on the main strategy, bolstered somewhat by a letter to the RAG chairmen from the Community Planning Association of Canada, endorsing the COST presentation. In East Kildonan an appearance of a COST delegate to a regular Community Committee meeting, explaining the case, was sufficient to elicit an
invitation to appear on the railway panel, and a date was set for the public meeting. In Fort Rouge and Lord Selkirk communities, presentations of the full slide show were made to the RAGs prior to their deciding whether to recommend having COST appear at their public rail meetings. In the case of Fort Rouge, the RAG proposal was accepted by the Community Committee and two public meetings were eventually held, although the format was not as planned. Only two of all the community meetings followed through exactly as intended, although the process helped develop a growing body of public contact and participation.

Attendance at meetings was limited, but media coverage had expanded the audience well beyond the local, interested parties who attended. The Manitoba Environment Council meetings had been well covered in the city papers and radio, and community newspapers had carried lengthy reports on the RAG-COST meeting in Fort Rouge. Ecospeak and Prairie Dog Press had also published newspapers on transportation and city planning issues, broadening the scope still further.

The main point of the COST presentation linking the freeway and railway plans was being well made, and was picked up by some councillors who had seen the presentation. The railway consultants were freely acknowledging the connection. But from the line of questioning that was emerging, it was becoming apparent that COST would have to go the next step and question whether the freeways were necessary in the first place. Council had just approved $450,000 for unspecified road design studies and, based on past performance, these funds seemed slated for freeway plans.

The first of the series of organized community rail meetings was held in the Fort Rouge area at Churchill High School on April 24. Somehow the wires were crossed and the city representatives failed to show. COST made a presentation and tried to fill in some of the gaps they had expected the city to do. About forty people attended, including some local councillors.

The second meeting was held at Grant Park High School for residents in the West End of Fort Rouge and in the Assiniboine Community Committee area. There was a fair turnout of about eighty people. This time presentations were made by the city and by COST. The city representative, apparently unaware of the scheduled format, was not prepared to debate. It was agreed instead that he would make his presentation and answer questions first before leaving the platform to COST. While the planned debate did not materialize, it was nonetheless the first time that the two presentations and points of view were heard at one meeting.

The next two meetings went more or less according to format. In Fort Garry on May 7, the railway committee was represented by the consultants Damas Smith. Presentations by Smith and COST sparked a lively debate informative debate. The well attended meeting proved very satisfactory to many present including members of the People First group who had launched the first suburban revolt. On May 15 a meeting in the Midland Community heard presentations from COST and city representatives, and again a lively debate ensued.

During the April-May period there had been considerable difficulty getting some of the meetings organized. Several were cancelled or postponed,
and COST was forced to keep revising plans throughout. There were rumblings that city technical staff were not pleased at the prospect of entering a political debate, or of defending plans that were officially a product of the five party consortium, even though they had played a major role in preparing them.

Early in June, COST discovered that a fresh round of meetings were to be organized, this time going back to the original idea of contracting the job out to the consultants. All of the Community Committees were to be included in five regional groups. The meetings were to begin the following week and be completed ten days later.

A COST meeting was promptly called on June 8. As the COST presentation was no longer included on the public meeting agendas, it was decided to distribute a handout at the door outlining the COST position instead.

As the public meetings had been arranged with indecent haste, and little apparent publicity, it was decided to boost attendance with a COST press release sent to all media. The release stated who was holding the meetings, the place and the time. It announced the reasons why COST wanted a good turnout and included a copy of the handout entitled, "Concerns of COST". This last sheet covered most of the main points made in earlier presentations, plus the new information that the historic site at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers might not be released for parkland after all, as the CNR and Great West Life Company were negotiating about a new office building there.

The first public meeting of the new round took place two days later for the Centennial and Midland Communities. Members of COST arrived
to distribute the handbill. Following the official presentation, a motion was put from the floor asking to see the COST presentation. The motion was passed almost unanimously by the people present and the show went on. A good debate followed similar to the Fort Garry meeting. The next day, the meeting and the COST viewpoint received good coverage on radio, television and both city papers, prompted largely by the COST press release.

The remaining four meetings were attended by COST solely in a watching capacity without further presentations. "Concerns of COST" was circulated at each, and the points raised were often picked up by the people. In addition, the COST points were covered by the community newspapers with the Fort Lance reprinting the sheet almost verbatim. An editorial in the Leisure section of the Free Press also gave COST and its concerns good play. The final meeting of the series signalled also the end of COST activities for the summer.

On July 18, 1973, the new Unicity council produced its first general policy statement on the major city plans.77 This was a culmination of the process officially set in motion by the councillors' seminar back in April. Many of the resolutions were vague, and the voting roll went unrecorded. Nonetheless, in an important statement of principle, Council decided to reject freeways in favour of an expanded arterial street system, with increased emphasis on public transport. This reversed the position taken by the former Metro Council, and in so doing, realized one of the principle aims of COST.

At a further meeting on August 1, Council refused to endorse rail relocation in principle, but after consideration of the consultants' report on the community meetings, asked for a further study of a "Do Nothing" option. This option would essentially leave it to the railways as to whether they wished to move their yards or not for commercial reasons. The consultants' report that had accurately summarized the prevalence of suburban protesters at meetings, had ignored the COST compromise, calling for study of positive action on yard removal, leaving the mainlines where they are. They were opting instead for an all or nothing approach which threatened to put centre against suburb, now that the common interest brought on by the freeways was no longer at hand. It was left to await results of the further study.

This case study is interesting not primarily because of the matter that it dealt with, nor because of the success that is certainly important; it is interesting because it demonstrated a form of citizen organization which was innovative, and because it demonstrated a process which was innovative.

