


# Urban Change in Winnipeg: The Adoption of Bill 36

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by Tom Axworthy  
1972

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The Institute of Urban Studies





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WINNIPEG

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URBAN CHANGE IN WINNIPEG; THE ADOPTION OF BILL 36

by

Tom Axworthy

July, 1972

## Introduction

One of the most pressing questions currently being asked in Canada is whether our nineteenth century local government structures impede the solution of twentieth century urban problems? The answer of late most often has been, yes. Within the last decade, growing public concern about pollution, expressways, housing and demands for that vague entity called participation, has prompted every Canadian province to review the workings of its local government system. Several important restructurings have resulted but the reform in Winnipeg, Manitoba has recently attracted the most attention.<sup>1</sup>

On Saturday, July 24, 1971, the legislature of the Province of Manitoba, gave third and final reading to Bill 36, "The City of Greater Winnipeg Act". The passage of the Unicity Bill ended one of the most bitter conflicts of modern Manitoba politics and ushered in a unique experiment in North American metropolitan government.

Bill 36 is interesting both for its substance and the process which led to its creation and adoption. The new Winnipeg local government structure is a genuine innovation which attempts to combine political decentralization through the use of community committees and citizen advisory groups - with the amalgamation of twelve municipalities into one big city. This combination of administrative and service centralization, with built-in participatory channels, has led observers to label Winnipeg's experiment as the most exciting urban development in Canada since the formation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953.<sup>2</sup>

It is, of course, too early to assess the success or failure of the new structure. The Unicity council was only incorporated January 1, 1972. But what can be examined now is the process which led to the adoption of the reform. The successful introduction of change is one of the most difficult processes in politics and the Winnipeg experience may contain lessons for other areas.

### Literature Review

The existing literature on Metropolitan reform is of little help to Canadian students. Most of the material is drawn from American sources and while these contain useful accounts of battles to get Metropolitan reform in Miami, city-county consolidation in Nashville, etc., the precepts of Jacksonian democracy and the resulting hurdles of local referendums are alien to Canadian tradition.<sup>3</sup> The general literature on political change is, of course, voluminous but the application of many of the concepts to the specifics of urban politics is a hazardous process.<sup>4</sup>

Two studies which do apply directly are Harold Kaplan's Urban Political Systems, and Frank Smallwood's Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform. Smallwood has adapted the game-contestant approach of Sayre and Kaufman to the parliamentary system and clearly shows the effect of that particular government form on the type of strategy that various groups employ in supporting or opposing reform.<sup>5</sup> Kaplan studies the impact of environment on styles of local politics and hypothesizes that the large degree of social consensus and the low pressure or temperature of Toronto partially explains the existence of an executive-centered system.<sup>6</sup> From the study of Kaplan and Smallwood it appears that four basic questions must be asked about any attempt to gain reform:

- 1) What is the political culture and distribution of power?
- 2) What are the conditions which lead to the initiation of reform?
- 3) What kinds of resources and motivations are held by the participants in the contest?
- 4) What strategies are employed by the contending factions?

The first section of the case study describes the political environment of Winnipeg and briefly summarizes the history of local government in the city. Particular attention is paid to the dispute between the Metropolitan Corporation and the City of Winnipeg. The clash of these two bodies so immobilized urban policy making in Winnipeg that the provincial government not only perceived the need for change but was prepared to carry it out. Part I then attempts to answer questions one and two. Part II describes the process which led to the creation of the unicity plan and analyzes the various sections of Bill 36. Part II examines the motivations and strategies of the participants involved in the battle over the adoption of the bill.

### Part I

#### The Political Environment of Winnipeg

Like any political environment, Winnipeg has been shaped by demographic, economic, and historical forces. The life of a city is a constant balancing between conflict and co-operation<sup>7</sup> and socio-economic forces largely determine the conditions which either increase the sense of community or foster

disintegration. Population size, density and heterogeneity, for example, can generate both resources - energy, diversity, economic strength or conflict - ethnic disputes, overcrowding, etc. Historical events can condition the local political culture<sup>8</sup> which, in turn, affects attitudes towards corruption, the scope of local government activities, or the development of a local party system. Some of the more important environmental factors which have affected the life of Winnipeg can be classed under:

- (1) Population characteristics
- (2) Economic Indicators
- (3) The Ethnic Transformation

#### Population Characteristics

Winnipeg has a population approaching 550,000 and an area of over 228 square miles. Prior to amalgamation the region was governed by 14 separate units - the Metropolitan Corporation, the central City of Winnipeg and 12 suburban municipalities (See Table 1 and Figure I).

The original inhabitants of what is now Manitoba were the Indian people, primarily Cree, Saulteau and Chippewayan. There are now approximately 32,000 Indian people in Manitoba and 34,000 Metis.<sup>9</sup> It is estimated that at the beginning of the 1960's there were only 5,000 - 6,000 Indian/Metis people residing in Winnipeg, but by 1971, 15,000 - 40,000 native people lived in the city, almost all in the downtown core.<sup>10</sup> In a survey undertaken by the Indian-Metis Friendship Centre and the Institute of Urban Studies, it was found that 50% of the native people had family income under \$4,000, 17.3% were unemployed, and 12% were on welfare.<sup>11</sup> This shift in

the last decade from rural reserves to downtown Winnipeg has helped create the situation recognized by the government White Paper on Urban Reorganization, that, "Social ills and hence social costs tend to concentrate in the core area. These costs have to be borne almost entirely by taxpayers in the central area despite the fact that many of the people requiring social services and creating social costs have migrated to the central area from outlying communities."<sup>12</sup>

With the development of the fur trade, French Canadian traders came to Manitoba with many of them eventually settling in the St. Boniface area. Over 8% of the population of Greater Winnipeg is French-Canadian.

Thomas Douglas, Earl of Selkirk, brought the Selkirk settlers to the Red River Valley in 1811-12 and from that time onward settlers from the British Isles and Ontario formed the base for the growing population. Icelanders and Mennonites arrived during the 1870's and by 1900, thousands of Ukrainians, Poles, Germans and Jews were being lured by free land and cheap transportation. Table 2 indicates the huge jump in Winnipeg's population between 1901 - 1921 with the rise steady but unspectacular after that date. The city fathers, in the early 1900's, thought Winnipeg would become the Canadian Chicago and consequently built the wide thoroughfares of Portage and Main and the huge aqueduct to Shoal Lake (completed in 1919) to accommodate a population twice the size of Winnipeg at the time. It was a bit of misplaced boosterism that has eventually earned the accolade of "far-sighted urban planning". (See Table 2).



The last demographic indicator of some importance is the rate of growth. Compared to other urban centers in Canada, Winnipeg has lagged behind. From 1961 - 1966 the population increased by 6.9% compared to the national rate of 9.7% and from 1966 - 1970 the rate was only 5%, compared to 16% for Toronto, 15% for Vancouver, 16% for Edmonton and 21% for Calgary. This slow rate of growth, however, has been regarded by many as a blessing. The housing shortage is less severe in Winnipeg than many Canadian centers and there is time to assess the nature of the problems. As the current president of the Downtown Business Association has said, "We don't want faster growth. Now we have time to plan and think things over".

What growth there has been is largely concentrated in the suburbs. Since 1961 the City of Winnipeg has had a loss of population of 3% (with the downtown core decreasing by nearly 10% despite the influx of native peoples). Since 1951 the suburban municipalities have doubled their population and they showed about a 20% increase from 1961 - 1966.<sup>13</sup>

Like many North American cities since World War II, "the municipalities have been the target for much of this population movement from the City of Winnipeg, while the central city itself is often the destination of families from rural Manitoba and from overseas."<sup>14</sup>

#### Economic Indicators

The growth of Winnipeg has not been dramatic but it has accounted for most of the increase in Manitoba as a whole. A 1969 estimate placed the population of Manitoba at 980,000 with Winnipeg accounting for 54% of this total. The rural population of Manitoba has declined steadily from

55.9% in 1941 to 32.9% in 1966 to an estimated 30% in 1969.<sup>15</sup> The Metro report, The Place of Greater Winnipeg in the Economy of Manitoba, showed that from 1961 - 1966, the growth of Winnipeg accounted for 77.9% of the growth of Manitoba and that from 1966 - 1969 Metropolitan Winnipeg continued to grow while the rest of the province lost population.

Winnipeg provides about two-thirds of all the jobs in the province of Manitoba, two-thirds of all provincial income and about three-quarters of the individual income tax.<sup>16</sup> In short, it is in a paramount position within Manitoba and dominates the province even more than New York City vis-a-vis New York State.

This situation has had obvious political implications. Until 1958 when Duff Roblin won the provincial election, Manitoba had been governed by a succession of conservative small town lawyers and farmers in a heavily rural dominated legislature. A "us versus them" mentality often prevailed and Winnipeg was viewed with suspicion. The creation of the Metropolitan Corporation was opposed by several rural members because it would help the development of Winnipeg and this view was again expressed a decade later when Unicity was being debated.

This provincial indifference to Winnipeg's urban problems was expressed in more concrete ways than florid rhetoric from backbenchers. The report on the Place of Greater Winnipeg in the Economy of Manitoba, systematically examined the different types of provincial expenditure and found that, in education, for example, Winnipeg received only \$1.43 in provincial funds for every dollar received locally while the comparable figure in the rest of the provinces was \$4.95. In the areas of housing, and other "urban

oriented programs, the province simply has not had any of consequence."<sup>17</sup>

In transportation, Winnipeg received only 9.5% of the provincial expenditure on highways, despite repeated demands from the Metro Corporation for more assistance and even in non-financial matters such as the location of provincial buildings, like the head offices for the Manitoba Telephone System, Hydro-Electric Board, Medical Services Building and Red River Community College, the province paid little attention to the Metro redevelopment plans.

Winnipeg's paramount position in the province has had different consequences. On the one hand, it is simply too important to ignore. The economic well-being of Manitoba depends on the health of Winnipeg and in political terms, half the province's population does reside there. But its very strength has naturally made rural Manitobans and their representatives eager to put the weight of the provincial government on the side of rural Manitoba. It was not until Duff Roblin, an urban man and the N.D.P. under Edward Schreyer, an urban government, came to power that this provincial neglect began to change.

Within Manitoba, then, Winnipeg looms large. But from another perspective, it is quite small and has many of the attributes of a folksy town. It is, after all, only half a million. Economically it is integrated with most people travelling outside their home area to work downtown. Shopping plazas of course exist but most of the major stores and almost all the entertainment facilities are in the downtown area. Participation in community projects, like the 1967 Pan American Games or the former annual dyking of the Red and Assiniboine at flood time is enthusiastic and city wide.<sup>18</sup> The

dictates of the environment (waiting for a street light at Portage and Main in January is one of the supreme tests faced by man) have forced citizens to co-operate since the Selkirk Settlers arrived in 1811 and the relative isolation of Winnipeg has also required that the city fall back on its own resources. The city supports, for example, a summer musical company, a symphony orchestra, a professional theatre company and one of the best ballet troupes in the world -- cultural resources unusual for a North American city of its size. Definitions of 'community' or degrees of integration are notoriously difficult concepts to operationalize but by almost any standard, Winnipeg was a social and economic whole long before the political unification of Bill 36.

