## Reducing the Size of Winnipeg's City Council: Process, Myths, Realities and Alternatives

by Brijesh Mathur 1991

The Institute of Urban Studies





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#### REDUCING THE SIZE OF WINNIPEG'S CITY COUNCIL: PROCESS, MYTHS, REALITIES AND ALTERNATIVES Published 1991 by the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg © THE INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES

Note: The cover page and this information page are new replacements, 2015.

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#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This publication is the result of the Institute's desire to contribute to the current debate in Winnipeg over the size of Winnipeg's City Council. The assistance of three student researchers of the University Winnipeg in collecting the information on which this paper is based is gratefully acknowledged. Herbert Koehl collected much of the data and prepared the maps. Christian Douchant collected data and prepared tables. Christian Cassidy's paper, "Bigger Wards-Bigger Councils? A Case Against Reduction of Winnipeg City Council," prepared for my class, provided a ready reference on the issues raised in the current debate on the size of Council. Professor Christopher Leo provided valuable suggestions of substance.

Brijesh Mathur Acting Director

#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT DEBATE

#### 1.1 REDUCTIONS IN SIZE OF COUNCIL SINCE 1960

The size of Winnipeg's City Council has been a recurrent issue for many years. In 1960, there were 102 elected officials in the municipalities which then constituted Metropolitan Winnipeg. Metropolitan Council consisted of 10 members directly elected from special pie-shaped districts which included both inner city and suburban areas. The rationale for such a system was that while Councillors in the constituent municipalities would represent the interests of their respective wards, the Metropolitan Councillors would bring a city-wide view to govern Winnipeg. It was not a question of whether ward or city-wide interests should be represented, but rather that both interests were important for good local government. However, within such a system, there was considerable tension between the metropolitan and municipal government, and, in 1972, metropolitan government, was replaced by the amalgamation of the constituent municipalities into Winnipeg's Unicity. Emphasis was placed upon the representative role of local governments, and upon citizen access and participation. A large City Council consisting of 50 members elected from separate wards was constituted.

In addition, the Unicity legislation established 13 Community Committees, each covering a number of wards and consisting of the Councillors from these wards. The Community Committees were intended as the means for achieving greater participation and decentralization of certain functions. To advise and assist each Committee, the legislation provided for the establishment of a Residents Advisory Group (RAG). Despite the emphasis upon participation, the goals of participation were not realized, and certain problems of accountability and leadership developed in the day-to-day functioning of Council. In 1977, several of amendments were made to the Unicity structure. However, these amendments did not address the problems that had surfaced. Among the amendments was one which reduced the size of Council from 50 to 29, and of the Community Committees to 6 from 13. Certain discretionary powers of the Committees were also abolished.

A review of the City of Winnipeg Act in 1986 examined, among other issues, the question of the size of City Council, and recommended that the number of wards be reduced to 24, but that the number of Community Committees remain the same (6). That recommendation was not implemented. It is interesting to note that the number of wards has been reduced from 102 in 1960 to 29 in 1991, a reduction of nearly 300%. However the problems of governance have not been solved. In 1988, the newly elected Progressive Conservative minority government of Manitoba drafted legislation to amend the City of Winnipeg Act to reduce the size of City Council from 29 to 23 members. That amendment was defeated in the Legislature.

#### 1.2 THE CURRENT DEBATE

The current debate (1991) over the size of City Council has surfaced as a result of an announcement made by the leaders of the Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties during the 1990 Manitoba election, to reduce the size of City Council in the interests of greater efficiency and economy. The leader of the Progressive Conservative Party announced during the campaign that if elected, he would reduce the size of Winnipeg's City Council to a number between 12 and 15, and expressed his preference for pie-shaped wards which include both inner-city and suburban areas. Upon forming the government, the Progressive Conservatives appointed "The Winnipeg Wards Review Committee" to recommend an appropriate number of Councillors between 12 and 15; the future of the Community Committees; and the basis for electing councillors. The process has been widely criticized for deviating from established practices governing the delineation of wards. There is also a belief among many that a further reduction in the size of City Council will not result in improving the functioning of the city's government. Moreover, it is also argued that pie-shaped wards will disenfranchise certain groups, particularly those in the inner city.