The organization itself was innovative for four major reasons:

1. The recruitment and use of professionals. Professionals have been a part of citizen groups in many other places and at other times, but they have not usually been employed to lend much more than status and/or prestige to a group. In this case, however, they were used to prepare a sound and well documented case regarding the proposals and their implications.

78. Ibid.
2. The area-wide base of the organization. Even though the actual proposals affected only a few areas of the city, attempts were made to interest all areas in this question. This was on the whole a success, as most areas were aware of, if not actually involved in, the process.

3. The level of the debate. It has been the general case that groups opposed to governmental proposals have tended to argue on an emotional level dealing with things as neighbourhood character, preservation of the environment, etc. In this case, the level of debate was much higher. While it most certainly contained emotional arguments, it also contained a very well researched and well documented appraisal of the faults in the original proposal study. The research and documentations done by preprofessionals was one of the greatest factors contributing to the success of the group.

4. The secunding and volunteering of numerous technical resource and citizen groups. The groups that were involved with the COST group were numerous and varied, and provided the group with the technical, organizational, informational and clerical tasks so necessary for success in an operation of this type.

The process was innovative in that it took place in a system which is innovative. It demonstrates the value of such a system and also of such an approach within this type of system.

Had this debate occurred three years ago, it is doubtful whether the group would have been able to appear on the same panel as the people presenting the city's proposals. Indeed it is even doubtful that the city would have held informational and discussion type public meetings at all.
The group made good use of the new structure. They contacted Resident Advisory Groups, worked through them to the Community Committees, and finally to the Environment Committee of Council. Presentations were made to RAG groups and to Community Committees. Again, it is doubtful that under the old system such presentations would have been allowed. These presentations allowed them to obtain the support of residents, RAG groups and Community Committees, and individual councillors.

They also had a legal forum where alongside the presentation of the facts by the city, they could give their presentation and their interpretation of the facts and the proposals. This legal forum is very important in terms of future citizen participation in the process of decision-making.

The old pattern of the city giving its proposals, of citizens objecting with little or no information and of the city being able to confuse people with their technical experts appears at an end. Now citizens have begun to secund their own technical experts and to prepare their own proposals and solutions and now they have a forum wherein they can challenge and possibly defeat the formerly secure city representatives. The old adage, "You can't fight City Hall" is beginning to become forgotten. The question is how will city officials and politicians adapt to this trend. They have in existence an institutional form that could lead to a generally co-operative arrangement between citizens and officials on planning matters, if it is properly used. Or, a basic conflict situation can emerge as has occurred in other cities. At this stage, there has been some signs of willingness by officials of the planning department to use
the RAG system, and there are some councillors who have joined in the spirit of the Community Committees. There is needed, however, a major analysis by Council of how they wish to deal with the new facts of "urban populism" and how they can develop the RAG-Community Committee system. This was recommended in the previous section and is reinforced by the material presented here.
SECTION V

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

* LIMITS OF STRUCTURAL REFORM
* COMMUNITY COMMITTEES
* TRANSITION PROCEDURES
* SCALE OF REPRESENTATION
* EXECUTIVE RE-ORGANIZATION
* ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHAUL
* OPEN GOVERNMENT
* RESIDENT ADVISORY GROUPS
* INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
* RESEARCH AND EVALUATION
In assessing the establishment of the new local government system in Winnipeg, and the transition period of that new system, several important observations can be made.

**Limits of Structural Reform**

First, the design of the system placed too much faith in the efficacy of structural reform. Built into the approach of the provincial government was the implicit assumption that a re-organization of structural arrangements of government would bring about certain desired changes in the performance of local government. The system was not designed with the political and social realities of Winnipeg in mind, but was predicated on the basis that those things wrong with the system were of an institutional not a political nature and could be corrected through structural engineering. Unfortunately, the system of government, designed as it was in a short space of time by consultants from outside of Winnipeg, did not take into account the interrelationship between political factors and structural factors, and did not encompass how the political dynamics of local government in Winnipeg would affect the institutional arrangements. This is a failing of proponents of government re-organization, generally. As Robert Wood notes, "By ignoring the effects of their proposals on existing power structures, by failing to set an alternative and better political process as a goal and most of all, by slighting individual values, advocates of
regionalism, consolidation or even federation thus raise inseparable problems of representation and shifts in political influence."^79

The provincial blueprint for change did envision a change in the form of choosing a mayor, from direct election to election by Council, and did propose the Resident Advisory system, both of which could have effected some change in the politics of Winnipeg. But, the first was ultimately abandoned and the other never supported, which indicates that the provincial cabinet underestimated the effects of the local political process upon their reforms. Yet as the previous discussions have shown, the governmental consolidation brought together an array of political forces which previously had occupied different jurisdictions, without providing a central integrating force to form majorities, hence the lack of decision-making power. The consolidation also tended to reinforce the conservative tendencies of local government by providing a strong block of representatives from areas where defence of property interests and disinterest in social matters could be expected. This suggests that the provincial government lacked any analysis on how to affect change on the political process of Winnipeg and did not envision how they were creating a political system that would lend itself to fragmented decision-making. The designers of the system would have done well to remember that when one engages in structural engineering, it is not enough to know how to arrange the bricks and mortar, there should also be a good understanding of the political foundation upon which the structure rests.

Community Committees

Too much haste and too little thought is also apparent in the treatment given to the poor definition of responsibilities given to the Community Committees. It has been suggested that the Community Committee system was a way simply of appeasing suburban members of the NDP Cabinet who couldn't stomach total amalgamation, although a brave face was put on the construction by heralding it as a form of decentralizing political power. If this was a compromise, it explains the lack of any clear definition of the role and responsibility of the Community Committees. Bill 36 set them out as subcommittees of Council but without clear powers except for the supervision of local services. In the following year, it was clarified that the Community Committee had only "advisory" powers. Yet many of the other processes of government, such as zoning, are initiated by the Community Committees. This confusion in role and responsibility has led to many of the delays and time lags in making decisions. Administrators and councillors are not sure what the right steps are between Community Committees and Council, so they insist that every possible step be taken. The result is confusion. On the one hand, in the matter of zoning a number of costly and duplicate hearings must be held. On the other hand, Council may disregard the position of Community Committees on matters of local plans and services.