#### \* The Ethnic Transformation

The railways have left an indelible mark on Winnipeg. They have made the city one of the major transportation clearinghouses in North America; brought hundreds of thousands of immigrants; and physically divided the city into north and south. The C.P.R. tracks between Logan and Selkirk Avenue mark the boundary of Winnipeg's North End, the ethnic center of the city, the province, and probably the prairies. Seventy percent British in 1900, the percentage of Manitobans of Anglo-Saxon stock has fallen to around 40% and Winnipeg is now one of the most ethnically heterogeneous areas in Canada. Groups, however, have tended to settle in definite areas; as Table 3 indicates. British descendents are inclined to live in the suburbs and the outer parts of Winnipeg (River Heights), French Canadians concentrate in St. Boniface and the Poles, Germans and Ukrainians still reside in Winnipeg and particularly its central core.

This ethnic pattern of settlement has played a major role in local politics. M.S. Donnelly has shown that aldermanic elections follow ethnic majorities - not one alderman has been elected in a ward where he did not have a large community of his ethnic origin to support him.<sup>19</sup> And, today, in the province where "foreigners" were once the objects of ridicule, the mayor of the capital city is a Ukrainian Catholic, the Premier of the province is a German Catholic and the two opposition parties are led by Jews.

But the ethnic majority was slow to make its political power felt. From 1920 - 1958, the names of the Premiers of the province and the Mayors of the city read like an Anglo-Saxon honour roll; Norris, Bracken, Garson, and Campbell for the province, and Farmer, Webb, Maclean, Queen, Warriner, Coulter and Sharpe for the city. This was due in part to one of the after-effects of the 1919 Winnipeg Strike. Throughout that crisis, there was widespread vilification of "foreigners" and "agitators" and the ethnic community was generally fearful of entering politics.<sup>20</sup>

In the early 1950's ethnic representatives such as Slaw Rebchuk and Peter Taraska won city council seats in Ward 3 (the North End) but the year which really marked the first ethnic breach of Anglo-Saxon dominance was 1956 when Stephen Juba, a third-generation Canadian of Ukrainian origin, defeated G. E. Sharpe, the incumbent mayor. Only two non-Anglo-Saxon candidates for Mayor had run prior to World War II and Juba himself had been unsuccessful in 1952 and 1954. In 1956, however, Juba was presented with an issue concerning alleged misuse of public money and this gave him enough "good government" voters, combined with his ethnic support, to defeat Sharpe.

Juba carried Ward 3 by 11,000 votes and despite Sharpe receiving twice as many votes in Ward I (the South side), the Ukrainian was elected.<sup>21</sup> Since his first victory, Juba has become almost a folk hero to many ethnic citizens and this combined with his great political skill, have made him almost unbeatable. Juba has expanded his political appeal beyond his ethnic base and in the Unicity mayoralty election he had a majority in all areas but it is his rock hard strength in the North End which has made him the most powerful politician in Metropolitan Winnipeg.

This political strength of the Mayor is an important factor. Stephen Juba believed in amalgamation and for fifteen years he carried on a crusade in favour of one big city. Politicians come and go but Stephen Juba went on and eventually a provincial government that agreed with his objective came to power.

### The Early Years

Economically Winnipeg developed as a single unit but historically the various municipalities were created at different times. Some, such as Assiniboia and St. Boniface, had long and vivid histories, while others like Transcona, in 1912, were formed for the more mundane reason of facilitating the establishment of a railway center. By 1924, fourteen municipalities had been created and this municipal structure did not change until 1960 when Metro was formed.

This formative period in Winnipeg's history saw many interesting events occur. In 1907, Winnipeg experimented with its first two level system of municipal government by initiating a board of control in addition to the city council. A referendum in 1918, however, opposed the board and

it went out of existence. . In 1906 a referendum resulted in 2,382 citizens voting in favour of a city-owned electrical plant with only 382 opposed. In 1911, Winnipeg Hydro began and for years Winnipeg had the cheapest power rate in the world. This experiment in municipal socialism was also profitable; from 1961 to 1970, for example, the amounts transferred from hydro surpluses to the city's general treasury totalled \$18.3 million. Over the years, there have been repeated suggestions that Winnipeg should share this largess with the other municipalities and as recently as 1971 the province hinted that Manitoba Hydro was interested in buying the city's operation but Winnipeg Council continued to be violently opposed to any transfer.

The event that changed the city's life, however, was the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919. Dividing the city into two armed camps, fifty years later the strike still polarized Winnipeggers. In the spring of 1969 the Winnipeg Local of the United Steelworkers presented a plaque to the city council commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the Strike. A tremendous debate ensued over the propriety of accepting the gift. As Professor J. E. Rea has written about the incident, "the furor came as no surprise to those familiar with the traditions of the city. The strike was the pivotal event of its history and has conditioned political life ever since."<sup>22</sup>

The background, events and repercussions of the strike have been much discussed,<sup>23</sup> and while the details cannot be discussed here, the meaning of the strike as summarized by Professor Rea is as follows; labour, led by radicals R. B. Russell and R. J. Johns, attempted a massive and permanent shift in economic power through the technique of the general

strike. The general strike was the major weapon of the One Big Union Movement, and labour was fiercely opposed by the Citizens Committee (composed of frantic businessmen), the Meighen Government and those who feared chaos and revolution. In June of 1919, the labour leaders were arrested, riots broke out, troops were used and the strike was broken.

The result was a polarized, hostile, seething city and local politics quickly reflected the yawning class division. On August 20, 1919, 3,000 people gave enthusiastic support to the formation of the Citizens' League, which would continue the work of the Citizens' Committee of One Thousand. Labour formed the Dominion Labour Party and the November 28 Municipal Election was fought on the issue of the General Strike. Mayor Grey, the incumbent who had helped stamp out the strike, was opposed by S. J. Farmer, the labour candidate. The Citizens' League placed ads saying, "There is only one Issue -- Red or White" and with its usual impartiality, the Manitoba Free Press carried editorials entitled, "Bolshie Pulls the Strings".<sup>24</sup>

Despite the backing of the newspapers, and business community, the League nearly lost the election. Mayor Grey defeated Farmer 15,630 votes to 12,514, but the city council of fourteen was divided evenly. The polarization of the city was evident from the results; the League won in the more affluent areas of Wards 1, 2 and 3 while labour candidates were victorious in Wards 5, 6 and 7, the working-class North End. Ward 4, a mixed area, was narrowly won by the League. It is doubtful, in fact, if the League would have won at all if property qualifications, which eliminated many working-class immigrants, had not been in effect. (Non-resident property voters could also vote and labour claimed that voters were sent in from as



far away as Chicago and Vancouver).

Fearful of labour's electoral power, the League opted for the tried and true tactic of gerrymander. Robert Jacobs, an officer of the League, successfully persuaded the Provincial Legislature to adopt two amendments to the City Charter. The old 14 member council, based on 7 wards, was replaced by an 18 member council based on 3 wards. The old wards of 5, 6 and 7, where labour's strength was concentrated was coalesced in Ward 3, while middle-class areas made up Wards 1 and 2. A measure of proportional representation was adopted (which may have had the effect of confusing ethnic voters who were used to the simple X) but plural voting, based on property ownership, was maintained. The Manitoba Free Press estimated that in Ward 3, the non-resident vote amounted to 10% of the electorate.<sup>25</sup>

The gerrymander worked. Although the labour candidate for mayor only lost by 931 votes out of a city-wide poll of 30,000, the League won twelve out of the 18 city council seats.

A pattern was set in the 1919 and 1920 municipal elections which has held firm since that time. Every municipal election has seen a business oriented anti-labour Citizens' Committee, later called the Greater Winnipeg Election Committee and now named the Independent Citizens' Election Committee, endorse candidates, provide funds and usually elect a majority of city council. These citizen election committees have been militant in their claim that they are independent and have no ties with the older political parties. Created during the era of the Progressive's, when Western suspicion of the older national parties was at its zenith, these citizens' election committees

have readily adopted the notion of U.S. municipal reformers that "party politics have no place at the local level". This anti-party bias has now become a strong Winnipeg civic tradition.

But, in fact, the express purpose of these organizations since the 1920's has been to prevent the election of a labour-dominated city council.

The anti-socialist bias of the coalition is most clearly demonstrated after municipal elections when committee chairmanships and other plums are doled out. Labour candidates always have been denied important posts like Finance Chairman and after the October 1971 election, not even a single NDP member was allowed to serve as a member of one of the council's standing committees. Generally the geographic divisions of 1919 have also held true - Labour, CCF or NDP councilmen have come exclusively from the areas north of Portage Avenue.

This early fusion of the anti-socialist elements at the local level was later repeated in the Manitoba legislature when a coalition was formed in 1935 to prevent labour dominance. Like the rural dominated legislatures, Citizen Election Committee members, on the whole, were reluctant to extend social services, public housing, welfare or anything that might raise taxes. Both leaders of the province and the city were poured from the same mould -- conservative, business-oriented and Anglo-Saxon. It was a great time to be a W.A.S.P.

As discussed above, the Strike also struck fear into the hearts of the ethnic community. Aliens, agitators and foreigners were held responsible, despite the fact that Dixon, Johns, Russell and the other leaders were of British origin. J. S. Wordsworth said that, "Without hesitation I say there was not a single foreigner in a position of leadership though foreigners

were falsely arrested to give colour to this 'charge'.<sup>26</sup> The Meighen Government amended the Immigration Act to deport immigrants who had been convicted of seditious offences.

Blamed for a strike in which they had little part and shut out from the labour movement which was controlled by British workingmen, the ethnic community shied away from politics -- particularly politics of a radical or left-wing hue. Tom Peterson in his excellent article on class and ethnic politics in Manitoba quotes a Ukrainian editor as writing in 1932, "Canadian Ukrainians do not have any influence. We are poor and need political help. Ukrainian farmers and workers depend for their livelihood on the more powerful. This forces us to support a politically influential party. Affiliation with small radical parties brings us Ukrainians only disaster and ruin."<sup>27</sup>

When members of the ethnic community at last became active at the local level, following World War II, they tended to adopt the pro-business philosophy of the ruling group. Aldermen like Slaw Rebchuk or Peter Taraska, elected in 1950, were members of the Liberal Party. Steve Juba in making a virtue of the old independent anti-party tradition, has not been particularly interested in social welfare issues and has never taken positions threatening to the business community. Despite the relative poverty of many North End residents, ethnic councillors, like the Mayor, frequently take more conservative positions than their South Winnipeg counterparts. Similarly, until the late sixties, the ethnic community worked through the traditional avenues of church, party and language associations and citizen groups were very rare -- although ratepayers associations were active in the suburbs. It was a Winnipeg version of the Negro King argument.

The Strike, then, was the key event shaping the parameters of the Winnipeg political culture. It divided the city into two distinct political areas. A local political association dedicated to keeping labour from council control and devoted to small "c" conservative positions, came to dominate the civic scene for the next fifty years.