## 2.0 PURPOSE AND CONTENT OF THIS PAPER

One objective of this paper is to examine the legitimacy of the current process for undertaking a review of Winnipeg's wards. Another is to examine the popular beliefs which have led to the advocacy of reducing the size of Winnipeg's City Council. A third objective is empirically to examine the consequences on representation of constituting pie-shaped wards in Winnipeg. Following from such an examination, alternatives to reducing the size of City Council for achieving responsible government in Winnipeg are suggested.

The main purpose in producing this paper was to present it to the Winnipeg Wards Review Committee and to others who may have an interest in the debate. The paper was prepared over a period of a few days. In the interests of increasing its readability, the author has purposely kept away from the normal scholarly practice of footnoting and referencing throughout the body of the paper. Instead, a bibliography has been appended for those who may wish to explore the issues further.

#### 3.0 THE PROCESS FOR DELINEATING WARDS

#### 3.1 THE ESTABLISHED PROCESS

Sections 5 (2) and 20 (4) of the City of Winnipeg Act (1971) prescribe the procedures with respect to the delineation of ward boundaries in Winnipeg. These sections of the Act provide for the establishment of The Winnipeg Wards Boundaries Commission constituted of the Chief Justice of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, the President of the University of Winnipeg and the Returning Officer of the City of Winnipeg. Such a commission met in 1988, and is required to meet every ninth year thereafter, or whenever recalled to review ward boundaries. Unless recalled, it is next scheduled to convene in 1997.

Since the review of boundaries is a politically sensitive matter, the intent in setting out the composition of the Commission in legislation is to avoid the perception of irregular practices. Moreover, the entrustment of the responsibility to persons who are viewed as objective and impartial, and who possess a certain stature in the community reinforces the credibility of the Commission and its recommendations.

#### 3.2 THE IMMEDIATE PRECEDENT

After the Commission was convened in 1988, it was advised by the Minister of Urban Affairs of the minority government that his government intended to seek the amendment of the City of Winnipeg Act to reduce the size of City Council from 29 to 23 members. The Minister urged the Commission to consider such an intent in preparing its recommendations. The Commission prepared two proposals, one for 23 wards, and the other for 29 wards and presented these at public hearings. However, before the hearings could be completed, the Government introduced the amendment in the Legislature. As stated earlier, that amendment was defeated. Following the public hearings, the Commission came to its own conclusion that in order to ensure community integrity and effective governance, the number of wards should remain unchanged at 29.

#### 3.3 THE CURRENT PROCESS

Upon re-election after a mid-term election, during which the reduction of the size of City Council was announced, the Minister of Urban Affairs, ignoring the established legislative process for the delineation of wards, appointed "The Winnipeg Wards Review Committee" to report with recommendations on:

- the appropriate number of Councillors between 12 and 15;
- whether Community Committees should continue to exist;
- whether to continue to have one Councillor elected from each ward, or to have a new ward system with more than one Councillor representing a ward;
- whether to have pie-shaped wards or some other configuration, and
- to submit a report with recommendations on the boundaries and names of each ward in the City of Winnipeg.

#### 3.4 CREDIBILITY AND LEGITIMACY

Apart from questions of legality, the creditbility and impartiality of the Committee appointed by the Minister has been questioned in the community for the following reasons:

• No White Paper was prepared by the government setting out its reasons for reducing the size of Council, a decision which the government has made without any public

discussion and a decision which is a given for the Committee.

- The Committee was not constituted of members prescribed in the City of Winnipeg Act. Instead, the Committee was constituted of three members, two of whom are known supporters of the party in power (one is a defeated candidate, the other a spouse of a candidate in the provincial election).
- Even before appointing the Committee to advise the government on the nature of wards, the Premier of the Province and the Minister of Urban Affairs had publicly declared their preference for pie-shaped wards.
- Although the government won a slim majority in Manitoba, it won only 13 of the 31 ridings in Winnipeg. All of these were in suburban areas of the city. Thus, the government cannot claim that it has the support of Winnipeggers for its election announcement on size of Council, and particularly the dismantling of inner-city wards.