Because of this duplication of procedures, where the Community Committees have an ambiguous set of responsibilities and powers and because there is confusion by officials as to the role of the Community Committee, it is apparent that one of the real advantages of decentralization

has been lost. Decentralization of local government, as demonstrated in several studies, does little to produce economies in service or in the efficiency of decisions on a metropolitan wide level. \(^81\) What it can contribute to a government, however, is important. By moving certain decisions to a smaller level, there can be a clearer view of the priorities of residents. There can be an elimination of many local decisions from the agenda of the regional Council and there can be a counter-balancing to the power of administrators who thrive under a centralized system. All these positives, however, are not working to the optimum in Winnipeg because decisions made at the Community Committee level must be made at the Council level anyway, and usually by a Committee of Council in between.

This suggests that a serious review should be made of the principle of decentralization and its expression through the Community Committee system. There should be a specification of which decisions can be made at the Community Committee level, with Council retaining just the power to consider appeals. This could apply in areas such as zoning, local improvements, recreation, and the delivery of certain services in health and welfare. It may be that a move toward a two tier system, with appropriate levels of decision, while retaining the concept of councillors serving on both tiers might be advisable. This may allow Council to apply itself with more time and application to metropolitan wide decisions in areas such as transportation, housing, and social policy, while leaving local decisions for disposal in the Community Committees. This

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is not a specific proposal that the return to a two tier system is preferable, only that it should be researched as posing an alternative to the present situation.

**Transition Procedures**

Another area of difficulty that should be looked at carefully by other provincial governments contemplating changes in local government is the haste with which the new system succeeded the old, with a minimum of planning and preparation. The Winnipeg system was brought into being within six months of Bill 36 being passed. The efforts by the provincial government to aid in the transformation were minimal. A group of three task forces which had only advisory powers developed position papers which contained some guidelines and recommendations, and some consultants were hired by the province to help the city deal with personnel and administrative matters. There was no attempt to educate politicians or administrators to the new system nor time to allow them to become conditioned to the change. Compare this to the British experience; in those cases where local government units were to be merged, periods of two or three years were taken in transition. Joint committees composed of aldermen and administrators of the respective jurisdictions were brought together to map out the transition, work out personnel problems, and most importantly, overcome their suspicion about the new system. A study of this merger process emphasized that unless time is given for those in the old system to become accustomed to the new, they will oppose it and feel uncomfortable.
with it — a situation that has obviously developed in Winnipeg. As the authors of the British study point out, re-organization plunges all employed in local government into a sea of uncertainty. Secure expectations about the future, characteristic of the system in the past dissolve and are replaced by a high level of uncertainty about the future. The jobs of elected members and most of their staff will change and they will have to establish their competence and authority in new work roles. There is evidence that while many are stimulated by and enjoy challenges of this kind, for many others unhappiness and frustration is the result.

If one looks at the degree of unhappiness and frustration reported by Winnipeg administrators and politicians, it is possible to speculate that some of those feelings are a result of the rapid move into the new system without an opportunity to work out proper procedures or to gain a sense of confidence and understanding of the new system. If the British method of employing a form of joint committees working at both the political and administrative level had been employed, and if there had been careful preparation of steps and procedures to follow as outlined in the Long and Norton study, then it is quite possible that several of the difficulties reported in earlier sections dealing with civil service unhappiness, political antagonism to the system, and administrative confusion might have been avoided.

The reason for pointing this out is not simply to show the virtues of hindsight. A lesson to be learned by this government and others is


83. Ibid.
that making a new policy or designing a new program is only the beginning. Effective implementation is equally as crucial to the success of the program. Planning of how to execute the new system of local government should have been very careful and very extensive, but it wasn't and the re-organization of government suffered as a result.

Of equal note, however, is that it is still not too late to cope with problems of transition, even though the system is now over two years old. There is still room for setting up special committees or task forces to work out difficulties in procedures or administrative arrangements or to tackle some of the problems of educating administrators in new management techniques that could be employed under the new system. It is also important to recognize that much of the dissatisfaction that is currently being expressed stems not necessarily from the structure itself, but from the unease and frustration that many officials and politicians have experienced in the transition. These feelings are apt to dissolve over time, especially if there are some efforts to educate and train those in responsibility to the demands of the new government. It is important, therefore, to view many of the present complaints as less institutional in nature and more psychological and administrative, not requiring legislative change.

**Scale of Representation**

While psychology may be at the root of many problems, there are still demands for legislative action. The most insistent demand is a

change in the size of Council. Recently the mayor of Winnipeg publicly requested a change in the size of Council. His position is supported, as was noted in the attitude surveys, by twenty-four councillors. The same criticism has also been expressed by certain media commentators. They all see the present fifty ward arrangement as being a major cause of confusion and poor decision-making. Their thesis is that reducing the size of Council will make it more manageable, thus better able to transact the public business.

Opposed to this position are the arguments advanced by the government in its White Paper and since pursued by original architects of the proposal, namely that the small size of the wards improves the representative quality of local government. This argument takes two forms. One, that the small electoral base increases the opportunity for the citizen to have contact with his councillor and to become involved in his government. This is an argument that has a long history in the theory of democratic government. The other argument is that the number of wards enables minority groups within the electorate to choose their own representative, or one who at least is more likely to be sensitive to their concerns. Graham Fraser makes the case, for example, that the rise of the reform aldermen in the inner city wards of Toronto was due in part to the break-up of the large ward system.