The Manitoba Club Syndrome,<sup>28</sup> in which Anglo-Saxon representatives from old businesses like Great West Life, Monarch Life, Investor's Syndicate and the Richardson interests would meet with their counterparts from the provincial and local government to decide affairs, increasingly began to dominate the city's life. North Winnipeg remained the centre of CCF-NDP strength provincially and well-known party members, like Stanley Knowles, Jack Blumberg, Lloyd Stinson and David Orlikow were at one time or another on the Winnipeg Council. But, ethnic loyalties gained in importance and ethnic/class interests often seemed to clash. The single most important politician from North Winnipeg, Stephen Juba, in no way threatened the economic status quo. In short, until recently, Winnipeg's political temperature was low, its style crusty.

#### The Coming of Metro

Prior to the creation of the Metropolitan Corporation in 1960, the municipalities in the Winnipeg region had co-operated in a wide variety of services and several inter-municipal special bodies were founded. The Metro Corporation, in essence, centralized these bodies under one government and was given the revenue to carry out the needed program expansions.

The formal special bodies included:

1. Greater Winnipeg Water District 1913
2. Mosquito Abatement Authority 1927
3. Greater Winnipeg Sanitary District 1935
4. St. James-Winnipeg Airport Commission 1937
5. Metropolitan Planning Commission 1948
6. Metropolitan Civil Defence Board 1951
7. Greater Winnipeg Transit Commission 1953

There were complaints from the municipalities that Winnipeg dominated these boards unduly and in some cases such as the Greater Winnipeg Water District, there were wide variations in service. But, despite the difficulties, this long experience of inter-municipal co-operation, undoubtedly aided the eventual emergence of Metro.

Perhaps the most important board was the Metropolitan Planning Commission. The Commission had only an advisory function and as George Rich, its deputy director, has pointed out, most of its plans went unheeded.<sup>29</sup> The board did, however, develop comprehensive schemes for Winnipeg as a whole and more directly, Eric Thrift, the head of the Commission and George Rich, his deputy, actively and sometimes single-handedly, battled for the creation of an area-wide government. The two planners spoke to women's groups, service clubs, employee associations and ethnic organizations -- always extolling the advantages of a Metropolitan solution to Winnipeg's urban problems. They kept the Metro idea in front of the eyes of Winnipeg politicians and the public generally.

When Winnipeg's urban problems forced the Provincial government to finally intervene it was the Metro solution which was uppermost in everyone's mind.

Following World War II, the expansion of the urban population in the Winnipeg region created the now familiar litany of urban problems. Expenditures soared; for example, the school debt of the City of Winnipeg rose from \$1,419,952 in 1945 to \$10,575,450 in 1956. Revenues were distributed unevenly; many of the industrial and warehouses settled in St. James providing that city with a heavy surplus, while Winnipeg went into debt. Assessment levels differed as much as 75% from municipality to municipality.<sup>30</sup> Because of the river system, there was a particular problem with bridges. Streets, bridges and recreational facilities were paid for solely by the municipalities in which they were located and municipalities like St. James were loath to pay singly for a bridge which everyone would use. The municipalities were dumping raw sewage into the Red and Assiniboine Rivers with such gay abandon that the rivers were literally stinking. The Shoal Lake aqueduct was over-taxed and water rationing was common. In short, the Winnipeg region suffered from a variety of problems which demanded an area-wide approach.

As early as 1950, the seriousness of the above conditions led the Manitoba Urban Association and the Union of Manitoba Municipalities to request a major study into the urban problems of the Winnipeg area. In November 1950, the Premier of Manitoba, D. L. Campbell, responded to the demand and formed the Joint Provincial-Municipal Relations Committee, made up of representatives of the government and the municipal associations.<sup>31</sup>

This Committee was the first of a staggering number of bodies to study local government in Winnipeg. It heard briefs from the City of Winnipeg, area municipalities and the formal associations which all outlined the tremendous increase in costs which had occurred since 1945 and asked for the province to increase its grants and take over the more expensive functions, like health and welfare.<sup>32</sup> The report of the Sub-Committee on Local Government in Winnipeg, neatly analyzed the problem of the Winnipeg region; "the whole area constitutes one integrated and interdependent unit based primarily upon the commercial, industrial, financial and transportation facilities which serve the whole region"<sup>33</sup>, but there was no corresponding political integration. The co-operative arrangement existed was not satisfactory:

Some municipalities have no representation on existing Metropolitan boards; the costs of some services, which are of general benefit are not being appropriately shared; because it has not been possible to arrange for joint participation in financing, it has not been possible to carry out major projects which would be generally beneficial; through lack of effective co-ordination, some municipalities carry on procedures which damage the interest of the other municipalities in the Metropolitan area."<sup>34</sup>

The sub-committee recommended a single Metropolitan Board to replace all the special purpose bodies and this was supported in the final report of the Committee in February, 1953. The Premier, in a speech to the legislature on February 25, 1953 agreed that a Metropolitan Board "could result in increased efficiency and economy" and "the government is prepared, if the councils of the City of Winnipeg and adjoining municipalities so advise, to bring in legislation for that purpose."<sup>35</sup>

To no one's surprise, the municipal councils in the Winnipeg area were not unanimous on the need for a Metropolitan Board, but once again everyone thought it would be a great idea to study the problem. Accordingly, in 1955 the provincial government appointed the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Committee (GWIC), chaired by John Bodie, a Winnipeg businessman. C. N. Kushner, a Winnipeg lawyer and later mayor of West Kildonan, became the secretary to the Committee and eventually wrote the report.<sup>36</sup> The appointment of the GWIC was the catalyst which led to the formation of Metro. The creation of Metro Toronto strongly influenced the Commission and frequent consultations were held with the Chairman, F. C. Gardner. Some system of Metro seemed so inevitable that the briefs of the various municipalities dealt almost solely with what form the new council should take and what functions it should perform.<sup>37</sup> Only the City of Winnipeg pushed for amalgamation.

In 1959, the GWIC published its Report. The Commission concluded that long-term planning was impossible under the existing system and that an area-wide government was needed. The Commission recommended that



adjustment be made so that the 19 area municipalities would be incorporated into eight cities: Winnipeg, St. Boniface, St. James, St. Vital, Fort Garry, East Kildonan, West Kildonan, Transcona. The central council would consist of the mayors of the eight cities plus six other elected members. There was to be amalgamation of the fire and police departments and the Metropolitan Corporation would assume responsibility for water, public transportation, sewage and drainage, airports, metropolitan highways and assessment. The Metro Corporation was to assume all of the duties of the special bodies and have the authority to determine what percentage in taxes each city would pay. The Metropolitan Corporation was also to establish a Metropolitan School Board: this board was to select all school sites and would control local board expenditures while the local boards would have the right to appeal any actions.<sup>38</sup>

The reaction to the GWIC report was mixed: in October of 1959, the City of Winnipeg, in a brief to the provincial government, declared that it was unalterably opposed to the creation of a metropolitan corporation.<sup>39</sup> Many of the municipalities were also opposed to the wide powers of the Metro Corporation and the transfer of boundaries. It was now in the lap of the new Conservative administration of Premier Duff Roblin.

#### Metropolitan Government

In the election of 1958, Duff Roblin had decisively beaten the Liberal regime of D. L. Campbell. The Conservative majority was equally composed of new found strength in the North, traditional Tory strength

in the rural areas and strong support from the suburbs of Winnipeg. The election had in fact divided the city -- the north going CCF and the south and outer suburbs, Conservative. The Premier was cautious but progressive and his government represented a welcome change from the Campbell Liberals who had become obsessed with economy in Government and low taxes.

Metro reform had not played any role in the election campaign but the government realized that something would have to be done. The problems, which had been analyzed since 1953, had gotten worse and the publication of the GWIC Report would demand some sort of response. The Premier personally took charge of the project. William Johnston, the deputy minister of Municipal Affairs, was mandated to come up with a plan. Mr. Johnston worked closely with Eric Thrift and other officials of the Planning Commission and again a delegation was sent to Metro Toronto to assess the experiences of that body. The problem for the government, as stated by a senior official of the Roblin Ministry, was how to get "a new form of government in a way least likely to disrupt the situation".<sup>40</sup>

The Premier and his associates recognized that a vigorous, area-wide approach was needed to solve the region's problems. Members of the government were also not impressed with the abundance of talent found in local council chambers and felt that new men would be needed to make a Metro structure work. Total amalgamation was analyzed as being politically impossible and the implications of one big city representing half the Province worried many. The suburbs, which were strong areas of Conservative strength, also had to be placated, and suburban municipalities were opposed to the strong powers given Metro by the GWIC.<sup>41</sup>

The result was a plan radically different from the Bodie Report. The government decided upon a minimal area-wide package and returned to the old idea of a Metropolitan Board - with added powers of planning - which would replace existing special purpose bodies. The recommendation of the GWIC for a Metro School Board and an amalgamated police force were dropped. Municipal boundaries were also left alone. The make-up of the council was equally distinct. Instead of the expected provisions for municipal representation, the government proposed that all ten members of the Metropolitan Council be elected from special pie-shaped districts which would include both central and suburban areas. It was hoped that the small number of councillors would increase efficiency and that the type of district would encourage area-wide thinking. One of the problems with Metro Toronto, the government believed, was that the representatives felt more loyalty to their home areas than to the central body.

Bill 62, the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act, was introduced into the legislature on February 12 and assented to six weeks later on March 26, 1960. The Premier, who had worked hard on the bill's creation, was its most active defender in the House. The main provisions of the bill included the ten member boundaries described above, a preferential voting system, a chairman appointed by the Cabinet with succeeding chairmen to be appointed by the council, and an Executive Director responsible for administration. The Corporation was given sole and full authority over all planning, zoning, and issuing of building permits; charged with the responsibility of preparing a master plan that would include long-term planning for major roads (Metro only had authority for Metro streets, the

City of Winnipeg retained its traffic authority), bridges, transit, sewer, water, garbage and major parks. In addition, the council was given many operational functions such as assessment, civil defence, mosquito abatement, flood protection, sewage disposal (but not collection) and water (excluding local distribution).

Metro was to have four major revenue sources; direct levies on each municipal proportionate to the relation of the assessment of that municipality to the total assessment; direct fees; a share of the taxes on industry collected by local municipalities and the sale of debentures. The latter were subject to the approval of the Municipal Board if the amount exceeded \$500,000. Ten municipalities were completely within Metro's jurisdiction with nine more partly in the Metro area and the additional zone. (See Figure 2).

The success of the government's compromise can be measured by the lack of conflict Bill 62 engendered. The basic principles of the bill, said Roblin, were the need for central planning and centralization of services. The only group to oppose the bill vigorously was the City of St. Boniface and its Member of the Legislative Assembly, Larry Desjardins, who feared for the French identity of his area. The Liberals, under D. L. Campbell, wanted a referendum on the issue. Most of the area municipalities agreed in principle with the establishment of a two-tier system (a situation at least partially due to Winnipeg's insistence on total amalgamation), although many felt that Metro's planning powers were too broad and all wanted direct representation. The City of Winnipeg attacked Metro's powers of zoning and land use and again stated that

amalgamation would be more efficient. Few interest groups submitted briefs and those that did appear before the Law Amendments Committee were in favour. In the end, only six members of the House, most of them rural Liberals, voted against the Bill. Initially, at least, the Government had achieved its goal of little "disruption".

