The Housing Task Force: A Case Study

by Lloyd Axworthy
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THE HOUSING TASK FORCE: A CASE STUDY

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On July 7, 1968 the Cabinet of the Federal Government of Canada authorized the Hon. Paul Hellyer, then Minister of Transport, to establish a Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. The terms of reference for the Task Force were as follows:

- to examine housing and urban development in Canada and to report on ways in which the federal government, in company with other levels of government and the private sector can help meet the housing needs of all Canadians and contribute to the development of modern vital cities.

The Task Force officially came to life on August 29, 1968 when Hellyer announced the names of Task Force members and the scope and nature of its activities (see Appendix A). It then began a widely publicized tour across the country. In each of the cities and towns where it stopped, public hearings were organized, visits were made to housing projects and renewal areas, and discussions were held with people ranging from a world-famous urban planner, Constantinos Doxiadis, who was visiting Canada, to housewives on the doorsteps of their public housing units.

On January 22nd, 1969 some six months from its starting date, the Task Force released a seventy-page report containing forty-five recommendations on ways to provide more housing at a lower cost and to improve the development of Canadian cities. Shortly thereafter, Hellyer presented to Cabinet a comprehensive legislative program on housing and urban development based on the Task Force findings. Three months later
he resigned from the government charging that the Cabinet was unwilling to take action on his proposals, which he considered to be of prime importance to the domestic well-being of the nation.

This resignation ostensibly brought to a close the short, eventful existence of the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. As a study of British Cabinet practices points out, little is left of a man's influence or ideas once he has resigned from Cabinet, and the Task Force was closely identified with the personality of Paul Hellyer. But it would be a mistake to let the Task Force slip from sight, ending up as just another entry in the history books. It was too unusual a government enterprise involved in questions too important to this nation to have the lessons of its experience lost.

A look at what the Task Force did and how it worked can reveal a good deal about the issues to be faced as we attempt to govern ourselves in contemporary urban society. It can tell us something about how policy is made and who makes it in Ottawa; the changes that are taking place in the functioning of the executive arm of the federal government; the ways in which issues are perceived, information gathered, and solutions prescribed and how government relates to the public in the emerging age of participation and apparent mass democracy.

More fundamentally, the Task Force experience also raises the question of whether parliamentary government stretched over a federal framework, can act as an effective, sensitive agent of social change. There is perhaps no question more important to be asking today. If our system of government is not, and cannot be an active, quickly reacting vehicle of reform or change, what is the alternative?
The Task Force, thus touched upon an issue more vital than the specific recommendations it proposed. Though mention of it never appeared directly in the Report, it was implicitly raising the basic question of whether a democratic system could survive in the kind of urban society that was being created in Canada. In its exposure of the labyrinth-like system of policy making, the deficiencies in research and experimentation, the frustration of ordinary citizens deprived of power and responsibility to manage their own affairs, the Task Force pointed to a serious weakness in the capacity of Canadians to cope effectively and democratically with the problems posed by the rapid urbanization of our society.

The purpose of this study is to use the experience of the Task Force as a starting point for examining at least in part how well prepared and able Canadians are to create a structure of policy-making relevant to the demands of our time.

SETTING - New Government

First the Task Force on Housing should be placed in context of time and events. The fact of a brand new government with a brand new Prime Minister, who had some very definite opinions about the way government should operate is the starting point of the Task Force. Under Lester Pearson, the Canadian Cabinet behaved in the fashion of a modified confederation of Chinese war lords. There were several strong Cabinet Ministers who vied for attention and power and competed openly for the implementation of their own individual programs.

Admittedly, there was a constant chaotic flavour to the proceedings, but such a system created a distinct identity for individual political
leaders, enabling them to command a hearing across the country. They were able to focus issues, project policies, and act as spokesmen for a variety of causes. Walter Gordon's stand on foreign ownership is perhaps the prime example. This tendency was emphasized during the Liberal leadership race of 1968.

Under Trudeau, this was to change. The Cabinet was to become a team, a corporate board of directors who worked behind closed doors, and who were expected to process information, consider alternatives in rational fashion, engage in proper long-range planning, and above all, assume a "low profile", an expression that was heard frequently on Parliament Hill in those early Trudeau days. Naturally in the first months of the Trudeau government this change in approach and style was not fully delineated. Many of the holdovers from the Pearson years were still around, and hadn't yet fully absorbed the new modes of operation. The new management of a Cabinet Committee system was in a shakedown phase, and the influence of the expanded Privy Council Office and Prime Minister's Office was not yet felt. There was, thus, a very different approach to governing. Whether the controlled style of Cabinet operation is preferable to the more rambunctious, individualistic Cabinet style of the Pearson years though is an open question. What could be gained by this order and planning, may be lost in the kind of personal leadership and individual identification with specific policies, that various Ministers such as Walter Gordon and Paul Hellyer and others provided in the Pearson government.

A second pertinent feature of that early Trudeau period was the
feeling of slight exhilaration carrying over from the Centennial and the momentum of the election campaign. There were brave forecasts of new worlds to conquer, and a sense of expectation that finally after the confusion and conflict of the last Pearson years, serious reconstruction in social and economic policy could take place. Whether sought by him or not, Trudeau had inspired ambitions for a new liberalism that would immediately engage the urgent issues. The Task Force on Housing was seen, for example, by many both in the public and inside the political arena, as an expression of the expected activism of the new Trudeau government.

The philosophy of participatory democracy that Trudeau had so successfully articulated during his leadership campaign gave added emphasis to the expectations that very exciting, aggressive new actions would be taken. Feelings of disillusionment with the Ottawa mandarins, with the machinery of government, with the conventional style of bureaucratic policy-making had become widespread amongst the younger generation of political people, MP's, primarily backbenchers and Executive Assistants. There was a sense that now was the time for the government to be more responsive and dynamic. Trudeau himself spoke of this and indicated through such decisions as setting up a regional desk operation in his own office that experiments in developing new forms of policy-making were acceptable.

No one was more prepared to do this than Paul Hellyer. His experience with the admirals during unification had made him wary of the established system of government advisors, and he felt the need particularly in the field of housing and urban affairs to go outside the normal channels. The difficulty, again, was that as in the case of the Cabinet, the meaning of this new style of participatory democracy was not defined nor any
indications given as to just how far and in what ways it could be conducted.

The situation, in those early months of the Trudeau government, was thus one of transition in style, of expectations of reform, but of ambiguity or imprecision in the new operating principles and perhaps even the objectives of government. The creation of the Task Force appeared as a direct expression of the desire for a more direct immediate response to serious social problems. It had the potential of pioneering new, alternative ways to make policy. But there was an uncertainty on just how far it could go in working outside the established Ottawa system.