86. Interviews.
Which thesis bears out? Would efficiency of Council be significantly improved by having fewer seats? On the other hand, does the small ward necessarily improve the representative quality of local government? At this stage there can be no definitive answers to either question, although there is some evidence to suggest that neither thesis is entirely correct.

To begin with, there is nothing to suggest that the cleavages in the political system of Winnipeg and the lack of an effective executive mechanism or an effective party structure would be eliminated by reducing Council in half. For those administrators and politicians who harken back with fond nostalgia to the days of the small suburban Councils, Metro Council or City Council, when ten or twelve elected representatives would gather together and make decisions by consensus, it must be pointed out that this was only possible because they were working in forms of government dealing with a limited number of functions. Each of the old jurisdictions had a limited piece of the action and worked within a political jurisdiction where there was a high degree of homogeneity. Even on the former Metro Council, which presumably acted for the whole city, it should not be forgotten that because of the peculiar form of pie-wedge constituencies, almost all the councillors won their election by appealing to a suburban, property owning electorate. As well, the consensus on policy that seemed to operate in Metro Council did so in part because its functions were limited. There were serious conflicts in local government in Winnipeg, except they occurred between Metro and the other jurisdictions.

Now all the conflicts, cleavages and differences in interest that are part of urban politics are contained within one multipurpose regional government jurisdiction. Thus, there is bound to be political conflict
and stalemate, no matter how many members of Council. What is lacking is the means of organizing the conflict in an orderly way, developing forms of organization that provide a basis for building majorities behind a consistent set of programs and policies.

At the same time, the connection between smallness in scale and improved representation is not exactly clear cut. To begin with, as the phone survey showed, there is somewhat less contact and visibility between citizens and elected representatives under the new system than there was in the old. This, however, cannot be taken to be conclusive. Of more importance is the extensive research by Sydney Verba and Norman Nie which has shown that particularly in urban settings the size of constituency is not the sole, or even a key factor in contributing to the degree of participation by citizens in government in its various forms.

To begin with, their study indicates that participation is directly related to such variables as socio-economic class, ethnic background, education, membership in organizations and other personal characteristics pertaining to the individual citizens. When it comes to the kind of jurisdiction which induces a higher degree of participation it was found that size was less a factor than a quality they call "community boundedness". By this the authors mean the degree to which a community has a clear autonomous identity and meaning to individual citizens, where he or she focus their activity or attention. The most obvious example is the small independent community that has a high degree of community identity as opposed to the amorphous downtown community where there is little attachment. One can measure the degree of "community boundedness" by

88. Sydney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America, Harper and Row, New York, 1972, Ch. 6-12.

89. Ibid., p. 243-244.
looking at a set of "indicators relating to the degree to which the community can be considered to have a life of its own", i.e., the number of organizations, mobility of participants, etc. The authors conclude that there is a clear connection between the degree of "community boundedness" and the degree of participation.

It appears, then, that ward size is less important than the question of how the scale of the jurisdiction contributes to the sense of community. It must be large enough to contain certain services and functions, but not so large as to be amorphous or have no relation to community configurations.

In specific terms of the Winnipeg situation, there are two considerations. One is that the present structure of wards and community committees could be used as the basis for implanting certain government services, offices and activities which will help create different community foci throughout the city with which people can relate. Already, city welfare and social services are being decentralized on a trial basis within the community committee structure. Thus, the present structure could be viewed as not providing for instant citizen involvement, but as a base for community building within the city. Many authors have pointed to the loss of community in urban areas and the need to shape distinctive forms of committees within the larger urban area. One effective way of doing that is through the decentralization of local government services leading to increased face to face contact between citizens and government

90. Ibid., p. 244.
officials. It is a strategy that would lend itself to the new structure within Winnipeg.

Secondly, if there is to be any revision it should be preceded by comprehensive research on what the optimum size is that could be used to determine the nature of electoral boundaries.

Obviously such research did not precede the introduction of Bill 36 -- an abstract population figure was formulated and the size of wards chosen accordingly. As has been shown, however, this is a crude and at times, misleading way of shaping political constituencies. There could be a more sophisticated understanding of what variables should be used in determining electoral boundaries leading to boundaries with a greater sense of the "community" fit that is required, balanced by the need for efficiency in Council operation.

The advocates of Council reduction should be particularly wary in this respect for their proposals may lead to a new set of problems without solving any of the old. As the following pages show, if the mayor's plan was followed and the councillors were chosen out of the six districts used to separate public works administration, one of the immediate results would be a serious mal-apportion in the vote. A second problem is that these districts cut across traditional suburban lines in the city, which creates its own problems.

A third problem is the loss of minority group representation that the present ward system now provides. If nothing else, the existing system gives access to political representation to poor groups and ethnic groups.

in the central party system. They would lose this access if there was a return to larger wards, as their voting strength would be submerged in a larger ward.

Another value of the small ward system that should also be recognized is the way they support the quicker mobilization of political change. It is easier to organize dissident or opposition forces within a small ward system. Groups dissatisfied with the status quo find it easier to concentrate efforts within a smaller jurisdiction to elect a representative of their point of view. Thus, if there is a concern for promoting political reform and political competition, the small ward arrangement is preferable.  

What, then, about changing to a six district electoral system?

According to the map of the six district system for the Department of Works and Operations prepared by Urwick, Currie and employing 1971 Census data, the population of each district is as follows:

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93. In a study of electoral systems in American cities, it was shown that non-partisan elections and at-large or large district elections favour the incumbent. See Charles E. Gilbert, Christopher Claque, "Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities", *Journal of Politics* 24, May 1962, p. 323-349.
Table 30

Six District Area Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area I</td>
<td>92,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area II</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area III</td>
<td>91,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area IV</td>
<td>86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area V</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area VI</td>
<td>111,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the proposal, anywhere from three to four to six councillors would be elected from each new district.