### A Decade of Conflict

The history of the years 1960-1970 is one of unending disagreement, disharmony and disputes between the Mayor of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan Corporation. The decade began with Mayor Juba declaring in 1961;<sup>42</sup> "We have taken as much as we can take...many people are having some serious second thoughts about Metro. I am offering to lead this fight. I am ready to stand or fall on it...If I have learned anything about fighting, and I have, I will use it all if necessary. This is probably going to get rough". Metro Councillor Robert Moffat replied that the Mayor was using his "favourite weapon"-- headlines at 4000 yards"<sup>43</sup> The decade closed with the vendetta unabated. The Winnipeg Tribune, for example, on September 11, 1969, contained an attack by the Mayor that "super governments, like Metro, lead to duplication, inefficiency and waste" to which a Metro Councillor returned, "If the Mayor has a policy, it seems to be one of continued opposition, harrassment, obstructionism, irresponsibility and lack of co-operation to any working proposal or method of dealing with Metropolitan problems."<sup>44</sup>

The battle was not merely verbal; the two governments found it impossible to co-ordinate urban renewal policies, traffic policies were often at odds and on one occasion, the City of Winnipeg even refused to

release its statistics on garbage pickup because Metro was doing a study on disposal. Metro councillors attacked the location of the Winnipeg City Hall while the mayor poured scorn on Metro's proposed Convention Centre. In the case of the Winnipeg Downtown Development project: each government produced its own plans, group of developers and supporters. The intensity of the conflict often deadlocked urban policy and the provincial government finally was forced to intervene in 1970. As a senior Metro official has commented on the dismal record, "If we thought of it, Winnipeg said it was bad, and vice versa".<sup>45</sup>

In its battle with the mayor, Metro had few political resources. Richard Bonnycastle, the Chairman appointed by Roblin in 1960, was a well-known Winnipeg businessman, a former President of the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce and a man with close associations to the Conservative Party. But he had never held public office before and the fact that he was an appointed official put him at a tremendous disadvantage vis-a-vis the mayor.<sup>46</sup>

Bonnycastle's first job was to find high calibre staff to get Metro started. Elswood Bole left his job as head of the Municipal Board and became Executive Director of the Corporation. Bonnycastle and Bole put together a first-rate staff and administratively Metro was an impressive success. But politically, try as he would, Bonnycastle was no match for the mayor. He once told a reporter that, "I used to wake up in the night and say to myself, 'Bonnycastle' what the devil have you gotten yourself into?"<sup>47</sup> To those who liked and admired him, the question was often repeated.

Metro suffered from a series of blows in the first year of operation from which it never really recovered. During that first year its image in the minds of many of the public became fixed; it was blamed for a series of large tax increases; and the province retreated from supporting its own creation.

The special electoral districts, designed to promote area-wide thinking, were an artiface with no correspondence to local feeling and as a political organization, the Metro level of government was the least visible political unit in Winnipeg. With only 10 councillors for an area of half a million people, people found it difficult to know their representative, and Metro seemed to be a remote structure. The media, by giving extensive coverage to the city-Metro conflict in one sense legitimized the struggle. Headlines from the first few months of Metro reveal the type of story citizens were seeing:

"Metro Worries City Personnel", Winnipeg Free Press, November 28, 1960.

"City, Metro in Squabble on Streets", Winnipeg Tribune, December 5, 1961.

"Kushner and Juba Attack Metro", Winnipeg Tribune, January 7, 1961.

"No One Takes Neutral Stand About Metro", Winnipeg Tribune, May 10, 1961.

"Juba Wades in Mire, Emerges Like Rose", Winnipeg Free Press, May 12, 1961.

"Too Much Squabbling", Winnipeg Free Press, June 1, 1961.

"Juba Bares Fists for Metro Attack",

Winnipeg Free Press, June 3, 1961.

The general impression given was one of constant bickering and conflict and Metro received much of the blame. But the most damaging and lasting impression of Metro was that it was responsible for Winnipeg's large tax increase of 1961. Winnipeg's mill rate had held steady between 43 and 44 mills since 1951. But in 1961, the city was forced to increase its budget by over 13 million dollars and the mill rate went up 7 points. The creation of Metro and the increase in taxes in the same year was too good an opportunity to be missed and the mayor happily blamed the whole thing on the new government. The Winnipeg Free Press carried a detailed study of the figures which showed that despite the fact that Metro had taken over services which had formerly cost Winnipeg \$2,300,000, the city's budget was only down \$300,000. The mayor and city bureaucrats had been unwilling to reduce their staff empires and thus 57% of the increase was due to Winnipeg spending. Education costs had finally caught up and accounted for 37% with Metro's increased levy being only 10% of the total.<sup>48</sup> Yet, despite the publication of the above figures and the explanation of Metro spokesmen, the general impression continued to be that Metro was responsible for higher taxes. The tax issue of 1961 became the first of many such incidents. From that time onward, the remote and almost politically hapless Metro became the favourite whipping boy of city and suburban politicians alike -- if things were going badly, it was Metro's fault.



Metro's one hope in these early years of conflict was visible support of the provincial government. This was not forthcoming. And as George Rich, the former planning director of Metro, has written, "This lukewarm attitude of the provincial government seemed only to encourage the critics to look for further real and imagined causes for complaint."<sup>49</sup> The province gave Metro a transition grant of only a little more than \$100,000 which forced the Corporation to immediately raise taxes. The Premier next stated that Metro would receive no special consideration and would be treated like any other municipality. During 1961, when Metro was being roasted from one end of the city to the other, the Premier was silent and even on one occasion said he agreed with critics that Metro had gone "too fast" in taking over services.<sup>50</sup> Bernie Wolfe gave expression to the general feeling along Metro councillors that they had been let down; "the Premier has been politically irresponsible in my view in throwing Metro to the wolves with no verbal or financial support."<sup>51</sup>

By 1962, an election year, Metro had become a source of acute political embarrassment for the government. A columnist for the Winnipeg Tribune wrote that, "on Metro government members and the opposition recognized that the Roblin Conservatives were facing a very real election issue."<sup>52</sup>

The provincial government saw its creation disliked by the public, hated by the Mayor of Winnipeg and opposed by the municipalities. Rather than expend its political capital in a defence of Metro, the government skillfully retreated. Section 210 of the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act called

for a review of Metro in 1965. The government moved this date up and established the Greater Winnipeg Review Commission on October 2, 1962. Criticism of Metro lessened after the Commission began its work and the Government temporarily was "off the hook". It was to resort to a similar strategy four years later.

The three man commission, chaired by Lorne Cumming who had written the well-known Cumming Report advocating Toronto Metro, reported in February, 1964 and made numerous recommendations which they described as "relating to technical matters". In their briefs to the Commission the area municipalities were united on three basic points:

1. No direct representation on the Metro Council;
2. Confusion about planning and inequality of assessment;
3. Lack of local funds: payments to education and Metro often took up to 75% of a municipal budget leaving little room for local initiative.

The Commission ignored many of the complaints of the municipalities and only in the areas of planning and assessment did the Commission recommend important changes.

One of the main recommendations of the Commission was that business assessment would be subject to the same mill rate as real property. This recommendation had the effect of removing from the municipalities the option of choosing between the assessment of personal property or the levy of a business tax. The Commission helped clear up some of the confusion about planning by giving municipalities the right to appeal Metro decisions or proposals on planning to the Municipal Board. These recommendations

*Answer Log 3*  
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were adopted in 1964. The Commission also recommended changes in the boundaries of the municipalities. At the time of incorporation, nine municipalities were wholly within the metropolitan area boundaries and ten were partly within. (See Figure 3). Following the Review Commission's recommendations, five rural municipalities (Rosser, Macdonald, East St. Paul, West St. Paul and Springfield) were withdrawn from the metropolitan area and two that had been partly within the boundaries were now totally included (Fort Garry and St. Vital). After the Town of Brooklands merged with the city of St. James in January 1, 1967, there were ten municipalities wholly and three partially within Metropolitan Winnipeg for an area of 170 square miles.

On the basic question of the usefulness of Metro, the Review Commission stated, "We have no hesitation in finding that on the whole the basic advantages of the local government system established by the Act have been demonstrated beyond question even at this early date...we have found no justifiable grounds for criticism and no real defects in the internal administrative organization".<sup>53</sup> Metro lauded the report as a vindication for its efforts but the Commission had not come to grips with any of the complaints - in particular the issue of municipality representation on the Metro Council, and the implementation of the Commission's recommendations did nothing to defuse the political situation. This was demonstrated in 1964 when Mayor Juba held a referendum on Metro; the results were not binding in any way but the outcome was embarrassing. To the question of whether Metro should be abolished, 28,389 Winnipeg citizens voted yes and only 12,053 said no. The referendum also asked whether the citizens wanted total amalgamation with 25,049 in the affirmative and

15,179 opposed.

In 1966, Premier Roblin again tried to get rid of his Metro problems by giving it to a Commission to study. On August 18, 1966, the Local Government Boundaries Commission was created. The Commission was chaired by Robert Smellie, the former Conservative Minister of Municipal Affairs and contained such local government notables as Stephen Juba and Elswood Bole. C. N. Kushner resumed his familiar role as secretary to a Local Government Commission. The Commission was to study the territory and boundaries of existing local government units and other matters considered relevant to the establishment of viable local government units.

From 1966 - 1968 the Commission spent most of its time studying education boundaries but in that year it began an extensive program of research on Metropolitan Winnipeg. It studied the costs of total amalgamation, different types of local government structures, and the factors which make up a community. During the time of the Commission's research, Metro and Winnipeg embarked on their bitter fight over the Convention Centre for downtown development and the N.D.P. defeated the Conservatives in the June 1969 election. In 1968, Duff Roblin had retired from politics after being defeated in the federal election of that year. He was replaced as Premier by Walter Weir, an undertaker from Minnedosa, who appropriately enough oversaw the demise of the Conservative Government. The N.D.P. had long favored total amalgamation and the change of government radically altered the possibility of real reform. By September, 1970, the Commission had completed its report (which Mayor Juba refused to sign) but the Schreyer administration had by then formulated its own plan.

In the main, the Commission's recommendations were similar to those of the 1959 Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission. The G.W.I.C. had wanted eight cities, the Local Boundaries Commission wanted nine: Winnipeg, Fort Garry, St. Vital, St. Boniface, Transcona, St. James-Assiniboia, Tuxedo-Charleswood, Old Kildonan-West Kildonan and North Kildonan-East Kildonan-Elmwood. The Metro Council would be composed of the mayors and aldermen of the nine cities plus ten directly elected representatives. Amalgamation of the police and fire forces was rejected but again, like the G.W.I.C., a Metro School Board was proposed. The Local Boundaries Commission then, favoured the constant demand of the area municipalities that there be direct representation on the Metro Council but events had already passed the Commission by. In summary, the three local government commissions were useful devices to defuse criticism but the Provincial Governments were not very inclined to implement the recommendations.