The above discussion prompts the conclusion that the process has little moral or political legitimacy, even though it may well be legal and can probably be justified on obscure legalistic and bureaucratic grounds. At a time when public confidence in the uprightness and honesty of elected governments in Canada is at an all-time low, the adoption of such a process would appear to be particularly insidious. However, the persistence with which the present government has pursued this issue suggests that it must believe that the ends which it hopes to achieve are so good that the means may be justified. No doubt, such a faith would rest upon some beliefs or myths related to its ends. The section which follows examines those myths.

#### 4.0 MYTHS AND REALITIES

A review of reports and articles in the print media of Winnipeg revealed five main arguments advanced by proponents of reducing the size of Council. Of these, four arguments are advanced primarily in favour of reduced Council size, while a fifth combines the argument for a smaller Council, with that for pie-shaped wards:

1. That a reduction in the size of City Council will save taxpayers' money in annual

expenses of Council;

- 2. That a reduction in size will bring Winnipeg's City Council in line with other Canadian cities of comparable size;
- 3. That a reduction in size will make Council and civic administration more accountable;
- 4. That a reduction in the size of Council will result in more speedy, coherent and consistent decision-making; and
- 5. That a reduction in size, in conjunction with pie-shaped wards, will reduce the so-called "parochialism" in decision-making which is said to characterize Council decisions.

Any student of Canadian local government will be able to discern a pattern in the above arguments which ties them to persistent conventional Tory reform ideology which emerged at the turn of the century. That ideology is based on notions of getting politics out of municipal government and providing greater control over civic affairs to the business community, along with marginalizing labour interests. However, the purpose in raising this point is not to dwell on the finer points of local government literature, but to point out that the notion is rooted in ideology.

#### 4.1 MYTH #1 - REDUCING COUNCIL SIZE WILL LEAD TO COST REDUCTION

On the surface, the notion of cost reduction is one that is most easily sold to the unaware as a justification to reduce the size of City Council. The simple arithmetic of 12 or 15 Councillors in place of 29 suggests that a penny or two off the tax bill might be saved. To some, Councillors, or politicians, for that matter, are not worth a penny anyway. However, when one considers that the issue of reducing the size of Council is closely tied to turning part-time Councillors into full-time, elected bureaucrats with doubled salaries, as well as offices, staff, expense accounts and the perks which would soon begin to pile up-the cost would not in fact be reduced, but more pennies would begin to flow out of the taxpayers pockets. Half the number of Councillors, would soon be worth <u>at least</u> twice as much. The real irony would be that most Councillors (by their own accounts) now serve the taxpayers for at least 40 hours per week at half salary.

Expenses of Councillors, however, would not be the only additional cost to the taxpayer. Because Councillors would then serve twice as many constituents, their workload would increase beyond reasonable hours unless they started to cut back on the time which they now spend serving their constituents. Their workload at City Hall would certainly not decrease, because there would be fewer of them to sit on Committees and to assume other responsibilities as full-time servants of the public who must make bureaucrats more accountable.

The notion that a reduction in the size of City Council will lead to savings for the taxpayers does not bear scrutiny.

### 4.2 MYTH #2 - REDUCING COUNCIL SIZE WILL BRING THE CITY COUNCIL IN LINE WITH OTHER CITIES

The size of City Council is closely tied to the ecological structure of the city and to the historical evolution of its government. In that sense, Winnipeg, with its cultural, ethnic, and socio-economic diversity and institutional evolution, is unique. Even a cursory review of Winnipeg's socio-economic conditions sets it apart from other Canadian cities. The social, economic and physical issues that Winnipeg's City Council has to manage, are more complex, diverse and intractable than those faced by Calgary and Edmonton. They require a diversity of views, which, in a democratic society, only the representation of diverse interests can bring. It is absurd to place Winnipeg's evolution and problems on a par with those of Calgary and Edmonton, the two cities of comparable size often cited as having fewer Councillors than Winnipeg. Those cities have a different structure of local government, and their ecological structure and institutional history are different.