SETTING - Housing and Cities

By the summer of 1968, the federal government was under pressure to tackle the increasingly troublesome conditions in the related areas of housing and urban development. For most of the period after World War II federal housing programmes under the National Housing Act had underwritten a successful expansionary housing market. Production generally kept pace with new demands and the HMA guaranteed mortgage was the magic ingredient that gave the middle class their suburban home. There had been little done in the field of low income housing, but Canadians were too busy enjoying the post war boom to be much worried about deteriorating inner cities, urban ugliness, or the plight of the disadvantaged.

This situation began to change in the mid-1960's. Tight money began to pull funds out of the mortgage market, and housing production fell. At the same time the surge of post war babies reached the age where they wanted their own dwellings, causing a significant demand for new accommodation. The increasingly higher costs of housing and the rising
Interest rates meant that even middle income families, especially in cities such as Toronto were unable to purchase homes. The municipalities were running short of funds as they were forced to keep up to the demand for new services and facilities. Growing awareness of the urban environment, inspired in large part by Canadians observing the difficulties of American cities, added further to the growing climate of concern and criticism.

The federal government was ill-prepared to meet these new demands. In the autumn of 1967, the Pearson government forestalled a major debate in the House of Commons by promising a federal-provincial conference on Housing. The conference was held in December of 1967 and was a disaster. The proposals presented by the federal government were scorned by the provinces as being meaningless, and the provincial Premiers left a day early deciding that if the sum total of the federal government's thinking about the problem was to set up a Council on Urban Affairs, then they would better spend their time at home. The conference revealed that existing federal programmes were not sufficient to meet the current housing problems, and that the supply of new ideas for coping with conditions in the city was sadly depleted.

Little was done by the Pearson government in the ensuing months, due to the total preoccupation with Liberal leadership politics. Several of the aspiring candidates, however, made major speeches on the issue of housing and urban affairs, particularly Paul Hellyer who introduced his concept of new cities for Canada.

In the June 1968 election campaign, Prime Minister Trudeau broke his normal practice of speaking in general terms about unity and the Just Society to deliver a specific address to the annual convention of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities in Edmonton on June 4th.
on the issue of the cities. Hellyer had been instrumental in having
this speech given and it bore the mark of his thinking. In the speech,
Trudeau uncharacteristically made specific pledges. He promised to set
up a Task Force on Housing and Urban Development and thus acknowledged
that serious problems existed in the field of housing and urban develop-
ment.

In a very basic sense, this emergence in the mid-1960's of
concern over housing and cities represented a new generation of social
issues. They were issues that didn't fit the traditional categories of
welfare, health or social services which had been the stock in trade of
reform policies in Canada. The political parties and leaders had
developed certain philosophical approaches and operational responses to
issues of a 'welfare state' variety. But now, a new set of issues growing
out of what some authors call the "post-industrial state" appeared,
more subtle, complex and diffuse in nature, calling for responses that
couldn't be handled by traditional means. Governments of all levels had
been dealing with urban problems for a long time. But never in the context
of mass urbanization, with all its attendant problems. Canadian cities
were not only expanding very quickly, they were becoming qualitatively
different in the style of life they imposed. The system of government
responsible for the cities was engulfed by the whole range of demands
set up by the growth, movement and change that was taking place in the
cities. The patchwork of rules and regulations, divided jurisdictions,
inter-governmental arrangements, and long-standing financial aids were
not capable of managing the cities in an effective way. The failure
was one of structure - it was just too ill-organized. It was one of thought -
the conventional theories just didn't work. And, it was one of leadership -
no one really wanted to take the responsibility.

It is curious why federal government officials responsible for housing and urban policy didn't see the storm coming sooner and begin preparing for it. One reason was that on the Cabinet level the field of housing and urban development, had been virtually non-existent. It was a part-time job, passed with great frequency to a variety of Ministers who all carried other portfolios, and usually treated the task with irritation when it was dealt with at all. Therefore, no Minister really saw it as an issue in which he would invest much of his time, nor political energies. In fact, one could say that in general there were very few political people in the government concerned with the issue. The dispensing of legal work on CMHC mortgages was an attractive patronage plum, but beyond that, federal Cabinets made little effort to establish cogent policies for housing and urban development.

As a result, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation was left virtually alone without too much prodding from the politicians. CMHC over the years, had developed an efficient organization for servicing those programmes that had been introduced over the years, those previously being to guarantee FHA mortgages, give grants and loans for urban renewal, public housing, sewage treatment and research. As is true with all well-running organizations, it was quite satisfied with the smooth functioning of its operation and didn't engage, as few organizations do, in continuing self-appraisal and review. Neither was there really any other source of outside appraisal or generator of new ideas with sufficient expertise or information to challenge or question its performance. The provincial housing corporations were all quite new and tended in any event to be staffed with old ex-CMHC men who shared many views in common with their former
colleagues. Even if they did differ, they were not apt to be too contrary in public to the organization that paid for most of their programmes. As well there were very few urban experts or urban centres in the universities, and they certainly did not provide much critical comment. The Ottawa-based lobby and pressure group organizations which had an interest in urban matters such as the Canada Welfare Council, Federation of Mayors were also closely linked to CMHC and the ruling structure of the federal government, and contented themselves with making an annual plea for more money or more public housing, goals also shared by CMHC. So, in effect, there was a close system of policy-making, populated by a small number of men who over the years had become well acquainted with one another and with each other's views. Alternatives to this tightly linked network of policy-making might have been provided by the political people in Ottawa, but they had little interest and little concern in the issues.

The slowness of government to respond to all the danger signals that kept flashing from the urban areas in this period highlights the question of government's capacity to be a successful instrument of change. When there is a virtual monopoly of information and skill exercised by government, and when there are no independent or competing sources of ideas or policy, then it leads invariably to a situation where response and reaction to change is too slow to be useful, if it happens at all.

**THE FEDERAL FACT**

An additional factor in assessing the work of the Task Force is the difficulties of making policy in a federal system. The emergence of the issues related to urbanization and housing occurred just at a very critical point in the continuing Canadian struggle between federal govern-
ments and provinces, and at a sensitive point in the relations between French and English speaking Canada. National Unity was the first priority of the new government, and constitutional change its preoccupation. Every other issue was measured in terms of its bearing on the delicate negotiations and relationships in re-ordering unity, and restructuring confederation.

The problems associated with housing and urban development, involving as they do major questions of inter-governmental relationships ran cross-current with the Trudeau government's desire to work out proper boundaries of respective provincial and federal responsibilities. Trudeau, though a federalist, did not believe in an aggressive, activist role for the federal government and felt that the federal government had a minimal role in the cities. He, and other Ministers from Quebec, were therefore, not going to encourage new federal policy initiatives in housing, especially when it would be bound to upset the provinces and make negotiations more difficult.