The objectives of the politicians are twofold. Firstly, they hope to eliminate parochialism by unifying both adjacent suburbs or parts of the inner city with one or more suburbs. Thus, it is expected that they will be found to think in terms of the interest of a large community cutting across historical/political boundaries.

Two inner city Community Committees, Midland and Centennial, become Area I, St. James remains integral as Area II, West Kildonan, a suburb, joins Lord Selkirk and the western half of St. John's, both originally part of the inner city, as Area III. East Kildonan, Transcona and the east half of St. John's become Area IV, St. Vital and St. Boniface are Area V and Assiniboine Park, Fort Garry and Fort Rouge become Area VI, blending what used to be Charleswood, Tuxedo, Inner City and Fort Garry. These districts are of course designed for administrative purposes. As the earlier table shows there is a wide variation of the population of
each Community Committee but that does not pose problems in administering to variations in population. The variation goes from 70,000 in St. James to 111,000 in Area VI -- a variation of 41,000.

This variation has great implications regarding principles of representation. If, as has been rumoured, each district will have an equal number of councillors (perhaps from 4 to 6), then a district of low population like St. James will have stronger representation than district VI. Under a system of six representatives for each of six Community Committees the numbers of people that councillors would represent in the six districts would vary significantly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Residents per Councillor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>15,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>11,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>15,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>14,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>13,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>111,000</td>
<td>18,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under such a system, a councillor from Area VI would be representing about two-thirds more people than a councillor from Area II. Areas I, III, IV and V, having more equal populations, would have lower ratios. Such variations depart from the widely accepted and valued principle of proportional representation.
If, on the other hand, a system of proportional representation were employed where each councillor was to represent approximately 14,000 - 15,000, the following number of councillors would be required:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No. of Councillors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although representation is equalized in the above situation, we now have a variation in the numerical strength of each district. Area VI would have two-thirds more representatives than Area II and 30% more representatives than each of the other districts. If they can work in concert, they could dominate the others on Council.

What all the above tinkering shows is that drawing new districts and developing new representation proportions results in problems as complicated as the problems existing at the beginning -- that is, parochialism due to an uneven distribution of population.

Another problem in trying to tinker with the present community committee boundaries is the constantly growing population of the suburbs
and constantly declining population of the inner city. If one tries to anticipate this trend and plans for several years from now, the inner city may be under represented while the suburbs are over represented.

According to 1971 Census figures, these are the areas of highest growth between 1966-1971:

**Table 33**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. James</td>
<td>59,255</td>
<td>71,431</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Garry</td>
<td>21,177</td>
<td>26,127</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kildonan</td>
<td>11,955</td>
<td>17,713</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vital</td>
<td>29,528</td>
<td>32,963</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Boniface</td>
<td>43,214</td>
<td>46,714</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcona</td>
<td>19,761</td>
<td>22,490</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleswood</td>
<td>7,373</td>
<td>12,180</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inner city as a whole has experienced a decline in population:

- **Inner City**
  - 1966: 257,005
  - 1971: 246,246
  - % Change: 4.2%

Meanwhile, the City as a whole has grown from:

- **Winnipeg**
  - 1966: 508,759
  - 1971: 540,262
  - % Change: 6.2%

In the inner city, the population is basically steady with most census tracts showing a small decline or small increase varying from 4% decline to about 4% increase.
This is not intended to suggest that the fifty ward system should necessarily remain frozen. Rather, it is a recommendation that the time between now and 1975, when a review of the Bill is required, be used to seriously examine the issue of electoral boundaries so that revisions can be made on the best research possible. To tinker with the system now would be a mistake; but so would neglect of proper investigation about what kinds of jurisdiction should be formed to gain maximum participation along with efficiency.

**Executive Re-organization**

Another area of proposed change in the system centers on the executive-administrative branch of government. Problems should have been expected in these arrangements after the provincial government changed the electoral system of the mayor, making for direct election. What they didn't do was alter other parts of the executive machinery which depended for their workability on the ability of chief executive controlling a majority group on Council. Once the mayor was freed from having to be responsible to a majority, the concept of the executive policy committee acting as a form of Cabinet operation fell through. To make the system work, once the electoral changes were made, the mayor should have been given some prescribed powers to wield vis-a-vis Council, which would have enabled the mayor to exercise some initiative and staff support in his own office to enable him to take initiatives. The model that could have been employed would have been the strong mayor system employed in certain American
cities where the mayor's office has power of initiative in appointments, budget making and a veto over Council bylaws. 94

Contrary to this, however, the proposed changes being mooted about by certain councillors and by a provincial study group is to make the mayor into a ceremonial figure and to elevate the position of deputy mayor. In effect, the deputy mayor who would be elected by Council would take the mayor's place in being a member of the executive policy committee and ex officio on other committees, while the directly elected mayor would fill the figurehead position.

This again is a form of tinkering, fraught with difficulties and severe consequences in the political system. It is obviously born out of frustration with the present incumbent of the office who at least according to many councillors pays little attention to his executive responsibilities. But, one could imagine the kind of internecine warfare that would ensue in the future between a strong minded, directly elected mayor, who might be the champion of a certain group on Council, and a deputy mayor who represents another group, both sharing some executive control. It would lead to shambles.

Preferably, any changes to be made in either the position of mayor or deputy mayor should be designed to consolidate the powers of the executive and give them the ability to take policy initiatives. This requires giving the office of mayor certain policy making powers, such as budget, and a capacity to shape an administration according to his tastes through the appointment of officers. It also requires setting up certain agencies

with the executive system that would give the central policy making group some support resources and staff.