Within Manitoba, while Winnipeg's Councillors represent roughly 20,000 voters, Brandon's Councillors represent 4,000 and Portage La Prarie's only 1,200. Moreover, 31 MLAs are elected from Winnipeg. If such a high intensity of representation is necessary in other urban areas and at the provincial level, then surely the 29 representatives on Winnipeg's Council, which is supposed to be closest to the people, are not too many. To suggest otherwise is to make nonsense of the commonly held ideal that local government is closest to the people, and to use a double standard when considering the size of Winnipeg's Council, on the one hand, and representation of other jurisdictions and levels of government, on the other.

## 4.3 MYTH #3 - DECREASING COUNCIL SIZE WILL LEAD TO GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY

There is a belief among proponents of Council reduction that the lack of accountability of Councillors arises out of the fact that because there is a large number of them, it is difficult for the public to monitor their actions in Council. On this basis, it is argued, that it will be easier to keep track of fewer Councillors. This notion is too simplistic and almost impossible to confirm empirically without extensive surveys of the cognitive and mental retention capacity of voters' minds under controlled conditions. A more definitive approach to accountability of Council would be to open up the decision-making processes of Council, and to increase the participation of the public in municipal decision-making.

Moreover, the problems of accountability in Winnipeg's city government, as in any large or complex organization, arises out of the lack of clarity in political and administrative roles. Councillors cannot be held responsible for their actions in the present set up because it is impossible to identify their role in making particular decisions vis-à-vis the various Committees, the Mayor and the administration. To remove such anomalies, some alternatives have been suggested over the years by the various Review Committees appointed to recommend reform of the City's government. It is interesting to note that <u>no</u> Committee has recommended the reduction in the size of Council as the means to achieving accountability. Rather, their recommendations had to do with how the Mayor is elected; who appoints the City's Executive Policy Committee; who chairs it; who appoints the Chairs of the Standing Committee; how powers are divided among the Council, Mayor and the Committees; how budgets are formulated; how executive power is delegated; and how responsibilities are divided. It is <u>these</u> issues which mitigates accountability rather than the size of City Council. For years, various provincial governments have displayed inertia in addressing these issues. The current government, instead of addressing the real issues related to accountability, has sought refuge in the non-issue of Council size.

Another point about accountability needs to be made. Larger wards will, undoubtedly, mean higher expenditures by candidates during civic elections. Such expenditures are likely to be twice as much as those incurred by candidates in the provincial elections. In the absence of party funds, candidates for Council will need to raise their own funds. Undoubtedly, they will seek assistance (overtly or covertly) from stakeholders. The group that is most likely to assist would be the land development interest which dominate municipal politics. In the case of pie-shaped wards, these interests will be able to buy the loyalties of Councillors and distort accountability, thus frustrating the very purpose of going for larger wards.

#### 4.4 MYTH #4 - A SMALLER CITY COUNCIL WILL IMPROVE DECISION-MAKING

It has been claimed that the present size of City Council militates against consistent and coherent decision making because the group is too large, and, consequently, splintered. Such analysis begs the question as to <u>why</u> over 50 MLAs are not likewise splintered, if size alone causes splintering? The obvious answer is that no party or larger alliance now binds the Councillors, and creating parties or other cohesive alliances would remedy the problem. However, this paper is not about the pros and cons of a party system at the local level, which, in all likelihood, cannot be legislated. If the objective is to minimize dissent among Councillors, then the solution would be to have a Council of one.

However, the making of consistent and coherent decisions is not so much a function of size or dissent on Council as it is of leadership, process and structure. As in the case of accountability, so also are the issues of leadership, process and structure tied to the delineation of powers, roles and responsibilities. Here again, numerous recommendations have been made by Review Committees on how to improve decision-making in Council. These recommendations seem to have been put aside to make way for the panacea which the reduction in the size of Council is believed to be.

### 4.5 MYTH #5 - REDUCED CITY COUNCIL AND CONSTITUTING PIE SHAPED WARDS WILL REDUCE PAROCHIALISM

The term "parochialism" has been used so often to describe the actions of Winnipeg's Council that many regard this as the worst pathology of City Council. In turn, parochialism is attributed to a large Council consisting of members who represent relatively small and homogeneous wards. It is alleged that such Councillors are unable to take the larger, city-wide view. Hence, the advocacy of a smaller Council with wards of supposedly greater diversity. In the minds of the provincial government, achieving greater diversity would require the merging of inner-city and suburban wards.