A basic fact of Canadian government thus is reaffirmed. Efforts at social change through government policy must take second place to the requirements of keeping the federal system together. Several extra sets of hurdles, all the more difficult to jump in these days of active provincialism by provincial premiers, and the prickly nationalist feelings of Quebec are in the way of every proposal for change. New social policy must therefore also have a built-in strategy for coping with our peculiar federal fact. Programmes and responses to issues cannot be judged simply on what is the best answer, but what is also capable of being accepted by all the different governments. As the recent memoirs of General Eisenhower
document, he spent less time on strategies to win the war, than strategies to keep the allies together. Obviously, there must be a balance between the requirement to keep up with change and the requirement to hold together. The difficulty is in determining where the balance lies and what criteria is used for judging when too much emphasis is placed on one or another side of the scale. What is it that would properly assess whether it is more of a risk to have an acute shortage of housing or to raise the ire of provincial governments. This was the kind of issue raised by the Task Force and one that is still unresolved.

REASONS FOR A TASK FORCE

The concept of a Task Force is borrowed from the military. It connotes a separate organization designed to achieve a very specific goal, in quick fashion, operating outside the normal administrative structures. The idea first received currency in the beginnings of the Kennedy administration where the President was suspicious of the policy output of the career civil service and anxious for relatively quick answers to pressing problems.

For similar reasons of dissatisfaction with the policy process of the bureaucracy Canadian Cabinet Ministers also began using the instrument of the Task Force to develop new policies. In the Pearson government, for example, there was the much publicized Task Force on Foreign Ownership established by Walter Gordon, and a quiet, little known Task Force set up by John Turner while Registrar-General to re-vamp the Corporations Act. These two operations had a common working method of pulling together a group of outside experts who were to develop new policy or programme proposals in a very short defined period of time. They differed in that the Foreign
Ownership Task Force led by Melville Watkins was very noisy and public, while the Corporation Act Task Force received only passing mention in the press. Furthermore, the Foreign Ownership Report became a public document, while the Corporation Task Force reserved its findings for the Minister.

The guidelines for setting up the early task forces, or for governing the way they should operate were never properly defined, relying basically on the preferences of the individual Minister. They were an ad hoc response to fill a need in the system of policy-making. They were a means of bringing in special outside experts of particular competence and to provide alternative ideas to those received from the civil service. This reflects the increasing skepticism and suspicion that existed between politician and civil servant or the inadequacy of the government service to provide the range of skills necessary to solve an increasingly complex variety of problems. The Task Forces were seen also to be a quicker, cheaper device than Royal Commissions, and more publicly acceptable, particularly in light of the reaction to the time and expense incurred by the Bi-lingual and Bi-culturalism Commission. As well, they were viewed as a more personal instrument of the Cabinet Minister, a body of his own choosing where he and his staff could have immediate access, and not have to work through the rituals prescribed by Deputy Ministers. They also had little relation to Parliament or its members. They were then very much an attempt by certain Cabinet Members to get out from under the civil service, without getting back into Parliament. The Task Forces might thus be looked upon as direct out-growths of the efforts of certain of the political executives to exercise a policy-making and leadership function in an individual way by drawing into government outside talent responsible to them on a short term basis, to solve problems that government personnel did not have full capacity to meet.
the government to review a host of matters ranging from unemployment insurance and welfare policy to the post office and amateur sports. The most prominent and publicized of them all was the one set up under Minister of Transport Paul T. Hellyer.

The inspiration for the Task Force came from Hellyer and he was its guiding hand. Paul Hellyer had for many years a vital interest in the area of housing and urban affairs, as well as an understanding of the subject, unusual for someone in politics. Although his public fame had been primarily won as the Minister of Defence who had piloted through unification, his interest in urban matters went back to the time when he entered political life with the ambition of doing something about housing. As a developer in Toronto, he had gathered both experience with the practical problems of developing cities and strong views on the failures and foibles of various government programmes.

in the new government, he achieved what he had long sought - the responsibility for housing and urban policy. After the 1968 election, Hellyer was given ministerial responsibility for Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, in addition to this Transport portfolio, and he received agreement from the Prime Minister to launch a Task Force. He proceeded then to establish in his own office a separate organization to assist in the administration of housing and urban affairs programs and used the summer months to assemble a staff and make plans for the Task Force which were scheduled to begin activity in the fall.

CONDUCT AND OPERATION

Hellyer made several important decisions on the format and conduct of the Task Force. There were the critical determinants in shaping the
outcome of the Task Force operation. The first was the demand for speed. Hellyer believed that serious breakdowns were occurring in the Canadian housing market and felt that extensive legislative action would have to be taken by the government before the 1969 construction season to correct the flaws. Particularly pressing was the need for financial measures that would direct sufficient funds into housing to meet the projected annual demand for some 200,000 units. The schedule was therefore to be a tight one. The Task Force would complete its work inside of six months, giving the government time to legislate the desired changes by the Spring.

The Task Force was designed therefore to be an instrument dealing with an immediate problem, as well as to design a longer range program. This pressure of time meant that very little in the way of basic research could be commissioned. It was felt that available resources and research would be suffice to give a basic analysis of the situation and that the Task Force need not provide answers to all problems, only point out those that needed lengthier review. There was an obvious risk in such an approach. Critics would have the opportunity to latch on to those problems that were left unanswered, and obviously some factors would be overlooked. This must be balanced against the merit of developing policy and programmes that are topical. A serious failure of present government practices is time lag. By the time officials perceive an issue, get the policy machinery moving, and implement a programme, chances are the issue has gone through several new phases and the programme doesn't fit. A Task Force that seeks to be relevant can at least match its formulations to existing problems - preferring to be partial in its recommendations than to be badly out of date.
A Task Force operation working to meet immediate issues can also be effective if there is existing a body of applied research to draw upon. Then, it is simply a matter of sifting through evidence and applying what has been found. Unfortunately, in the case of the Housing Task Force, the state of urban research, particularly policy research was dismal. When it came to asking the universities and their thinkers for answers what came back was opinion, conventional wisdom based on what the Americans or Swedes were doing, or requests for new research grants — very little in the way of recommendations for new actions based on hard analysis of Canadian conditions. Thus, the one important fact, relating to the capacity of government to form policy to match events is how much of a pool of knowledge there is to draw upon. How much there is to draw upon is directly dependent on how much has been previously invested in problem solving research. The capacity of the Housing Task Force to develop comprehensive solutions was impaired by the lack of this kind of knowledge and the shortage of basic data relating to urbanization, the housing market and other serious conditions in the cities.