At present, for example, the Executive Policy Committee and the mayor's office have no staff for research, co-ordination or policy making similar to groups such as the Privy Council office in Ottawa or the Policy Planning Groups of Cabinet on the provincial level. They must rely totally on line departments for policy initiatives, requiring a transmission first through the respective committees of Council. This severely limits the creation of a central policy thrust or the planning of a legislative program for Council.

If there are to be changes in the organization of the executive policy making system of local government, then it should be in the direction of creating an executive body with both legal powers and staff resources so that it can take initiatives and manage innovation effectively. As one author, David Rogers, points out, strategies for innovation in management may be more effective in gaining improved delivery of municipal services than structural changes in government. The strategies he proposes are as follows:

1. Lateral integration of the fragmented agencies of city government and between it and the private sector, e.g., superagencies, public private development corporations.

2. Administrative decentralization and increased community participation, e.g., community health centre.

3. Parallel structures to city bureaucracies prodding them to be more responsive, e.g., community planning boards, neighbourhood city halls.
4. Improving the planning, information and administrative capacity of the city bureaucracies. 95

Of particular significance in implementing these strategies is a reform in the municipal civil service. There must be effective ways of training new urban managers, appraising performance and productivity and developing more effective means of decision making than the present hierarchial arrangements. Thus, if there is to be a change in the new city system, the most productive effort would come from addressing the issue of management and civil service.

Administrative Overhaul

Closely tied in with the issue of executive re-organization is the need to review and correct several serious malfunctionings in the administrative process. In the last session of the Provincial Legislature, the City of Winnipeg prepared a number of housekeeping amendments designed to clarify the meaning of the Act and these should be acted upon. More importantly, though, is the need to revise the powers of certain agencies to bring about more effectiveness in decision making, without sacrificing political or public control. One area where re-design of institutions would be appropriate would be in the development field. There is now serious confusion and overlapping in responsibilities between various agencies and committees of Council. This has caused, as noted in the case studies, problems of land shortage and a lack of hard bargaining and

serious examination of major land development proposals. These difficulties will become more widespread when the city becomes involved in activities of neighbourhood improvement, land assembly or future downtown projects. In each of these cases, there is a premium attached to having a body able to make decisions without constant referral to many different agencies.

To solve this, the city and the province would be well advised to look at the model of various forms of public development corporations being employed in several American states and cities. For example, the New York State Urban Development Corporation has the power to assemble land, float its own bonds, transcend local bylaws and override local planning ordinances. It is now actively involved in a number of satellite town, inner city development and low cost housing projects and has greatly speeded up development time. In other cases, Boston and St. Louis being good examples, development corporations were set up by the state and the city, but were governed by boards of private people. Perhaps the most imaginative scheme was the one proposed for the state of New Jersey, where a network of community development corporations were planned that would be jointly run by public officials and citizens.96

The point is that not only should there be a cleaning up of administrative difficulties and a re-defining of powers as was recommended in relation to community committees, there should also be efforts at institutional innovation. The city needs effective new instruments to

implement the more difficult tasks of managing and shaping growth and development and these are not available under the present Act.

**Open Government**

While it is imperative that there be a strong executive system, it should not be a closed system. As our case studies have shown, there is a high propensity in Winnipeg's new government to meet behind closed doors and not to use consultative processes with citizens, particularly on development issues. Yet, as those studies have also shown, particularly in regards to railway relocation, the city might have saved itself a good deal of grief if a procedure of open hearings had been adopted. Even the mayor of Winnipeg has been moved of late to call for greater openness in Council meetings, recognizing the dangers inherent in the closed shop system of government.

Some state governments in the United States have enacted environmental acts which require hearings to be held and impact studies to be publicly disclosed on all projects that might significantly affect the environment. Arguments were made at the provincial legislature committee meetings, prior to the enactment of Bill 36, for similar kinds of provision, and the Bill did include a provision (see 635(1)) requiring an impact study to be conducted on all major public works. The city had not honoured this requirement until very recently, and then the impact study goes only to Council for review. The private citizen cannot challenge in any legal way a city action if the impact study reveals serious environmental damage.

The provincial government itself has not manifested any particular concern in this area. In fact, in its handling of environmental matters

directly under its purview, it has shown a marked reluctance to divulge information or engage in open public hearings. Yet, the need to open the process of government is there, and the machinery in the form of the Community Committee-Resident Advisory system is in place. All that is needed is first the enactment of provisions making the holding of in-camera meetings of Council committees restricted to only certain issue areas, i.e., personnel, and only after there is unanimous approval of Council. And, secondly, there should be a provision requiring local government (provincial government for that matter) to hold hearings on programs of major environmental impact, as well as assistance for advocacy groups to enable them to make an effective case on the issue under debate. With this requirement in place, City Council would then have to formulate a set of guidelines on the procedures for processing major development plans and projects. There is now some initiative being taken to provide city employed planners to help develop "action area plans" as set down in the new legislation, although after over two and one half years there has been virtually no progress made in establishing such plans. But, there still remain major issues of railway relocation, transportation systems, downtown development, industrial parks, new communities, and if past practices are followed, those will be decided in an ad hoc way, with a minimum of information supplied and almost no attempt to garner public views or engage in any form of comprehensive planning.

Other cities are trying out forms of public involvement in the planning process. The Greater Vancouver Regional Planning Commission developed a major program of community consultation on transportation. Some American cities have undertaken an extensive process of consultation involving various techniques of public meetings, group participation and
survey research to arrive at basic goals and programs in urban development.