There are two questions with respect to the reduction of parochialism through pieshaped wards. The first is: What are some examples of parochialism that is sought to be eliminated? The second question is: Will pie shaped wards produce greater diversity associated with city-wide interests?

With regard to the first question, the following passage is illuminating:

There is widespread belief among members of the municipal elite--which seems at various times to have been reflected on the review committee--that municipal politics in Winnipeg is afflicted by parochialism, so that those who are pursuing the well-being of the city as a whole find themselves blocked by the advocates of narrow, ward-based interests. Intuitively, that proposition seems to make sense, but on examination it becomes clear that it is largely subjective. I asked each of the elites who complained about parochialism to give me an example of a decision that illustrated his or her view. For each of the examples I heard, an argument could easily have been made that it was the alleged parochialists who were in fact the pursuers of the city's overall welfare. For example, a number of people cited the cancellation of Sherbrook-McGregor overpass as an example of the triumph of downtown parochialism. If the decision had gone the other way, however, it could as easily have been portrayed as suburban north-end parochialism, saddling the city with a key link in an unwanted future expressway system.

Whether we are confronted with parochialism, therefore,

or simply with an elite frustrated because they are not getting their way as easily as they would like, is a matter of opinion. There is no conceivable evidence that would settle the question conclusively. The proponents of the parochialism thesis generally argue in favour of at-large elections within each community to replace the current ward system. My opinion is that the wards are performing a valuable representative function and that any legitimate concerns about the failure of city-wide leadership can be more effectively addressed through the provisions--discussed above--for strengthening of the mayor and the EPC, than by abolition of the ward system. (Christoper Leo, <u>Revising the City of Winnipeg Act: A Discussion Paper</u> [Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, 1987] 28. pp. 15-16).

The above quotation suggests that the term parochialism, at least in the context of the current debate, is a synonym for interests other than those of suburban development, highway and bridge construction and other similar projects. It is important to be clear about what we mean when we advocate "city-wide" interests, particularly when we use the notion to shape the city's electoral system to yield such a perspective on Council.

The second question about pie-shaped wards is answered in the next section of this paper.

## 5.0 PIE-SHAPED WARDS: A RECIPE FOR SUBURBAN BIAS, INNER CITY NEGLECT AND THE MARGINALIZING OF COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

#### 5.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

One way to assess whether pie-shaped wards would produce greater diversity associated with city-wide interests, is first to define city-wide interests, construct them to hypothetical pie-shaped wards, and to examine their socio-economic characteristics to judge whether citywide issues are likely to be of concern to Councillors elected from pie-shaped wards.

In this section, some important city-wide interests are first identified. Next, eleven

socio-economic indicator of present wards and two hypothetical pie-shaped wards are compared, using computer generated map sets empirically to examine the effects of boundary changes on aggregate socio-economic characteristics of wards. From such an analysis, conclusions are drawn about the effect of pie-shaped wards on representation on the one hand, and on city-wide interests on the other. The eleven socio-economic indicators used in the analysis were constructed from the 1986 Census of Canada and include:

Map Set 1 - Percentage of Low-Income Households
Map Set 2 - Percentage of Female Single Parents
Map Set 3 - Percentage of Dwellings of Age Characteristics
Map Set 4 - Percentage of Rented Dwellings
Map Set 5 - Population 15+ Without Secondary Certificate
Map Set 6 - Language Spoken
Map Set 7 - Percentage of Aboriginal Peoples
Map Set 8 - Percentage of Seniors
Map Set 9 - Population 15+ without Grade 9
Map Set 10 - Unemployment
Map Set 11 - Immigration

#### 5.2 THE MAP SETS

Each set of maps contains three or four maps. The first map in the set shows the distribution of the indicator in the present 29 electoral wards of the city. The second map shows the distribution for Community Committee areas. The third map shows the distribution for a hypothetical division of the city into eleven wards, three of which are formed by merging parts of the area in the City Centre/Fort Rouge Community Committee with other contiguous wards to create pie-shaped wards which respect the natural divisions of the river system. Six other pie-shaped wards are created to the east of the three wards. The area to the west of the three pie-shaped wards is divided into two wards which have marginal characteristics of pie-shaped wards, in that they do not contain inner-city areas. The fourth map was constructed for only five of the eleven indicators because of problems in mapping marginal values. This map represents a classic example of pie-shaped wards which respect the natural divisions of the river system, and yet yield the magic number of five pie-shaped wards advocated by proponents of such wards.