Even with these limitations, the Task Force succeeded in covering most of the ground, and listening to a good many of the experts. The logistics of canvassing an entire country was complicated, but the Task Force was able to visit some 27 communities, read 500 briefs, listen to 250 oral presentations, attend a number of public meetings, and hold discussions with a number of government officials. The three and one-half month tour gave time for numerous discussions and arguments among Task Force members so that by the end of the schedule a synthesis of approach and idea took place. And, true to his intention, Mr. Hellyer had a report within six months, and recommendations to the government shortly following.
A second critical decision was the organization of the Task Force. The membership of the Task Force and its terms of reference were based on what Hellyer conceived as a form of jury operation. Members of the Task Force were chosen in good Canadian fashion on the basis of geography and on the different skills in various disciplines they could bring. But, he very carefully avoided selecting individuals who were acknowledged as "wise men" in the field. The idea was to bring together a group of people who were not identified with existing policies, who had not fought battles to introduce public housing or urban renewal, or who were not closely tied with the "in" system of experts who occupied senior membership in the network of groups and associations that had formed the fraternity of policy influentials on housing matters over the years. Hellyer felt that if there was to be real reform, and just not a regurgitation of the same answers that had been offered over the years, a more objective group was required. They could sit back and ask hard questions without feeling particularly committed to any existing scheme. This did not mean that Task Force members were without views, nor was Hellyer himself. It simply meant that being outside the network, members of the Task Force might evaluate what had been produced by the existing system more effectively.

As useful as this might have been from a policy-making point of view, it created difficulties from a political point of view. There is no question that the fraternity of policy influentials felt snubbed. None of the respected members were on the Task Force, so how could there be confidence in its findings. As well, aside from one official from CMHC who acted as liaison and took little part in the proceedings, there was little
direct participation from the Corporation. They prepared research papers, and were very efficient and useful in helping to organize the Task Force tour. But, they had little direct input. So, there was real separation between the Task Force and those individuals who had long presided over housing and urban policy. This caused resentment and suspicion by those excluded, and their response to the Task Force was framed by these feelings.

Another group of interests not represented on the Task Force were the provincial or municipal governments. The Task Force appeared to members of these other governments as a totally federal approach, dealing with a subject that crossed jurisdictional lines. During the course of Task Force hearings, conversations were held with provincial ministers responsible for housing, with many mayors and local government officials, and briefs were received from most cities. These were quite sufficient in presenting the arguments of the other levels of government. The Task Force was looked upon as a federal show and thereby lost some of its legitimacy. It also gave some provinces the chance to disassociate themselves from the findings, as they could claim no involvement with the deliberations of the Task Force.

This points to another set of difficulties for policy-making on social issues. Because most of the contemporary issues cannot be divided into neat compartments, respectively assigned to each level of government, what mechanism is available and most suitable for generating new policy formulations. The approach of the Housing Task Force was to use the advocacy approach. One government sets forth a set of propositions which other levels of government can then respond to and issue their own alternatives. There is the approach of the Constitutional conferences where
there is some attempt at joint discussion and formulation at the official level, followed by the advocacy proceeding in formal constitutional meetings. Then, there is the approach of having truly combined policy-initiating commission, representative of all levels of government. The problem in this approach is how to select what representative, and whether the members would act as spokesmen for their respective governments, or engage in a collective enterprise of investigation. The other approach is the constitutional one which seeks to remake the constitution to eliminate inter-jurisdictional responsibilities. This is unrealistic.

The approach used by the Task Force was probably the best one available under the circumstances. The problems inherent, and the time involved in working out a Task Force that would have involved all levels of government, would have set back the actual undertaking to a point where its work and findings would have been irrelevant. The Task Force on Housing could not afford to be an experiment in federal-provincial policy-making, along with all the other things it was attempting to accomplish. It could have been greatly aided, however, if there had been a functioning inter-governmental mechanism, that had been addressing itself to the problems of jurisdiction, constitutionalism and federal-provincial-municipal relationships in the field of housing and urban affairs. A decision to establish such a body was one of the few outcomes of the 1967 federal-provincial housing conference, but it was not functioning at the time of the Task Force. Therefore, aside from one paper commissioned to study the federal-provincial implications of its findings, the Task Force made little reference to the complicated question of how its findings could be implemented inside the constitutional federal framework. This would be a source of many problems when it came to the Federal Cabinet's discussion of the Report.
A NEW MINISTERIAL POWER

In setting down operating guidelines, the Minister of Transport proceeded right from the start on the basis that he would be the chairman of the Task Force, be present at its hearings and deliberations, and quite naturally exercised a strong influence on the findings. This was a radical departure from normal practice. The tradition, whether with Task Forces, Royal Commissions, and even in the bureaucratic policy process, is for the Cabinet Minister to stay aloof, or at least separated from the working body.23

The reasons are obvious. A policy initiation body can come forth with recommendations that may be unacceptable to the Cabinet. The Minister to whom the Task Force or Commission or whatever reports, simply passes the report on to Cabinet. The Government is thus in no way committed to the findings, except to study them, nor is the individual Cabinet Minister. He may personally be in favour and argue so in the confines of the Cabinet room. But, publicly he is disassociated, and if Cabinet does not accept the recommendations, he is not forced to resign. Even in the case of the Task Force on Foreign Ownership where Walter Gordon was clearly associated with the issue and where he undoubtedly exercised an informal influence on its deliberations, he did not become an official part of the body. All this is done in the name of Cabinet solidarity, that sacred principle bequeathed to us from eighteenth century British practice. No Minister can be at odds with his fellows, as the government must stand united.

Interestingly enough, at the outset of the Task Force, there seemed to be little questioning of Hellyer's participation by other
members of the government. Hellyer himself believed that he had been given a mandate to create a new policy and felt that his leadership of the Task Force would insure results that he could personally endorse and submit as recommendations for government action. Yet he was in effect creating something of a brand new instrument of policy-making, one that went beyond the conventional functions assigned to Royal Commissions or other Task Forces. It was not a body separated from government, not a semi-independent investigatory body from which government could divorce itself. It was a grafting on to the executive arm a personal ministerial policy-making body - an extension of the office of the Cabinet Minister that was not civil service. It endowed the Minister with a new set of powers of investigations, public accessibility, and intellectual skill. It, in effect, changed the role of the Cabinet Minister in several important ways. It gave him new resources for competing with the expertise of the bureaucrat, it widened his powers as a policy initiator and thrust him into the position of public advocate for change and reform.