#### Evaluation of Metro.

Metro clearly was not a political success. Faced with a powerful opponent who took advantage of every opportunity to belittle it, possessing few political resources on its own and with little backing from the provincial government which had established it, the Metropolitan Corporation became a misunderstood and disliked structure. However, it had many concrete achievements; as the 1970 Local Boundaries Commission noted, "the crisis situation which existed in 1960 in connection with many of the area-wide or inter-municipal services no longer exists."<sup>54</sup>

In the area of planning, Bill 62 provided that Metro was to prepare a Master Development Plan. A first draft was completed in 1963-64 but was changed after the Cummings Commission. In 1966, after a second series

of public meetings, a plan was formulated and several outside consultants were invited to give a second opinion. Again, after several changes the plan was adopted by Metro and approved by Minister of Municipal Affairs in 1968. In 1971, Bill 36 stated that the Metropolitan Development Plan was to be approved Greater Winnipeg Development Plan. Metro was the first local government body to subsidize public transit from area wide taxes and several bridges were constructed. Summer rationing of water became a thing of the past and Metro built enough plants to treat all Winnipeg sewage. In 1960 the difference in assessments was sometimes as much as 75%. But by 1965 Metro had completed a total area wide reassessment on a uniform basis. Finally, in the area of parks, in 1960 Metropolitan Winnipeg had only 15 acres but by 1970 this had been increased to 2,040 acres.

The greatest effect of Metro though was to change attitudes on the desirability of re-organizing local government for Winnipeg. In 1960, total amalgamation seemed incomprehensible as a solution to Winnipeg's problem and the creating of a two-tier system seemed to be a large step. By 1970, people were used to area wide government and Metro had proved that amalgamation was at least technically feasible. Indeed it is somewhat ironic that Mayor Juba has had to use the old Metro administrators to run his Unicity. In 1968 the Metro Council went on record favouring amalgamation, the Commission on Manitoba's Economic Prospects recommended one city for the Metro area and in a debate in the Provincial Legislature both the NDP and the Liberal Party supported unification of the area municipalities. By one standard, Metro was so successful in making the

the case for area wide government that there was never any question of returning to the pre 1960 era and the issue was simply whether to move forward or not. From this perspective it can be argued that Metro was only an evolutionary step on the way to unification.

But if Metro promoted unification by showing that it was feasible, Mayor Juba certainly forced the issue. The political wrangling and constant bickering between Metro and the City of Winnipeg seemed to foreclose the possibility that the two governments would even co-operate fully--and co-operation was needed for shared jurisdictions like urban renewal and development generally. If Metro had been as much of a political success as it was an administrative one there would have been little demand for a new city structure. Mayor Juba, by his power, skill and obstinacy kept the amalgamation issue before the public and the senior government. Metro may have ensured that Winnipeg would never return to the fragmented system of pre 1960 but Mayor Juba was the single individual most responsible for making Winnipeg one big city.

## Part II

### The Unicity Concept

The surprise election of the New Democratic Party in June 1969 made reform of the local government structure in Winnipeg inevitable. The NDP had been the third largest party in the legislature with virtually all their members coming from Winnipeg. The NDP is a party committed to change and more effective public institutions and this coupled with the switch from a suburban-rural party to a central city party led ultimately to

Bill 36. The 1969 election saw the city and province polarized; the Conservatives held the rural south, south Winnipeg and the suburbs, the NDP-northern Manitoba and north and central Winnipeg. The NDP, led by its two most prominent urban spokesmen - Sidney Green and Saul Cherniack -, both former Metro councillors, had long favoured amalgamation. Most of the social ills associated with urban life accumulated in the downtown core while many of the richest sources of revenue were located in the suburbs. Amalgamation would result in more equitable distribution of the costs and resources. The NDP was the party of the central city and as Bernie Wolff, vice chairman of the Metropolitan Corporation, wrote in a brief, "no surprise should be registered at the determination of the present government's decision to proceed with restructuring regional government in the Metropolitan Winnipeg area".<sup>55</sup>

At the time of the upset victory, Robert Smellie and the other members of the local Boundaries Commission offered their resignation to the newly formed Provincial Government. Premier Schreyer refused to accept the offer and asked the Commission to continue working. However, it soon became evident that the proposals of the Commission and the inclinations of the Government were at odds. In 1970 the Government asked Dr. Meyer Brownstone to begin working on a scheme of unification.

Brownstone, a native of Winnipeg, had worked for the CCF government in Saskatchewan from 1947 - 64. Beginning as an agricultural economist, he had directed the research of the 1955 Saskatchewan Royal Commission on Rural Life - much of which was concerned with local government in rural areas - and eventually became deputy-minister of Municipal Affairs. The 1955 Saskatchewan Royal Commission had emphasized the



need for citizen access within the decision-making process and Browntree was known as an advocate of grass roots participation. Saul Cherniack and Sidney Green supplied the impetus for unification--they had both argued for it while on the Metro Council--but Brownstone was primarily responsible for the other main thrust of Bill 36 - the encouragement of citizen participation and political decentralization. Brownstone put a team of consultants together which included Lionel Feldman and Dennis Hefferon and actively began work in the summer of 1970.

During the fall of 1970 the Brownstone recommendations went to the Cabinet. There was definite controversy within the Cabinet over the Brownstone proposals and many were eventually changed. One highly placed source has said "what was left out of the White Paper is more important than what remains".<sup>56</sup> The main issue of contention apparently was over the continued existence of the local municipalities. The main proponents were Cherniack and Green on one side and Al Mackling, the Attorney-General and a former alderman for St. James, and Saul Miller, Education Minister, and former mayor of East Kildonan on the other. This "Miller-Mackling -- Cherniack-Green" confrontation pitted the suburban representatives against the supporters of amalgamation. The impasse was resolved with the compromise of the community committee. Bill 36, in fact, is an excellent example of the compromise: it allowed a suburban member to emphasize the community committee and a central city representative to praise unification. In the debate on Bill 36, for example, Frank Johnstone, the Conservative Member for Sturgeon Creek, attacked the "hypocrisy" shown by Mr. Mackling in preaching the "evils of total amalgamation for six years as St. James alderman" and then supporting the bill. The Attorney-General replied to the attack

by arguing that Bill 36 was not amalgamation but rather "regional government and a series of community committees."<sup>57</sup>

Although the report of the local Boundaries Commission had been submitted in September, the government held up its publication until the Cabinet had decided on an alternative plan. Finally, in late December the local Boundaries report was released and a week later on December 22, 1970 the White Paper Proposals for Urban Re-organization was unveiled. Mr. Cherniack who had been designated Minister of Urban Affairs, said the report was a "wholly new approach" which would continue the efficiency of centralization with more citizen participation. The Premier, for his part emphasized that the White Paper meant one city but "with provision for recognizing existing communities".<sup>58</sup>

#### The Concept Examined

The White Paper analyzed Greater Winnipeg's urban problems and came to the conclusion that "almost all of the urban area's difficulties stem in whole or in part, from three main roots--fragmented authority, segmented financial capacity and lack of citizen involvement".<sup>59</sup> The solution proposed was a bold combination of unification of the municipalities and de-centralization of the political process.

The White Paper can be conveniently sub-divided into the sections dealing

with:

1. Unification
2. Political structure
3. Municipal administration
4. Participation
5. Provincial-local relations

### Unification

The government proposed to create one city. The twelve municipalities would cease to exist and there would be one central council. The unified council would be the exclusive law-making body responsible for all programs, budgets and for relationships with other governments. The government hoped that a unified council would end citizen confusion over what authority was responsible for what function, prevent the inequitable exploitation of the tax base, distribute services more fairly and plan more effectively. As a first step in creating one city, the White Paper proposed that the mill rates of the municipalities be uniform. Under this formula most of the area municipalities and the city of Winnipeg would experience a decrease but the richer suburbs of Charleswood, North Kildonan, St. James-Assiniboia and Tuxedo would pay more. One of the major issues connected with the unification proposal was the question of how much the new structure would cost. Robert Smellie, Elswood Bole and many others argued that unification costs would climb drastically (and it makes sense that the policemen in Brooklands would now demand the same as their Winnipeg counterparts, i.e. costs would level up to the highest denominator). Mr. Bole, in fact, estimated that most citizens would pay a hundred dollars more in taxes a few years after the amalgamation.<sup>60</sup>

Earl Levin, the Director of Planning for Metro and Ellen Gallagher, Mr. Cherniack's executive assistant countered this cost argument in a series of speeches and articles that made the point that the Government had not amalgamated to save money but rather to increase the effectiveness of local government through better area-wide planning, distribution of services, etc.

### Political Structure

To govern Unicity, the White Paper proposed a 48 member central council elected from single member wards with the mayor chairman of the council. In essence the White Paper proposed to create a Parliamentary / Cabinet system of government. The government was opposed to direct election of the mayor for "area-wide election of the mayor would in our view not merely dilute the supremacy of the popularly elected council but leave ambiguous the question of who is really responsible, the Council or the Mayor", (p. 27). The government eventually retreated from this proposal and many observers are now asking the same question posed in the White Paper about the new Winnipeg Council. The government adopted the traditional committee system of local government, but here too it made changes. The White Paper proposed to create a central executive committee composed of the mayor and the other committee chairmen. The Executive Committee would be the overall policy arm of the council and there would be three administrative committees: Planning and Development, Finance, and Works and Operations. Each of the administrative committees would have six

or more councillors and the administrative departments would report to the Council through these committees.

### Municipal Administration

The municipal administration selected was the Board of Commissioners system, found in Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. The Board of Commissioners would be chaired by a chief Commissioner and have as its members the various commissioners of the executive departments. The Board of Commissioners would supervise the city administration and make policy recommendations to the council through the policy committees. The unification of the bureaucracy frightened some observers. James Lorimer wrote about the White Paper:

"The government's plans for community committees does not implement their preferred desire to generate citizen involvement but the other aspects of the policy proposal do very effectively centralize power, increase the effectiveness of the bureaucracy and in general will make the work of citizens trying to make their views heard at City Hall that much more difficult".<sup>61</sup>

### Political Participation

The decision to create 48 member wards was the direct result of the government's desire to increase citizen access. The White Paper proposed to have one councillor for every 10 - 12,000 people. The wards in fact are probably more of a community than the areas contained in the Community Committees. They are smaller in scale and tend to group people who fall in similar economic and social calibers.

The large number of wards, however, clearly makes it imperative that there be some informal means of organizing the council. Implicit in the White Paper proposals is the hope that party politics would come to the Greater Winnipeg area. The cabinet-type of government envisioned in the White Paper merely gives form expression to this hope. One of the major issues of the fight over Bill 36 was on the charge that the NDP hope to win a majority of NDP members on the regional council and had structured the wards to bring this about. However, in an examination of the issue of party politics at the local level, Bill Burdeyny, the suburban editor of the Winnipeg Tribune found that out of the 112 local council members in Metropolitan Winnipeg prior to the passage of Bill 36 only 12 were members of the NDP.<sup>62</sup> Realizing this fact several members of the Cabinet were less than sanguine about the party prospects at the local level. After the election of October 6, in which the NDP won only 7 out of the 39 seats it contested, Premier Schreyer said he was surprised at the result but that he had never felt the party would do well.<sup>63</sup> Thus, it was a desire to increase participation not to improve partisan gain which prompted the creation of a large number of wards, although party officials naturally tried to take advantage of the situation after Bill 36 was passed.