#### 5.3 IDENTIFYING CITY-WIDE INTERESTS

The only documented statements on what might be considered to be city-wide interests are provided in <u>Plan Winnipeg</u>. Inadequate as these are, they do provide a starting point to enumerate the interests of the city as a whole. <u>Plan Winnipeg</u> is currently being reviewed, and it is reasonable to expect that the basic interests of the city will not likely change in the new plan. Some additional interests, consistent with the idioms and issues of the 90s, will probably be added to the interests in the extant plan. One of the new interests will likely be based on the current initiative to develop a Social Development Policy for the city. The other will probably centre around the current cliché of Sustainable Development.

Without going into a long and elaborate discussion, the following items might be considered to be a minimum package of city-wide interests:

- the limitation of suburban development;
- the revitalization of the inner city and inner suburbs;
- addressing the shelter and services needs of all residents, particularly those who are most in need, such as low-income households, female single parents, seniors, Aboriginal peoples and new immigrants

#### 5.4 EFFECTS OF PIE-SHAPED WARDS ON CITY-WIDE INTERESTS

How might Councillors elected from pie-shaped wards respond to the above interests? What do our Map Sets tell us? The conclusion of this study is that pie-shaped wards will likely bring a suburban bias, foster the neglect of the inner city and marginalize communities of interest. These conclusions are based on the following observations:

- (1) The maps representing 29 wards in all eleven map sets indicate substantial differences in the distribution of socio-economic conditions between inner-city and suburban areas. Most disadvantaged groups are concentrated in the inner city and its contiguous areas; and, in most instances, represent a significant proportion of voters of wards to be able to influence the outcome of elections.
- (2) As we move from 29 wards to 5 pie-shaped wards, the representation of

disadvantaged groups becomes marginal in terms of their ability significantly to influence the outcome of the election.

(3) The maps representing the Community Committees in all eleven map sets indicate that the City Centre/Fort Rouge Community Committee is significantly distinct from the other Community Committees in that its Councillors represent the disadvantaged groups in the city. As we move from the Community Committees to five pie-shaped wards, the special interests represented by the City Centre/Fort Rouge Community Committee disappear into the larger homogeneity of the pie-shaped wards. It would be reasonable to conclude that under such conditions, the voters representing the special interests of the inner-city would get lost in the overwhelming majority of suburban voters.

It can be concluded from the above observations that pie-shaped wards would not be conducive to the consideration of city-wide concerns in Winnipeg. Rather, the Councillors elected from such wards would, as politicians, cater to the interests of their suburban majorities. In such a process, the current tensions in Council arising from inner-city vs. suburban interests will most likely be resolved in favour of suburban interests. The losers in the process will be the residents of the inner city -- low income households, female single parents, seniors, Aboriginal people, recent immigrants, occupants of poor housing and the receipients of poor services. However, the city will be a bigger loser in that a political structure will be put in place which sacrifices the larger interests of the city to the parochial interests of suburban development. The structure is unlikely to be sustainable, because sooner or later, the tensions it creates are bound to challenge its survival.

#### 5.5 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

There are significant financial implications in introducing any system which alters the existing Community Committee structure, because service-delivery systems of civic departments are structured along the jurisdictional partitioning of these committees. To meet the objectives of accountability in service delivery, those arrangements will need to be

altered. There are no estimates of the financial implications of such alterations.

Moreover, the present system of urban planning in the city is also organized on the basis of Community Committee areas. Consequential changes to the planning system will also have financial implications. The financial implications of implementing a new political system are often high, and rarely foreseen. Before a decision is made on pie-shaped wards, the financial implications should be assessed to see if the probably illusory benefits of the system are justified.