This transubstantiation of the Task Force into a new kind of policy-making body had very visible results. When the Task Force came to town, it was not headed by some little known university president, judge or businessman. It was headed by the Minister. It was a body with power not just to recommend, but because of the involvement of the Cabinet Minister, presumably to act. This made a great difference to the proceedings. The presence of Paul Hellyer on the Task Force gave it an impact and visibility it otherwise would not have had. When people appeared before it they were speaking directly to the man who would introduce new legislation. The extensive publicity that accompanied the Task Force was not a result
just of the seriousness of the issue, but also because the chairman
was a senior Cabinet Minister who was pledging concrete results within
six months. The expectations that were thereby created may have been in
bad form for those who believed in low profile politics, but they did
indicate that this form of policy-making can stir a response, and make
government believable to the public. It is something they can see, readily
accessible. It is putting the power of the office of Minister closer to
the citizen - close enough that he believes he can directly influence
what it does.25

This transformation of the Task Force concept was never
articulated at that time - neither the press, the public or other members
of the government fully grasped the significance during the fall months
as it criss-crossed the country. Only when the Task Force Report was
ready for release in January of 1969, was there a reaction. Because the
Report itself challenged several accepted ideas, and was not just going
to be a repetition of existing policies, did the implications of the Task
Force become clear. Here was a controversial Report, being made public,
with the signature of the responsible minister affixed. Efforts were
made by members of the government to alter the timing and form of presentation,
but it was too late. The Report was released and soon thereafter, Hellyer
presented to the government a new housing programme based on the Task Force,
as he promised he would do six months previous when the Task Force began.

Obviously, thus use of a Task Force by a Minister ran against
customary Cabinet practice. The system is not built for that kind of
extension of ministerial power, and it was bound to cause problems,
particularly the feeling that Hellyer had usurped the power of Cabinet to
decide policy. This might have been looked upon as an aberration, and passed over if it hadn't been for the fact that the Report pushed a strong activist role for the federal government and ran counter to the attitudes of several Cabinet Ministers on matters of federal-provincial relations. Furthermore, Hellyer had a sense of urgency and pushed for immediate consideration and quick dispatch of his recommendations. These factors combined to make a real issue of the nature and style of the Task Force, and to set up strong opposition to Hellyer's programme.

The longer range implications of this Task Force challenge to the existing Cabinet system are important. There is increasing discussion of the inadequacies of the present system of Cabinet Parliamentary government. There are changes by the opposition that Trudeau is creating a presidential system. There are complaints from Members of Parliament that they have little influence. There is continuous criticism of the operation of the civil service. And, there are even mutterings from Ministerial offices that the present team concept is inhibiting.26

The Hellyer Task Force was one response to these various complaints about the machinery of government. Even with all its imperfections, it was one way of giving much more of a role to the responsible elected political leader. It was a way of developing alternative policies from those of the civil service. It was a way of providing some counter-weight to the growing power of the Prime Minister. It was a way of utilizing the position of Cabinet Minister to give issue leadership and provide direct contact to the public. It, thus raised certain critical questions of how well the present system operates and whether or not the new generation of issues demands new methods of executive action.
This does not mean that a totally disorganized system is the answer - nothing would be gained by having Cabinet Ministers constantly roaming the countryside promoting a random selection of unrelated programmes. But it does suggest that perhaps adaptations can be built into the system to permit, with the prior cognizance of Cabinet, certain Ministerial Task Forces to operate in a public fashion in those issue areas where such a mechanism would be justified. The resulting recommendations should be the responsibility of the Minister, but he needn't resign if his full programme is not accepted. It would be an acknowledgement of the Government that some kinds of problems, especially in the stage when they first appear, need the kind of direction a Ministerial Task Force would provide. The question is whether it is worth the effort to develop an instrument of government that can contend with immediate problems with some dispatch, and with a more open form of contact with the public, rather than continue in the present, more rigid framework.

**PARTICIPATORY POLICY-MAKING**

Perhaps the judgment on that question depends on the evaluation of the Task Force as a vehicle of participatory policy-making. Though the decision to personally head the Task Force might have been the most significant from the political and governmental point of view, the decision by Healyer to take the Task Force directly to the people might have been the most progressive departure.

There is a growing disillusionment in Canada with the way decisions are made. There is a lack of trust in government, a sterility in the debate of the experts, and a distinct feeling that too many people are left out of those decisions that affect them. Student unrest,
wildcat strikes, citizens' movements, are the familiar signs. The idea that democracy is not working well in Canada, especially urban Canada is very pronounced, and there are of course all kinds of explanations based on theories of alienation, anomie, mass society to explain why. That it is happening is a fact, and that institutions of political parties, representative chambers and bureaucratic structures aren't coping with this feeling is another fact. Perhaps the most exciting aspect of the Trudeau phenomenon in 1968, especially to the young, and the urban middle class was his sincerity in calling for a new form of participatory democracy.

The Task Force on Housing had as one of its guiding principles, that it would talk to the people. The philosophy was expressed by Hellyer in a speech to the Canadian Real Estate Board during the early days of the Task Force. He said:

"In our Task Force, we are having a look at the country as it really is. Members of the Task Force are having to do what few Canadians are ever forced to do. They are being taken out of their normal routine worlds of teacher, businessman, politician and are having to discover a new world. We are by necessity, day by day, being compelled to shake off our long standing notions and basic prejudices. Through our meetings, our walks in the streets, our tours of apartments, senior citizen homes, and public housing we are being exposed to the inner world of urban Canada.

...we are finding out from people themselves what they think, talking to them in their own neighbourhoods. This is not a Task Force that will make up its mind only through written evidence or expert testimony. We are also absorbing the character of Canadians as they seek to find a decent life in a very complicated urban world." 28

He meant what he said. It began with a public meeting in a suburban middle class housing development in Ottawa, where over 300 citizens and Task Force members engaged in a tough four-hour question
and answer session. From that time on the practice was to spend about fifty per cent of the time in each community talking and listening to the views of a great range of citizens. There was the standard procedure of all commissions and task forces - to properly entertain briefs from a variety of groups and experts. But, in addition, there were the multitude of gatherings in public housing projects, walking tours of urban renewal areas, conversations on doorsteps, large open public meetings, and lunches with citizens groups. It is difficult to measure the number of people who were approached, and who offered their views. There were many dramatic episodes - a teenage girl in Regents Park who described her troubles living in public housing, a 6:00 a.m. visit with fishermen in Newfoundland, a tour through some of the bad housing occupied by Indian and Metis in downtown Winnipeg, the angry outbursts of housewives in Thompson where there were no family homes, the toughness of the Chinese community in Vancouver who wanted to plan their own urban renewal.

There is no question that this experience had a strong influence on the Task Force. Time and again it became clear that there was a disparity between the views of the people and the views of the experts and the decision-makers. The sociologists would say that what was needed was more public housing, the people who lived in it disagreed. City officials waxed eloquent over the success of urban renewal, people told a different story. Academics said there was not really a housing crisis, people told of their frustration of not finding a good place to live at a price they could afford. It became very clear that the perceptions of the "influentials" who made policy, and those of the people were very different, causing Task Force members to be very skeptical of the advice and information given them by experts and officials.
There was also a reciprocal effect on citizens. For the first time for many, they were being asked what they thought. They were given a hearing, an invitation to express what they felt to the man who could decide. Legitimacy was given to various citizens groups, as Hellyer sought what they had to say and gave his support to their efforts. One might contend that the phenomenon of citizens movements across Canada, was given substantial push by the Hellyer Task Force. Some critics labelled the Task Force a travelling circus - perhaps correctly when you consider that circuses attract the attention of a lot of people and get them involved.