Nothing like this has been tried in Winnipeg, even though the system for operating such a decentralized consultative process is in place. There is a need to re-structure the development process in Winnipeg, to eliminate impediments to effective decision making, to simplify the procedures, and to open up the system and ensure that there is full disclosure of information and accountability on decisions. The beginning of this re-structure could come from the provincial government in setting out a legislative framework for open meetings and public hearings.

Resident Advisory Groups

Another area where there is need for major improvement and clarification is with Resident Advisory Groups. This was a major innovation in Bill 36, but as the previous assessments have shown, the RAGs as they are called were orphaned by the provincial government as soon as the Bill was passed and have been treated since with guarded indifference by city government. As a result, the RAGs have had a spotty and sporadic existence. Various studies and authors have commented on the general decline and ineffectiveness of the RAGs as a medium of citizen participation.

One glimmer of hope is the recent agreement by the Tri-Level Group, a joint committee of federal, provincial, municipal representatives, to allow the RAGs to receive a $230,000 grant from the Federal Ministry of


99. See Meeting the Problems and Needs of Resident Advisory Groups, op.cit.; Inland Magazine, Volume 1, No. 4, November 1973; Winnipeg Free Press, Winnipeg Tribune reporters.
Urban Affairs. This money, to be used to supply the RAGs with research and communication assistance, should be of real help in overcoming some of the obvious weaknesses of RAGs in being able to cope intelligently with issues that concern them and to make some beginnings in informing the general public what is going on.

It must not be expected, however, that under the present structural arrangements of Winnipeg's government that the RAGs will become the vehicle of widespread citizen involvement. Right now they attract the citizen activists, that small minority of men and women who take an interest in local issues. They have no significance to most citizens whose only concern with government is how well does it deliver services. If and when the Community Committees become more responsible for decisions on service delivery, then the RAGs would increase the scope and range of their reach. Thus, in part, the future of the RAGs is closely tied to a revision of the powers and responsibilities of the Community Committees, as previously outlined.

Even without this occurrence, however, the RAGs have an important role to play. Acting as an arena for activist involvement is in itself an important function in several ways. The RAGs bring the different activist groups together and force some process of decision making between them, perhaps leading to a certain consensus on issues. They also bring the activists into continual contact with city councillors and officials, a relationship of benefit to both. The activists gain a sense of the

realistic constraints government people operate under; the government officials gain a sense of community thinking and have new options open to them.

As well, we saw in the railway relocation case how the RAGs have the potential of from time to time becoming the location of major debate and discussion on neighbourhood priorities and concerns, and that potential is itself worth preserving so it can be used when it is needed.

What is apparent is that the RAGs, like other parts of the new system, were introduced without a very clear idea of what they would do, how they would operate and what impact they would have. It was simply a virtuous thing to connect citizens in with local government. What is needed, now, however, is a clearer definition of the role and place of the RAGs in the scheme of things, based on an extensive investigation of the role they have played, and the effect they have.

This study of RAGs should be encased in a larger investigation of the citizen participation philosophy of this new city government. It is somewhat remarkable to note that there is yet to be any kind of real debate and discussion in city government on RAGs or the general issue of citizen involvement. In fact, it is possible to hypothesize that Council and senior officials have only concentrated on those aspects of city government familiar to them, treating the other newer aspects with which they were presented in Bill 36 with indifference or dislike. Hopefully this neglect will be rectified as the newness wears off or as a new generation of councillors and officials who are not tied to past experience come to the fore.
Intergovernmental Relations

A further notable aspect of the new system is the relations that have been established with senior levels of government. One benefit that might have been expected is the ability of city government to deal in a more coherent and consolidated fashion with senior levels of government. Under the old system, there were a number of local government units which was both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, senior levels of government, especially the provincial level, could deal with a number of local government units and play one against the other. Now, there is only one, stronger and more potent, and this has occasioned serious disputes between city and provincial officials over housing and finance. It can be expected that this pattern of conflict will continue as the bargaining power of the city increases, its political leadership continues to be different in attitude and values from the present provincial leadership, and there is an increasing demand by the city for new revenue. This, however, may work to the benefit of the citizens of the Winnipeg area as they now have only one spokesman pursuing their interests rather than many separate units.

The tangible benefits of this new bargaining position have thus far been minimal, although the city has made its case for a share of the growth taxes. 101

A provincial government study has reportedly recommended a new committee to be set up to provide a continuous negotiating forum. This, however, is likely to be of little significance. The arbiter of

provincial-city relations will likely be sheer power politics and will be a consistent issue in the province over the coming decade.

Where there has been a degree of mixed benefit in the new structure is in the functioning of the tri-level committee. This group, organized primarily through federal initiatives, has been a place where projects involving all three levels have been discussed and at times decisions made, i.e., railway relocation. This would have been far more difficult, if not impossible, to organize previously when there were fourteen local units in existence. Thus, there has been an improvement in the intergovernmental consultative process.

There is one serious drawback to this process, however, and that is its secrecy. Tri-Level meetings are normally held monthly, with a number of important items affecting Winnipeg residents on the agenda. Yet, there is never any announcement of meetings or agenda items, nor any public reports to respective elected assemblies. Obviously, there is need from time to time for informal discussions between governments. But, often such discussions lead to de facto decisions with little reference to legislative bodies. It is just one further example of legislative responsibility being eroded and one further step into a form of administered state. In time, this aspect of local government policy making will have to be examined to see if it is working in the best interests of the city. Certainly the example of the tri-level decisions setting up the Railway Relocation study shows that this kind of decision-making can become distant and removed.

102. For a discussion of this issue, see Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, University of Toronto Press.
from public sentiment and outlook, and would benefit if there were a clear cut system of reporting tri-level meetings back to respective legislative bodies.

Research and Evaluation

Finally, a word on research and evaluation. As stated at the outset of this report, the new system of local government in Winnipeg is a subject of widespread interest. As such, it deserves a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation, conducted over a period of time. There are a variety of areas that need to be researched, i.e., structural, administrative and financial areas.