The most innovative participatory device was the concept of the community committee. These committees were to be the key link between the citizen and the new council. The committees were to be composed of the councillors from the wards within their boundaries, i.e. in one sense they were area committees of council. The White Paper proposed

to create 8 community committees which largely corresponded to the existing municipalities.<sup>64</sup>

Community committees were to have the administrative responsibility for local services like community centres, parks and libraries but the White Paper emphasized "their most important function by far will be to provide ready access by the people to the local government system", (P. 36). Community committees were expected to :

- 1) maintain close communication with local citizens
- 2) spur citizens to discuss and develop ideas on policy
- 3) conduct appeal activities (e. g. Board of Adjustment functions)

Formal community conferences of the citizens in the area were to be called once or twice a year and on issues affecting the area, officials of the regional government were to explain their progress to the citizens and hear the elector's views at first hand. The White Paper maintained that "the avenues of political access will have been opened, and if openness is exhibited, citizens in our view will respond", (P. 43).

#### Provincial-Local Relations

One of the least noted aspects of the White Paper but potentially one of the most important was the design for a new provincial-local relationship. The White Paper called for a "parallel and complementary re-organization at the provincial level to ensure that the autonomy and integrity of the new local government is not merely maintained but strengthened", (P. 44). A new Department of Urban Affairs was to be created with the responsibility for scanning and co-ordinating all

provincial department programs. The province was now committed to developing an urban policy towards Winnipeg rather than a health policy, transportation policy, etc. One device to help this coherent focussing was a system of urban accounts which would record all public activities in the Winnipeg region and analyze the effects of the progress of the urban environment.

In response to the problems of Metro Winnipeg and the years of conflict and deadlock the Government proposed an innovative solution which in part was frankly experimental. At one stroke the Schreyer administration planned to unify the city and introduce party politics at the local level--two issues which had divided the city for years. The White Paper was the opening shot in a battle which dominated provincial politics for the next six months.

### Part III

#### The Adoption of Bill 36

The political battle over Bill 36 can be divided into two phases: in the first or White Paper stage the government maintained that it was not irrevocably wedded to the White Paper proposals and it gingerly explored public reaction through a series of town hall meetings. It knew that the area municipalities would be opposed but the basic question was how the public would respond. Would the White Paper develop into a major public issue like the 1970 dispute over automobile insurance or were the municipal councils and bureaucracies really representing only themselves?



The opponents of the White Paper tried to broaden the dispute sufficiently to force the Government to retreat. This attempt failed. The second phase of Bill 36 occurred after the Government had presented the Bill to the legislature. At this point, the arena of conflict was transferred from public meetings to the legislature. The opposition

now attempted to change particular parts of the Bill and build up points to be used against the NDP in the October council election. By phase two the "war" had been lost but several tactical "battles" remained to be fought.

#### The Preliminary Maneuvers

The technique of issuing a White Paper was a wise move by the government. It allowed them to present several controversial ideas without being completely committed to the program. It gave an opportunity to test public opinion and see the resources of their opponents before they actually drafted the bill, and to make adjustments on matters of detail. Many times during the next few months various cabinet members said that the Government would change some aspects of the White Paper. For example on February 25, Mr. Cherniack said that the government was not "married" to the planned reorganization.<sup>65</sup> This approach of the government gave the impression that it was open-minded and receptive to the demands of the public. There is some doubt how far the government would have retreated, and the bill which was eventually presented to the legislature differed little from the White Paper. But the government did change some non-essential aspects which belied the opposition charges of "dictatorial". The use of the

White Paper and the series of public meetings also extended the Unicity issue over a long period of time which helped defuse the emotional aspects of the debate.

The initial reaction to the White Paper varied. Most representatives stated that they hadn't time to read the document yet. But both Stephen Juba and Jack Willis, the Chairmen of Metro, welcomed the plan while the Mayor of Charleswood, Arthur T. Moug's reaction was "it's lousy".<sup>66</sup> However, within a few weeks the opposition began to form and by February the different camps could be clearly delineated. On January 4, 1971, D. A. Yanofsky, mayor of West Kildonan wrote in the Winnipeg Free Press the first of a series of articles examining the government's plan. In these articles Mayor Yanofsky questioned the need for a large central council and said it would bring party politics to the Greater Winnipeg area. He also questioned the need to disrupt all of Greater Winnipeg in order to solve the financial problems of the city of Winnipeg. Soon the various area municipalities began to publicly oppose the plan. On January 13, Fort Garry municipal council declared an "all out fight" against the White Paper and the next day the council of St. Vital followed suit. Suburban NDP members like Attorney-General Al Mackling were attacked. The local St. James paper said Mackling was the "pall bearer at the death of St. James-Assiniboia."<sup>67</sup>

On January 21, the area municipalities grouped together to form a common front against the Government. Mayor R. A. Wankling of Fort Garry called the meeting and ten of the area's twelve municipalities were opposed to the urban re-organization policy. Mayor Stephen Juba was not invited to the meetings because of his known support for

amalgamation and only Mayor Stanley Dowhen of East Kildonan favoured the central city concept. The mayors agreed to meet jointly to propose alternatives to the plan and coordinate their attacks. In the legislature, the Conservative Party was the strongest opponent of Unicity. Prominent spokesmen like Elswood Bole, former executive director of Metro and Robert Smellie, Chairman of the Local Boundaries Commission, kept up a steady attack on the White Paper.

The government while receiving few outright endorsements of its proposals, received general support from the City of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan corporation. Each of these government, while asking for specific changes (Mayor Juba in particular wanted a directly elected mayor) gave the Province their support "in principle". The Winnipeg newspapers, unlike almost every other issue in Manitoba politics, were strangely mute on the government's plan. The Winnipeg Free Press had long supported amalgamation and Saul Cherniack was one of the few ministers who had not been criticized by the newspaper.

Since the paper supported the idea but opposed the government it remained silent. The Winnipeg Tribune raised several questions about Unicity but "on balance it appears that the concept of amalgamation of the present twelve municipalities into one city has merited support".<sup>68</sup> The White Paper also received support from the few associations or interests concerned with municipal politics. The Downtown Business Association and the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce raised queries about certain aspects of unification but basically believed that amalgamation would be good for business. On January 26, 1971 the Winnipeg Free Press

reported that C. J. Rogers, president of the Downtown Business group said that the White Paper was "reasonably compatible with what we have in mind". Other supporters of the government included Lloyd Axworthy, director of the Institute of Urban Studies who said that the opposition to one-city was nonsense,<sup>69</sup> and the Manitoba Association of Architects who also favoured a single-authority government.

One significant source of support for the Government came from the Municipal Employees Union. Apart from the elected members of the local councils, the municipal employees were the group most concerned with the proposed re-organization. Mr. Cherniack announced that all existing employees would be guaranteed their job, although there might be some change in position. He also stated that the pay of the employees would remain at their present level and that "no employees would suffer a loss of rights because of the change". Representatives of the Canadian Union of Public Employees responded with a brief in support of the government and R. A. Henderson, Prairie Director of CUPE said the union was "not impressed by the local politician's internal politics of self-preservation".<sup>70</sup> By guaranteeing the jobs of the municipal union and the local officials, Mr. Cherniack secured the support or at least the neutrality of one of the few groups powerful enough to offer significant opposition to the White Paper.

Within a month of the introduction of the White Paper the opposing sides could be clearly seen. In January, Mr. Cherniack announced that the government would hold eleven public meetings from January 22 to February 24 to explain in detail the Unicity concept

and listen to the public's views. With the suburban opposition crystallizing at the January 21 meeting of mayors, the real forum of conflict shifted to these public meetings.

### The Public Debate

The opponents of Unicity attempted to use the public meetings as a demonstration to the government of the unpopularity of the White Paper. The various municipal councils urged their citizens to attend and sent propaganda to the voters. The council of Fort Garry, for example, prepared a sheet which stated on its title page in bold, black type:

YOU WILL LOSE:

YOUR MUNICIPAL IDENTITY

YOUR TAX RESERVES

YOUR LOCAL REPRESENTATION

YOUR COMMUNITY CONTROL

Other councils openly aided citizens groups who had formed to oppose the plan. The St. Boniface council sponsored a public meeting on behalf of a group of citizens who were worried about the loss of St. Boniface's identity. Mr. Prince, the leader of the St. Boniface group told the council to "help us prove to them (the government) that they are rail-roading us".<sup>71</sup>

The opposition to the White Paper presented three main avenues of attack:

1. the cost of one big city
2. the loss of local identity
3. the introduction of party politics to Greater Winnipeg

Elswood Bole and Robert Smellie led the attack against unification because of its cost. On January 14, Mr. Bole said centralization, amalgamation

of police and fire services and consolidation of services provided at different levels of the municipality would cost an additional \$18 to \$20 million or an increase of 17 mills.<sup>72</sup> Later he put this into dollar terms by stating that the taxes of most residents would increase by \$100. Robert Smellie called the proposals in the White Paper "a Frankenstein's Monster that will come to haunt you when you get your tax bill".<sup>73</sup>

The concentration of attention on the issue of cost led Ellen Gallagher, the executive assistant to Mr. Cherniack, to write that "the main theme of the public debate so far has been the cost of unifying services, and while this is perhaps not an entirely irrelevant issue, it certainly is a long way off the central point of the proposals."<sup>74</sup> The main point for Mrs. Gallagher and the government was the quality of service provided.

The issue of local identity was an emotional one: all the area municipalities discussed the issue but it was in St. Boniface, with its tradition as the home of the French Fact in Manitoba, where it made the most impact. Many citizens felt that St. Boniface, which in fact preceded the founding of Winnipeg by half a century, would cease to be autonomous. A St. Boniface citizens group circulated a petition and planned a march to Ottawa (what good this would do, no one bothered to explain). However the intensity of the issue prompted the French Canadian Health Minister, Mr. Rene Toupin to promise that the government would recognize the cultural identity of St. Boniface.<sup>75</sup>

The White Paper was also criticized for prompting party politics at the local level. Many of the local mayors concentrated on this point and Robert Smellie put their position most succinctly when he said the White Paper was "the NDP manifesto for provincial control...it will

require party discipline to make it work, and which of the three political parties is ready to fight an election at this time? One the NDP. They have designed the entire system in their favour."<sup>76</sup> Many opposition members such as L. R. Sherman, Conservative member for Fort Garry charged the government with "callous political gerrymandering" in the arrangement of wards under the proposed central city plan.<sup>77</sup> This charge of gerrymandering was one of the most common complaints in the early period of the conflict.