This was a very healthy happening. It helped the Task Force reach conclusions that it would never have reached if it had been satisfied to play the conventional game of public hearings, pressure group briefs, and official briefings. It created a vehicle for public participation in policy-making. It was transitory - a one-shot effort, but it tapped a well spring of opinion, wisdom and experience that rarely penetrates the closed system of decision-making that is endemic with modern government. It has provided a model for succeeding ventures in participatory policy-making, making fashionable, maybe even necessary efforts to go beyond the circle of those with influence or organizational power to talk to the many kinds of average citizens. The style, approach and method of involving people was one of the most important aspects of the Task Force and one of its major commendations as a new policy device.

OPPOSITION

The Task Force, when it finally reported, was faced with serious
opposition. Some Cabinet Ministers resented the manner of presentation of the Report, and felt that they were being pressured into accepting recommendations because Hellyer had already publicly staked his position on their being approved. The rationale for opposing the recommendations were couched in terms of concern over the activist federal role espoused by the Report, and over fears that it would disrupt existing programmes in urban renewal and public housing. There might also have been elements of personal reaction against Hellyer, especially from newer Ministers who reacted to the image of Hellyer as the tough, uncompromising Minister of unification days.

This opposition was supported and indeed abetted by members of the old "housing" fraternity - both within and without the civil service. There were several senior civil servants who had no liking for the Minister of Transport. He had often expressed his opposition to the rule of the bureaucracy and had fought them in the unification debate. There were others in the government service who had been responsible for some of the Programs that the Report attacked, and they added their voices to the inside network of opposition.

They were joined by spokesmen for various Ottawa-based pressure groups or volunteer organizations that professed interest in the "social" aspects of housing. Their opposition was by far the most irresponsible - often misconstruing the recommendations and intent of the Report. Repeatedly the charge was hurled that Hellyer and the Task Force were against low-income housing, making one wonder whether many of these professional reformers had bothered to read the Report before they made their criticisms. In fact, the Report was critical of public housing as a means of providing low-income housing and recommended changing public housing programmes. But it also
recommended introducing a number of other alternative programmes to alleviate the problem of low-cost housing. The opposition of this group of private groups who are supposed to be dedicated to social progress ranged from public criticism to private memoranda to members of the government. They displayed an extreme conservatism in their attitudes towards changing the system and can be awarded points equal to the most obdurate business or trade group in a defense of a status quo that they helped to create.

The other major source of opposition came from certain provincial governments. The Report had raised serious questions about the workings of the urban renewal, public housing system, particularly the practice whereby the national government paid for the programmes and the provincial governments took the credit. There was also an attitude prevalent amongst some provincial housing officials, that accomplishments in the housing field could be measured simply by the gross number of units that were built with federal funds regardless of how well they fitted the needs of people. A closed federal-provincial conference of housing Ministers was held in Toronto in late February and representatives of the larger provinces displayed their opposition to any change in the role of the federal government. Through the circuit of federal-provincial secretariats and other informal links, these fears found the ears of those in Ottawa who were particularly sensitive to the concerns of the provinces.

Each of these kinds of oppositions were not to be unexpected considering the way the Task Force contravened established working relationships. They really can't be changed without friction and opposition. The reaction in Cabinet, the opposition of civil service, the antagonism
of influential private groups in the network of housing policy-makers, the
disagreement by provincial governments represent the sources of reaction
against efforts at change. This is not to imply that all the criticisms
were totally wrong, and all the actions of the Task Force and Paul Hellyer
were right. But it does reveal the pressure points in the policy-making
system, and suggests that any attempts at social change had better en-
compasse strategies to cope with the attitudes and opinions held by those
who occupy the critical positions in the system. That is why it is
important to consider ways in which political leaders can mobilize public
support and create public demand, as it is one counter weight to the
established holders of power.33 That was one advantage held by the Task
Force. Strong support came from many areas. Many members of the govern-
ment caucus applauded the Task Force, particularly those from big cities
where the problems were critical, the abuses most pronounced, and where the
Task Force had communicated the government's concern. There was general
support from the media, and from many individuals who had been crying in
the wilderness over the years in their opposition to urban renewal and public
housing. The most telling sign was the favourable reaction by the public,
especially the hard pressed and the low income. From the representations
and letters received by Hellyer, it was clear that a chord of response had
been struck with the many Canadians who were suffering most for lack of good
housing and good urban policies. Perhaps the weakness was that such support
was not given the time to germinate.

The array of forces designed to hold up the introduction of new
federal programmes won out. Hellyer introduced his program in early February.
In mid-April, it was still being shuttled from one Cabinet Committee to
another. Hellyer resigned on April 22.
SUCCESSES

The resignation did not mean that the work of the Task Force was a failure - quite the contrary. In the first instance, Hellyer's departure propelled the government into action and by June of 1969 housing legislation was passed by Parliament that incorporated many of the recommendations of the Task Force. Many of the other findings of the report are still being acted upon by the government. Robert Andras, who has the full-time job of overseeing housing (an improvement in itself) has continued the stoppage of urban renewal until more effective programmes are developed. He has also offered $200 million for proposals to better provide low-income housing, and began some changes in public housing policy. He has also commissioned a major study of urbanization which could gather much of the data that was absent, when the Task Force began its work.

More important, Hellyer and the Task Force did spark beginnings of activity that could bring about even more significant changes in the field of housing and urban development. The Task Force evaluated the issues, gave them visibility, created an awareness in the public that something was wrong. They helped activate many concerned groups and individuals to begin thinking seriously about the problems, and probing for new solutions. The Task Force findings challenged and discredited many conventional wisdoms, and exposed the weaknesses in major programmes such as urban renewal, land assembly and public housing. They demonstrated the need to find more effective answers. The Task Force also gave rise to new political processes centered on urban issues. The recent activity and influence of the citizens groups can be partly attributed to the credence given such movements in the Report and in Hellyer's actions in supporting their efforts. Reform movements in local government were given ammunition
by the Report. Housing and urban development have become major planks in Mr. Stanfield's opposition to Mr. Trudeau. And, even in Mr. Trudeau's own caucus, there are urban based MP's who take open issue with the federal government's lack of radical action. These happenings, cannot be ascribed directly to the Task Force. But the Task Force unlocked the door and set many of these forces loose and in so doing partially fulfilled its ambition to bring about change, even though its Report and the Minister who sponsored it were turned down by the government. To use the old adage - the first one to breach the barricade is bound to fail. But his efforts make it possible for others to follow.