#### 6.0 ALTERNATIVES

The alternative to revising the wards of Winnipeg is to undertake <u>meaningful</u> reform of its government along the lines proposed in the report of the 1985 Review Committee. Small changes in the number of wards may be possible, and indeed necessary, to strengthen communities of interest. The integrity of communities interest is central to local political boundaries. Recent reviews of Winnipeg's wards are unequivocal on this matter:

> The Committee further recommends that the boundaries and composition of both the Community Committees and the wards be adjusted where practical to provide: acceptable equality in population per representative, greater mutuality of interest and basis for cooperation among wards within Community Committees, and a lessening of parochial identifications dating from the pre-Unicity period. We suggest that new ward boundaries of Community Committee areas, as composed of mutual-interest wards, be determined on the basis of similarity of interest and other political criteria, rather than being patterned on the administratively-convenience public works district scheme...

> (City of Winnipeg Act Review Committee. Final Report, 1986. p. 40)

and

The major concern expressed at each of the public meetings was that the revised boundaries should address local and community interests on an equal basis with population density. The citizens of Winnipeg as well as the elected representatives, with one exception, were unanimous in expressing the view that the 29 ward proposal be retained, and that the wards identify more closely with comparable socio-economic characteristics and historical interests of the ward residents. (Report of the Winnipeg Wards Boundaries Commission, 1988)

p. 8).

## 7.0 CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions may be made from the discussion presented in this paper:

- 1. That the process employed in the current review breaks from established procedure and raises questions about the legitimacy and creditability of the Winnipeg Wards Review Committee.
- The notion of reducing the size of City Council is rooted in turn of the century Tory Reform Ideology rather than in legitimate reasons.
- Reducing the size of Winnipeg's City Council will increase rather than decrease the expenses of City Council.
- 4. Justifying a decrease in the size of Winnipeg's City Council on the ground of parity with cities such as Calgary and Edmonton is ill-advised, because Council size is a function of ecological structure and institutional evolution - not just the size of population.
- 5. Decreasing the size of Winnipeg's City Council, but not those of Brandon and Portage La Prairie, and making representation at the local level in Winnipeg more intense than at the provincial level, will introduce double standards and inconsistencies in political representation in Manitoba.
- 6. Decreasing the size of City Council will not increase accountability of Council and municipal administration. Nor will it improve decision-making processes. These can be improved <u>only</u> by opening up decision-making processes increasing public participation and reforming the internal structure of roles, relationships and decisionmaking processes of Council as recommended by the Cherniak Committee.
- 7. Pie-shaped wards will not foster a city-wide view in Council. Rather, they will engender

a suburban development bias, inner-city neglect and the marginalization of the voices of communities of interest with respect to their needs for shelter and services.


- 8. The alternative to reducing the size of Council is to undertake <u>meaningful</u> reform of the City's government as set out in the Cherniak Report.
- 9. Given the ecological structure of Winnipeg and the historical evolution of its government, a ward system is the best solution to political representation. Some marginal adjustments in ward boundaries along the lines of the proposals in the Cherniak Report would further strengthen representation.


# APPENDIX A - MAP SETS CHARACTERISTICS OF WINNIPEG WARDS, COMMUNITY COMMITTEE AREAS AND HYPOTHETICAL PIE-SHAPED WARDS


## LISTS OF MAP SETS


- SET 1 LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
- SET 2 FEMALE SINGLE PARENTS
- SET 3 DWELLINGS BY AGE
- SET 4 RENTED DWELLINGS
- SET 5 POPULATION 15+ WITHOUT SECONDARY CERTIFICATE
- SET 6 LANGUAGE
- SET 7 ABORIGINAL PEOPLES
- SET 8 SENIORS
- SET 9 POPULATION 15+ WITHOUT GRADE 9
- SET 10 UNEMPLOYMENT
- SET 11 IMMIGRATION

SET 1 LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS












SET 2


FEMALE SINGLE PARENTS










SET 3 DWELLINGS BY AGE









## SET 4 RENTED DWELLINGS










SET 5


POPULATION WITHOUT SECONDARY CERTIFICATE










SET 6 LANGUAGE










SET 7 ABORIGINAL PEOPLES













SET 8 SENIORS













SET 9 POPULATION WITHOUT GRADE 9










SET 10 UNEMPLOYMENT













SET 11 IMMIGRATION









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