The alternative plan proposed by the ten area mayors -- again only Stephen Juba and the municipality of East Kildonan were opposed -- in many respects clearly followed the report of the Local Boundaries Commission. The mayors proposed that:

1. the present municipalities be kept;
2. the present metro council be eliminated and a new regional council formed composed of the mayors and aldermen of the municipalities;
3. services administered by the new council would roughly be comparable to those now performed by metro;
4. the establishment of a Greater Winnipeg Education Region as recommended by the Local Government Boundaries Commission.<sup>78</sup>

The alternative proposed by the mayors revealed the pre-occupation of the group in preserving the status quo with limited modifications.

#### Government Strategy

In response to the attacks on the White Paper the strategy of the government appeared to be to try and defuse the issue as much as possible. Mr. Cherniack refused to enter into a debate over the cost of unification

and said "we are not forcing the unification of any services...The council itself will be able to decide."<sup>79</sup> The one positive feature feature of the White Paper extolled at all the public meetings was the benefit of equalization: "what we are saying is that if this equalization was in effect in 1970, then 80 per cent would have paid less taxes."<sup>80</sup>

But what the government tried hardest to do was to project an image of reasonableness and concern (compared to many of the extreme statements of the opposition). A sampling of headlines for the period in question contains the following examples: "Changes possible: Mackling...City Plan can be changed"...Changes likely in Urban Plan, Cherniack....City Plan Changes possible, etc." In the debate over public auto insurance the government had been accused of being dictatorial, rigid and unbending. Obviously the strategy of Mr. Cherniack was to change this image and have his opponents appear committed to the existing status quo.

In one masterful move, the government took away one of the most potent charges of the opposition and reinforced this image of reasonableness. On Monday, February 22, Premier Schreyer, announced that in response to the charges of gerrymandering, the government would set up an independent commission to review boundaries: "we just want to make clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that charges of rigging the boundaries is just a bunch of childish nonsense."<sup>81</sup> The head of the Commission was Judge Peter Taraska and he was joined by Dr. Hugh Saunderson, the retired president of the University of Manitoba and Charland Prudhomme the former clerk of the Legislative Assembly. On April 21, the Commission recommended that the number of wards be in-



creased to 50, the number of community committees to thirteen from ten, that the boundaries of several wards be changed and the names of about a third of the wards changed. The Commission kept the government's criterion of about 10,000 people per ward but it felt that familiar polling divisions used in the past should be retained "as much as possible within the new ward boundaries".<sup>82</sup> On May 14th, Mr. Cherniack accepted the Taraska report in its entirety and said the government was "most favourably impressed."<sup>83</sup> The Taraska Report, of course, did not deal in any important way with the central aspects of the White Paper (the terms of reference were tightly drawn) it merely changed details. But it seemed to give the approval of an independent board to the White Paper and it took a potent issue away from the opposition. (See Figures 4 and 5).

The success of the government's attempts to "cool" the political temperature on Unicity can be seen by the response to the public meetings. On January 27, 1971 about two hundred citizens of South Winnipeg met to discuss the plan and in the first few gatherings hundreds of people turned out. However, despite the efforts of the local councils, it was apparent that there was as much support for the central city concept as opposition. Indeed, as the public meetings continued it became obvious that Unicity was not a "hot" political issue in the minds of most voters. The attendance at the meetings began to fade out and in the end only 50 or 60 people were turning up. Sidney Green, who was as active as Mr. Cherniack in defending the plan, stated publicly that the poor attendance revealed the lack of success of the area municipalities in whipping up opposition to the White Paper.<sup>84</sup>

A telephone poll conducted by the Institute of Urban Studies of the University of Winnipeg confirmed this analysis: about half the respondents thought that some change in the structure of local government was desirable, but many were ignorant of the government's proposals and most said their stand would not affect their vote. The only clear image to come from the survey was that 87% of the respondents favoured the direct election of the central city mayor.<sup>85</sup>

A final indication of the real lack of public interest may be the St. Vital by-election held April 5th. The St. Vital council had taken a strong stand against Unicity and the seat had formerly been held by a Conservative. However, the NDP candidate Jim Walding was successful. The by-election had occurred in the middle of the White Paper conflict and Mr. Walding said his election proved that voters supported the central city concept. However most observers thought that the central city plan had not been much of an issue one way or another, and that most voters were not affected by it. But if "local identity" was as important to the suburb as the council felt, it is likely Unicity would have been accorded a more essential role in the campaign.

The opponents of the White Paper then, clearly failed in making the issue as decisive, far-reaching and emotional as they had hoped. Their strategy had been to create so much public furor that the government would be forced to back down. A recent example of a nearly successful campaign was the auto-insurance dispute and if the municipalities had been able to wage a similar campaign they might have succeeded (the Government was less committed to Unicity than it was on auto insurance).

By the time the Legislature began to debate the bill, the municipalities knew they had lost. As the Winnipeg Tribune wrote about the brief of the city of St. James, "Mayor Hanks, who up to now has been one of the chief opponents of the Unicity Plan, offered little criticism, indicating his suburb and municipality has more or less given up the fight and resigned itself to the idea that the scheme will go ahead."<sup>86</sup>

The government waged a skilful strategy and outmanoeuvred the municipalities but the failure of the suburbs lies deeper than mere tactics. In essence, the basic assumption of the suburban politicians -- that local identity was an important factor -- was no longer valid. Winnipeg had become an integrated unit and it was the local boundaries, not Unicity, which were regarded as artificial. In a revealing quote, William Greenfield, a strong Fort Garry opponent of the White Paper, was asked if he favoured a referendum on the government proposals. "I certainly would not", he shot back. "Mayor Juba has done such a good job of selling the White Paper that people in West Kildonan as well as in East Kildonan and even Charleswood believe him."<sup>87</sup> In their attacks upon the White Paper the mayors of the suburbs only represented themselves and as soon as the government realized this fact, Bill 36 became a certainty.

### Bill 36

On April 28, 1971, the Government released the draft of Bill 36. The draft legislation still called for a 48 member council but Mr. Cherniack had already announced that the Taraska report would be accepted. The Minister said that there were no major changes from the government's White Paper but rather it was "more of an elaboration" of that paper.<sup>88</sup>

①  
Amend. 6

In response to the demands of St. Boniface, the bill clearly contained in Part III, a declaration that the new city "shall make available at its central office persons who could communicate in French and English" and that all notices, bills or statements made to the residents of St. Boniface would be in French and English. The leading defender of the cause of Franco-Manitobans, St. Boniface M.L.A. Larry Desjardins, soon announced that he would support the bill and was satisfied with the protection given the French language.

Bill 36 did reveal in more detail how bodies like the community committees and Board of Commissioners were to operate and it carefully outlined the structure of the committee system of council. A departure from most other Municipal acts which usually allow local councils to structure themselves as they please. The Bill contained new and complex codes on items like assessment, taxation and borrowing although provisions from the 1956 Winnipeg Charter and 1960 Metropolitan Winnipeg Act were included as much as possible to smooth the transition. One interesting addition to the legislation was the provision that community conferences elect resident advisory groups of citizens to "advise and assert" the community committees. The Bill delegated to the City important and innovative planning and development powers and in its final form the Bill increased the size of the Executive Policy Committee to 10 members to ensure city wide representation rather than the 4 proposed in the White Paper. But in all major matters the Bill closely followed the White Paper. (See Figure 6).

On May 10, Mr. Cherniack introduced the bill for first reading and on June 3, the debate on second reading began. Debate lasted a month

and on July 9, 1971 the bill was passed with a vote of 31-15. Liberal Gordon Johnson defected from his party to support the government and independent Gordon Beard followed suit. From July 14 to 16, the law amendments committee heard public presentations, largely from the mayors in the Metropolitan area and on July 21, with only one significant change --an amendment allowing the direct election of the mayor -- the committee completed clause-by-clause debate. July 24, the bill passed third reading 22-14 with Conservative Inez Trueman, member for the Winnipeg constituency of Fort Rouge, supporting the government.

In the Legislature, the three parties simply rehashed the debate which had followed the publication of the White Paper. Led by Mr. Cherniack, the NDP put forward the position that Winnipeg was one socio-economic community which should be unified with encouragement for participation through the ward system and the community committees. The Liberal and Conservative parties both favoured schemes of reorganization based on the Local Boundaries Commission.<sup>89</sup> Suburban members like Conservatives Frank Johnson, or Liberal Steve Patrick attacked the government on the old themes of cost of unification, preservation of local identity, gerrymandering, and introducing party politics at the local level. Conservative rural members such as Harry Enns were fearful that rural Manitoba would be called upon to contribute financially to the City of Winnipeg and that the City was gaining too much political clout. On June 22, Sidney Spivak, the leader of the Conservative opposition, offered a sophisticated critique and asked a series of pointed questions about the powers of the city bureaucracy vis-a-vis those of the community committees.

But despite isolated examples of useful criticism, the impression one gets from the legislative discussion is that the members were only going through the motions. The government had a majority and was now firmly committed to the plan. All the arguments had been heard before. In fact, with the exception of Mr. Cherniack's opening address, no NDP member arose to debate the bill until following Mr. Spivak's speech of June 22. The Premier spoke briefly and vaguely. By and large it was a disappointing debate.

The suburbs, in fact, had turned from trying to defeat the bill which they knew was impossible, to organizing for the October civic elections which preceded the January 1, 1972 date for the new council. Organizations called The Independent Citizens' Election Associations began to spring up first in the suburbs and then in the city itself. As the Winnipeg Tribune described the activity "formations are taking place that look like a gang-up against the New Democrats in the anticipated battle for seats on the proposed one-city council."<sup>90</sup> The raison d'etre of the new civic party was independence from the organized national parties but partisan politics undoubtedly entered into the calculations of its leaders. Prominent individuals in the Conservative and Liberal parties were active in the movement and while these men were genuine about their desire for so-called "independence", a more compelling motivation was their fear that the new city council would become controlled by the NDP.

By the summer of 1971, Unicity was in and the only contentious item remaining was the nature of the mayoralty and this whole issue was overshadowed by the personality of Stephen Juba.

breaking vote. This episode shows his unpopularity among his own council -- if he was going to be mayor he would have to be elected. At approximately this time Mr. Juba began to make statements about running as the head of a slate of candidates to contest the fall election and if Juba had run a slate it would probably have been most effective in North Winnipeg -- the centre of NDP strength.

As Bill 36 moved to the law amendments committee the only real question was the mayoralty. Twenty-seven presentations were made to the committee but the groups represented reveal the lack of significant interest group activity in Winnipeg local politics. Thirteen of the briefs came from local mayors, aldermen, or metro councillors. There were only two representatives of ethnic groups the St. Boniface citizens' group mentioned above and a Ukranian organization opposed to official languages; two professional bodies--the Institute of Urban Studies and the Manitoba Association of Architects--the Chamber of Commerce and the Liberal Party. Seven individuals made personal appeals. There were no briefs from rate-payers associations, real estate interests, planning groups, companies, labour unions, welfare agencies, or community associations. Apparently only the local politicians were interested in what was going on.