MACHINERY FOR CHANGE

Aside from whatever effects the Task Force might have had in producing new approaches to the problems of housing and urban affairs, its experience raises the more basic question of how prepared is the government in Canada to be an active innovator - an agent for social change. The Task Force was an instrument of policy-making different from what government had tried up to then. It ran contrary to the model of rational, administrative decision-making being applied by the Trudeau government. It provided a proto-type of how the power for policy-initiation of individual political leaders can be enhanced and how an alternative mechanism to the civil service, or the closed inter-acting systems of bureaucracy and private pressure groups can be effectively devised. It also provided one way of giving meaning to the idea of participatory democracy.

In doing this it ran counter to some sacred precepts of the Cabinet system of government. It jarred the conservative tendencies of many Canadian decision-makers, both political and public servant, who
believe that government should not initiate expectations, but simply receive demands and serve as a broker between competing interests. It also showed the difficulties inherent in our federal system in bringing about programmes of social change. Canadians suffer under a multiplication of obstacles in what is a difficult process of itself, and this can be a source of growing frustration in an era of new types of social and economic issues, unless it is brought to an end.

New governmental institutions to deal with the problems of governing a modern society are urgently needed, and this is where the lessons of the Task Force are important. The Task Force was not a perfect mechanism, nor was it designed to be an ideal instrument of policy-making. But, its experience shows that there are ways government can remodel itself to be open and activist, less bureaucratic, with more participation of people and less dominance by experts. It has shown that perhaps more leeway should be given to political leaders to provide issue leadership, and that the Cabinet system be re-fitted to suit a greater freedom for Cabinet Ministers. It gives encouragement to those who believe that government still might provide a relevant democratic means of making decisions even on complicated issues.

These are important insights to have. The issue of how govern-ment might fill a role of initiation, be a vehicle for legitimately capturing and expressing today's mood of discontent and be one major source of change is a critical political question. The success or failure of the Task Force thus cannot be presently measured. It depends on whether the value of the lessons it provided through its experience can be added to other lessons to help form a new theory of how government in Canada can act as an agent of change - keeping step with the pace of events. A look at the
Task Force can't give the entire picture of what is needed, but it might provide a good start.
FOOTNOTES


5. For an examination of the contrast in the style of governing, see Anthony Westoll, April 11, 1970, Winnipeg Free Press "Trudeau: A Look After Two Years".

6. The Task Force Report on Housing recorded on page 6: "In quantitative and even qualitative terms, the achievements since 1945 are impressive. Forty-nine per cent of the entire housing stock has been built during the period, the highest ratio of new housing additions in the entire Western World. In the years 1945-1968 a total of 2,838,251 new units were built in Canada, 682,276 financed by approved lenders were under the insured lending provisions of the NHA and 371,331 financed directly by CMHC loans." Report of the Federal Task Force on Housing and Urban Development, Queen’s Printer, January 1969.

7. In 1964 and 1965 there was an average of 165,000 housing starts. In 1966 this fell to 134,474. The vacancy rates for apartments in Toronto were 4% in 1966 and in 1968 less than 1%. Canadian Housing Statistics, 1968.

In 1969, the percentage of NHA borrowers from the upper third income group had increased to 44% from 1965 figure of 18%. The percentage of lower income families dropped from 18% in 1965 to 6%, in 1969 based on CMHC housing statistics.

8. The major proposals presented by Mr. Pearson and Mr. Nicholson, then Minister Responsible for Housing in their opening statement on December 11, 1967 were:

- loans for open spaces and transportation corridors
- an expansion of land assembly programmes
- contributions to the cost of regional planning
- slightly higher NHA loans
- a council on Housing and Urban Renewal
The above was the opening statement by the Prime Minister to the Federal-Provincial Conference on Housing and Urban Development, Ottawa, December 11, 1967.

9. See in particular Hellyer's speech to Liberal members of Parliament March 27, 1968. It is interesting to note that John Turner countered Hellyer's idea of new cities, and they engaged in one of the few debates on issues that occurred during the Liberal Leadership Campaign overshadowed as it was by personality politics.


12. Nathan Glazer in describing American Presidential Task Forces comments: "In this way the task force indeed resembles a naval task force cut off from the massive support and restrictions of its home bases and its regular chains of command". Glazer, Nathan: "On Task Forcing", The Public Interest, No. 15, Spring 1969, p. 41-42.


15. For an examination that has been made of these changes see Anthony Westell's series, April 14, 1970 - "Cabinet Secretariat Now Powerful Elite". Winnipeg Free Press.

16. An articulation of these can be gathered in statements made by Hellyer in a Press Conference on August 16, in a speech delivered to the Canadian Real Estate Board in Niagara Falls, October 7 and in the preamble to the Task Force Report.

17. Glazer, op. cit., Glazer points to these problems in the American experience.


20. The members of the Task Force as indicated in the Report were - "Its Chairman, Transport Minister Paul T. Hellyer, was himself the Minister responsible for federal housing policies. The remainder of its membership was drawn from the private sector, broadly representative of the geographical regions of Canada and of the varied disciplines and backgrounds most intimately involved in the subjects under inquiry. They were Dr. Doris Boyle of Sydney, Nova Scotia, an economist-sociologist on the faculty of Xavier College; ecologist
Dr. Pierre Dunsereau of the University of Montreal's Institute of Urbanism; W. Peter Carter of Montreal, Mortgage Controller of the Royal Bank of Canada; builder-developer Robert Campeau, President of Campeau Corporation of Ottawa; Dr. James Gillies, a land economist and Dean of the Faculty of Administrative Studies, York University, Toronto; and C.E. Pratt, a senior partner of the Vancouver architectural firm of Thompson, Berwick, Pratt and Partners. William H. Neville of Ottawa was appointed Executive Secretary. The Task Force also was assisted by Alfred E. Coll, Executive Director of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, as CMHC Liaison Officer and by Lloyd Axworthy, Executive Assistant, (Housing) to Mr. Hellyer.

21. For a similar though earlier example, see Peter Newman's discussion of Walter Gordon's use of outside advisors in the preparation of the 1963 budget and the resulting reaction of the civil service. See Newman, op. cit., pages 13-30.

22. As Bruce Doern points out in his study of Royal Commissions: "There is, therefore, superimposed on the urgent need for viable general public policy-making technique, all the problems of inter-governmental relations and jurisdiction. This need is on a continuing basis. See page 433, Canadian Public Administration, December 1967, Vol. X, no. 4.