Thus far, a comprehensive, co-ordinated research effort has not been mounted. There are several different academic and governmental groups pursuing different evaluations. Each of these are inadequately funded, and in no way organized so that they support and complement one another. As a result, the opportunity to put together an effective research effort is being lost.

Some efforts have been made at co-ordination, but the problem of politics, academic and otherwise, have interfered. Government has thus far been unwilling or unable to support an extensive research effort, fearing who might be doing it, or what they might find. The responsibility for correcting this clearly lies with the provincial government. Bill 36 was their creation, and by law in 1975 there must be a review of how well it is operating. It would be in their interests to have as honest and as comprehensive an appraisal as possible. After all, they have not taken the
initiative in bringing together the different groups involved in doing partial bits of research to see what combined effort could be mounted. The example they might consider is the consortium organized by the University of London to review and evaluate the re-organization of Greater London. Under the auspices of the University a number of different aspects of research have been started and organized in a co-ordinated way. Thus, there is a maximization of staff and resources and a minimization of duplication.

There is another advantage -- it is an independent evaluation. Nothing could be worse than the authors of the scheme also being the judges of their own handiwork. It would stretch credibility a little too far to assume that the creators of a new policy can also be objective evaluators. This local government reform in Winnipeg is too important to simply be left for some staff group of government to give it a glowing bill of health.
SECTION VI

CONCLUSION
The new scheme of local government in Winnipeg was a bold, if flawed, institutional innovation. It brought to Winnipeg a government that incorporated several structural changes that have been advanced as ingredients of modern urban government -- regional organizations, decentralized neighbourhood units, integrated financial systems. But, it was a new structure that by itself could not change many of the basic ills pertaining to the political system.

The difficulties in decision making on social and economic issues that characterized the old system were simply transferred to the new, only this time the stalemate and conflict occurred within the same governmental unit rather than between units. Where there was a lack of concern on social problems in the old, this persists in the new. Where there was a tendency to quickly approve major development projects under old Metro and City Council, the same tendency was true in the new. In other words, this particular re-organization did not prompt any major change in priorities or administrative and political practices. As Frances Frisken states "Obstacles to effective metropolitan political unification have their roots in the wide disparities in goals, attitudes and social characteristics which prevail throughout metropolitan areas. Until these disparities decrease, administrative decrees which affect the representational structure, quality of leadership, or the scope of formal responsibilities of metropolitan political organizations are likely to have only limited success in increasing the willingness or the ability of those organizations to influence areawide development". 103

The changes that will occur will come more slowly as the new system of ward representation, community committees, resident advisory groups, begin to gradually affect the style and practice of local politics. There is a potential for more openness, more accessibility, more representation of minority groups if these particular arrangements are retained and in the case of community committees and RAGs, given more power and responsibility.

Delivery of services under the new system has thus far remained relatively unchanged. The new system has not meant a new form of administration or appreciably new innovative management. But, again these changes will take time.

Where there is need for serious review and perhaps correction is in the area of the political policy making agencies, primarily the office of mayor and the Executive Policy Committee. A hybrid system was concocted in Bill 36 and there was no sufficient provision of executive powers given to the mayor to enable him or her to induce support for policy measures on Council. There is confusion on where initiatives should emanate and how a coalition of support can be developed for consistent programs. Thus, accountability is lost.

The system also suffers from the lack of a municipal party system which could also provide some cogency and leadership. This is partially a product of the history of non-partisanship in Winnipeg. But, it also is due to the fact that, as yet, there is no well defined set of issues or a strong enough sense of dissatisfaction in the electorate that could give rise to new political formations.

With neither a strong political executive nor a party system, the policy making process is fragmented. There are a variety of coalitions which cluster in support of an ad hoc series of proposals. Those measures
which require a high degree of political skill, patience and fortitude to pass are forgotten because there is little in the system to compel those attributes to be displayed. Individual councillors seek their own electoral self-interest by avoiding identification with unpopular moves. The only area where there is consistent direction is in the development field where there are certain councillors supported by a strong coalition, and on ceremonial and festival type issues which receive the attention of the mayor. However, the new system has created some added difficulties in these areas. Because of the awkward zoning provisions, land development is more costly and time consuming. This has contributed to a shortage of land. The mayor, for his part, is now subject to more criticism, competition and has less informal influences on councillors than he had in the old city.

At the same time, there are some distinct policy benefits. The unified tax and financial system has ended fiscal disparities between parts of the system. The city, while still in a junior position, has more leverage with the provincial and federal governments which could result in more revenue for the city. There are some signs that the first stirrings of citizen protest have been felt by the planners of transportation, which could yield a more environmentally responsible transportation system.

The reforms that should be made in the system are from this point on not structural in character, with the exception of some minor adjustments. The reforms should be political and administrative. There is need for a new "community" politics in Winnipeg, centered around issues of democratic control, i.e., how decisions are made and issues of quality, i.e., what kind of city do we want? There is also need for a more innovative management,
one that uses the most modern techniques of public administration to cope with the many changing facets of the city.

Finally, we must simply know more about how our city operates, what goes on, what the impact and effect of certain decisions, policies, and programs are. This requires a greater commitment to the investigation of the urban scene, understanding it and translating that knowledge into public policy. Perhaps this is the first step in the reform that Winnipeg, with its new structure but old politics, still needs.
OTHER IUS PUBLICATIONS

URBAN GOVERNMENT


Lloyd Axworthy, Maureen Grant, Jim Cassidy, and George Siamandas, Meeting the Problems and Needs of Resident Advisory Groups, 1973.

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COMMUNICATIONS


SOCIAL PLANNING


TRANSPORTATION