25. The recent White Paper on Taxation is an attempt to introduce public discussion into policy making without risking the standing of the Minister of Finance who may be forced to make changes. However, the White Paper clearly was the product of the civil servants in the Ministry of Finance and Mr. Benson, who is only acting as a spokesman for a policy position created in the traditional fashion of Royal Commission recommendations distilled by the civil servants.

26. See article by Anthony Westell - "Masses Closer to Government", April 17, 1970 which highlights the criticisms of the existing system of Cabinet government.


29. See comment by Peter Schrag: "Why Our Schools Have Failed", referring to the movement in New York for school decentralization, who said: "It is thus a revolt against the "professionals" - the people who took charge, in the name of reform and good government, and apparently failed to deliver the goods. In its unwillingness to trust the experts, the demand for decentralization is frontier populism come to the city, a rejection of outside planning and expertise." Page 317 in Gittel, Marilyn and Hevesi, Alan: The Politics of Urban Education, (New York: Praeger) 1970.

30. To quote from Anthony Westell: "Its mandarins are little known to the public but widely respected and sometimes feared in the federal service. They are credited by admirers with bringing a new cohesion to government policy-making, and accused by critics of destroying such outside initiatives as Paul Hellyer's housing task force." From "Cabinet Secretariat New Power Elite", April 14, 1970, Winnipeg Free Press.

31. See page 52 to 61 of Task Force.


33. See Jack Walker's "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy": "The elitist theory of democracy looks for the principal source of innovation in the competition among rival leaders and the clerical maneuvering of political entrepreneurs, which is, in its view, the most distinctive aspect of a democratic system. Because so many political scientists have worn the theoretical blinders of the elitist theory, however, we have overlooked the importance of broadly based social movements, arising from the public at large, as powerful agents of innovation and change."

34. The initiatives for the new legislation were presented by the Prime Minister in the debate following Paul Hellyer's resignation and the emergency debate on the government's poor handling of the housing problem. See the House of Commons Debates, Friday, April 25, 1969. Vol. 113, No. 136, p. 7973.

35. The example of the foreign policy review where ministers Kierans and Cadieu publicly took different positions, shows that it is not possible to have more freedom within our present system of cabinet government.
APPENDIX A

The Task Force Appointed

OTTAWA, August 29, 1968—Transport Minister Paul Hellyer, Minister responsible for federal housing policies, today announced the appointment of members of the new federal Task Force on Housing and Urban Development.

Assisting the Minister in his examination of Canada's urban problems will be Dr. Doris Boyle of Sydney, Nova Scotia; Dr. Pierre Dansereau and W. Peter Carter, both of Montreal; Robert Campeau of Ottawa; Dr. James Gillies of Toronto; and C. E. Pratt, FRAIC, of Vancouver.

Mr. Hellyer himself will serve as chairman of the Task Force which is scheduled to open a series of nationwide public hearings in Ottawa September 16-17.

William H. Neville of Ottawa has been appointed Executive Secretary of the Study.

The Task Force will also be assisted by Alfred E. Coll, Executive Director of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, as CMHC liaison officer and by Lloyd Axworthy, Executive Assistant (Housing) to Mr. Hellyer.

Purpose of the Task Force is to examine housing and urban development in Canada and to report on ways in which the federal government, in company with other levels of government and the private sector, can help meet the housing needs of all Canadians and contribute to the development of modern vital cities.

Dr. Boyle, a native of Baltimore, Md., currently is a Professor of Economics at Xavier College in Sydney. Holder of a doctorate in sociology and economics from Catholic University, Washington, she was head of the Social Sciences Department at St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, from 1950 to 1958 prior to returning to Baltimore where she was a Professor of Economics at Loyola University. She came back to Canada last year to assume her present position. A frequent lecturer and commentator on social and economic problems, she was married to the late Dr. George Boyle, noted author, teacher and founder of the Antigonish Co-operative Movement.

Mr. Carter, 39, came to Canada in 1957 from Britain where he holds a Fellowship of The Incorporated Society of Valuers and Auctioneers. In 1961 he became Senior Mortgage Officer of the Guaranty Trust Company. Between 1962 and 1966 he was Assistant Vice-President of Canadian Acceptance Corporation and General Manager of CAC Realty, its mortgage subsidiary. Since 1966 he has been Mortgage Controller of the Royal Bank of Canada. Mr. Carter is a Corporate Member of the Association of Ontario Land Economists and a former member of the Mortgage Advisory Board to the Ontario Government.

Mr. Dansereau, 57, graduated from the University of Montreal and subsequently obtained his doctorate in botany from the University of Geneva. A Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and a Guggenheim Fellow, he has lectured and taught at a number of major institutions, including the University of Montreal, MacDonald College, University of Otago, New Zealand, University of Michigan and Columbia University. In 1955 he was appointed Dean of the Faculty of Science and Director of the Botanical Institute at the University of Montreal. Currently he is Professor of Ecology in the University's Institute of Urbanism. Dr. Dansereau is the author of several research studies in the field of botany and ecology and has participated in a number of international conferences on environmental problems. This year he convened a symposium on "The Challenge for Survival: Land, Air, and Water in
Megalopolis at Rockefeller University and the New York Botanical Gardens.

Mr. Campeau, 44, is the President of Campeau Corporation Limited, a major Ottawa construction-development firm which has built more than 10,000 housing units since 1950. He also developed the $10,000,000 Place de Ville complex in the downtown area of the capital. Mr. Campeau is a member of the Board of Governors of Laurentian University in Sudbury, a member of the Advisory Board of Guaranty Trust Company of Canada, and Chairman of the Fund-Raising Committee for the new Children's Hospital of Eastern Ontario.

Dr. Gillies, 44, obtained his Bachelor of Arts Degree in Economics from the University of Western Ontario, his Masters from Brown University and his doctorate in economics from Indiana University. A former Professor of Urban Economics at the University of California, he served as Vice-Chairman of the Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles and an adviser to the California Commission on Metropolitan Problems. Now Dean of the Faculty of Administrative Studies at York University, he is a director of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, the Canadian Council on Urban and Regional Research, and the Institute of Canadian Bankers as well as a member of the Export Advisory Council to the Minister of Trade and Commerce.

Mr. Pratt graduated from the University of Toronto's School of Architecture in 1938. After wartime service with the Royal Canadian Air Force, he formed the Vancouver architectural firm Thompson, Berwick, Pratt and Partners with which he still is associated. He is a Fellow of the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada, an Honorary Fellow of the Architectural Institute of America, and a former President of the Architectural Institute of British Columbia. He was a member of the three-man Committee of Inquiry into Design of Residential Environment established by the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada and also served on the jury for the Toronto City Hall competition. His design of the University of British Columbia Gymnasium and the Thea Koerner Graduate Centre at UBC won Massey Medals in 1952 and 1962 respectively.