The event everyone was waiting for was the address of the Mayor. On the evening of Thursday, July 15, he gave a classic performance. He was all milk and honey -- "I take my hat off to the NDP", except when he strongly criticized the Local Boundaries Commission "that was the farce of all Royal Commissions every held." But he made it clear that he wanted to be mayor and that only through direct election could he achieve his

dream: "I have a good imagination", he said, "but I can't stretch it that far as to see the council electing me mayor. Can you imagine Wankling (Mayor of Fort Garry) or Yanofsky (Mayor of West Kildonan) voting for me?"<sup>96</sup>

On July 21, in the only significant departure from the White Paper, Mr. Cherniack announced that the mayor would be directly elected. Like the community committee dispute the final result was a compromise-- the first mayor of Unicity would be directly elected, in subsequent years the council would decide.

Perhaps the most important factor in changing the government's mind was the series of public meetings held in January and February. The suburban opponents of Unicity could be dismissed as special pleaders but the one change in the White Paper demanded by almost everyone was the direct election of the mayor. Winnipeg had always had a directly elected mayor and it was difficult for people to understand why this would be changed. This made an impression on the government.

The Cabinet Committee considering Unicity became split on the issue. One body of opinion held that Winnipeg required an area wide approach towards problems as well as the opinions of the local wards and that this would best be achieved by having the mayor elected by the whole city. Others felt that because Winnipeg was used to mayoralty elections the whole transition process would be eased if Bill 36 were changed. Opponents of the direct election argued that the whole logic of Unicity demanded a Parliamentary rather than a Presidential executive.

The future career of Stephen Juba was not a primary consideration. But those who favoured changing the bill may have felt that ensuring Juba's support would avoid creating a powerful opponent of Unicity and the



public support for a directly elected mayor may have been generated because the citizens of Winnipeg wanted Stephen Juba as their chief executive. Juba's influence then was indirect but pervasive.

The actual circumstances of the change were dramatic. Unable to agree, the Cabinet threw the decision to the NDP caucus. The caucus was just as split as the Cabinet and the votes were closely divided. Finally the Premier intervened and cast a tie breaking vote that brought about the change. The decision bought the Government time. If the opponents were right and the directly elected mayor was not working with council the way he should, the system would revert to its original form in three years. If the compromise was working a permanent amendment could be brought in. In any case, Stephen Juba achieved his dream-- he would be the first super mayor of Winnipeg.

### Conclusion

The literature review on metropolitan reform emphasized the significance of the political environment, the motivations and resources of the participants and the strategies employed by the contending factions. The Winnipeg case example also reveals the central importance of these classes of factors.

The environment of urban politics in Winnipeg was a curious blend of tradition and change. Economic factors like the impact of Winnipeg on the economy of Manitoba were the major reason why Winnipeg problems could not be ignored. It was too vital to the life of the province and too many voters lived there, for any senior government

to leave its problems unattended. The ethnic diversity of Winnipeg deeply affected local politics and in particular made Stephen Juba into a powerful participant. The political setting of Winnipeg, largely shaped by the events and aftermath of the 1919 General Strike, was a key factor.

The strike polarized the city into two main voting blocs and north Winnipeg became a center of support for the CCF - NDP. Building on their support in Winnipeg, the NDP finally became the Provincial Government in 1969. Identified with the central city for over forty years, the NDP was committed to amalgamation. In 1919 a local party composed of businessmen and the more conservative elements of the city was formed which by and large has controlled Winnipeg since that time. Devoted to an anti-socialist, anti-party, pro-business platform, this coalition has made its ideas the prevailing style in local Winnipeg politics. By 1970, like Harold Kaplan's case study of Metropolitan government in Toronto, Winnipeg's local government could be characterized as an executive dominant system with a fair amount of consensus and low levels of public or interest group participation.

In the battle over Bill 36, the political temperature continued to be low. The public did not seem to get aroused in any significant way and perhaps more surprisingly the level of interest group activity was almost minimal. Few pressure groups appeared to enter the conflict over Bill 36 (in contrast to Smallwood's case example of London where several professional groups were important actors) and almost none seem to have influenced the actual creation of the White Paper. Unlike some issues in Manitoba -- notably the dispute over auto insurance -- actors

like the newspapers, labour unions and business groups did not appear to be overly concerned. The only bodies with active roles were the formal decision-makers -- the local governments, the Cabinet, the legislature and the parties.

The anti-party, anti-socialist tradition also continued to be successful in the October 1971 municipal election when the Independent Citizens Election Committee (I. C. E. C.) decisively beat the NDP.<sup>97</sup>

### The Participants

As stated above, the active participants in the battle over Bill 36 were relatively few. On the one hand there was the NDP Government supported by the city of Winnipeg, Metro, and professional groups and on the other there were the area municipalities; the Conservative and Liberal parties in the legislature and some citizens' groups. The initiating factors were a result of the decade-long conflict between Mayor Juba and Metro. The inability of the two most important local governments to cooperate forced various provincial governments to intervene throughout the Sixties. The motivations of Stephen Juba -- whose single-minded obsession with Metro fueled the dispute -- are somewhat obscure but they were probably a combination of ego-drive, commitment, and a desire to have a convenient whipping boy. His political resources of successful vote-getting, skill at using the media, and ethnic appeal far outstripped Metro's.

The most important participants within the government were Cabinet Ministers Saul Cherniack and Sidney Green and consultant Meyer Brownstone.

Cherniack and Green had both been members of the Metro Council and were personally convinced of the benefits of unification. Brownstone contributed much of the impetus towards achieving greater participation. The government as a whole was fed up with the bickering between Metro and the City of Winnipeg and was determined to resolve the situation, i.e. there was a felt need that change was required.

The government received much of its political strength from the central city and unification would lower taxes and increase the ability of central Winnipeg to pay for services. Amalgamation had long been part of the program of the NDP and it was committed to reforming Winnipeg's local government structures; one of the constraints upon the government was the desire of suburban ministers like Al Mackling or Saul Miller to retain some form of local identity. This compromise resulted in the concept of community committees. The government employed economic inducements as a resource. The mill rates, for example, were lowered for 80% of the citizens and those suburbs whose rates would go up received a transitional grant from the government.

The motivations of the area municipalities were quite simple -- their very existence was at stake and Hell hath no fury like a politician about to lose his job. The motivations of the Liberals and Conservatives were political: the backbone of these two parties were suburban representatives and rural strength. Neither of these groups were much in favour of Unicity. Each hope to make gains in the suburbs by opposing Bill 36 and in the case of the Liberals this meant reversing previous party policy which had favoured amalgamation.

Strategies/Results

The battle over Bill 36 was fought in three main theatres: the press and the initial public meetings, the legislature, and finally the law amendments committee. In each of the locals the opposing groups were attempting to do different things. In the first arena, the government was sampling public opinion and the area municipalities were attempting to demonstrate a large public groundswell against the White Paper. In the legislature the parties were merely making political points to use against each other in the fall election municipally or later provincially (i.e. put it on the record). In the law amendments stage, professional groups like the Institute of Urban Studies, attempted to use their expertise to change the details of the bill and Mayor Juba and others attempted to demonstrate personally the fervor with which they held their views.

There were various stages of the campaign. For the first month or so the government and potential opponents made their preliminary moves. Rather than present a bill on the subject of urban reform, the government published a White Paper which enabled them to present their ideas while not becoming too firmly attacked if the political temperature became heated. The mayors of the area municipalities met informally, compared notes, and then announced their opposition at the formal meeting of January 21. The White Paper stage of the conflict continued until the end of April when the government brought down the bill which contained the White Paper proposals. This was the key period in the history of Bill 36, when Unicity could have been defeated. The Bill 36 stage of the conflict included the debate in the legislature and the attempts of

various groups to change specifics of the act.

The strategy of the government was to keep Unicity from becoming a "live" political issue. There were elements in the White Paper which could trigger off an emotional battle and at all costs the government wanted to avoid a repetition of the auto insurance debate. The government adopted the tactic of "sweet reasonableness" where it was willing to change non-essentials as long as the main outlines remained firm. To avoid the charge of being dictatorial, it set up a series of public meetings where cabinet ministers appeared receptive to change. The Taraska Commission was appointed to review the ward boundaries, and the French language was made an official language to appease the citizens of St. Boniface. The government bought off a potential source of opposition when they guaranteed that all municipal employees and officials would retain their existing salaries under Unicity. At the last moment when Bill 36 was safe, they also changed the nature of the mayoralty.

The strategy of the area municipalities was the opposite of the government: they needed to transform Unicity into an intensive issue with wide scope which would attract major currents of opposition. Because of the fight in Cabinet over the Community committees, it was felt that the government, as a whole, was not as strongly committed to Unicity as it had been to other issues. If enough public opposition could be generated, the government might retreat. Opponents to Unicity made strong attacks in the papers, the local councils put out propaganda and aided citizen groups to form, but the issue never jelled. The suburban mayors simply did not have enough political resources to constitute a real obstacle to the government.

Bill 36, then, is an important policy innovation. It was born in response to difficult environmental problems. It contained a novel approach to the solution of these problems and its adoption was the result of a major political confrontation. The battle over the Unicity restructuring throws light not only on the peculiarities of the Winnipeg political culture but also on some of the generalizations of the local government literature.

TABLE 1

MUNICIPALITIES AND POPULATION

Metropolitan Winnipeg 1971

<u>MUNICIPALITY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>AREA (sq. miles)</u>
R. M. Charleswood	11,300	36.7
R. M. Fort Garry	26,730	26.8
R. M. North Kildonan	17,599	9.3
R. M. Old Kildonan	1,432	9.4
Town of Tuxedo	3,218	7.5
City of East Kildonan	29,897	3.2
City of West Kildonan	23,962	2.8
City of St. Vital	32,789	22.6
City of Transcona	22,385	9.4
City of St. Boniface	47,553	18.2
City of St. James-Assiniboia	71,762	41.8
City of Winnipeg	259,946	30.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>
total unicity	548,573	218.4

Source : Winnipeg: Canada's Third Largest City, (Winnipeg: City of Winnipeg, 1972), p. 12.



TABLE 2

POPULATION GROWTH FOR THE  
CITY OF WINNIPEG AND METROPOLITAN AREA

1876 - 1966

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>CITY OF WINNIPEG</u>	<u>METROPOLITAN AREA (including Winnipeg)</u>
1876	3,240	
1881	7,977	
1891	25,639	
1901	44,778	48,488
1911	128,157	156,969
1921	179,087	229,212
1931	218,785	294,905
1941	221,960	302,024
1951	235,710	354,069
1961	265,429	475,989
1966	257,005	508,759

Source : Report of the Social Service Audit, ( Winnipeg : Social  
Service Audit Committee, 1969 ) p. 7.

TABLE 3



ETHNIC GROUPS AS PER CENT OF TOTAL POPULATION

1961

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>METRO</u>	<u>WINNIPEG</u>	<u>MUNICIPALITY</u>	<u>CORE AREA</u>
British Isles	45.0	42.8	47.7	36.9
German	10.5	11.4	9.5	12.6
French	8.4	5.3	12.3	7.4
Italian	1.2	1.6	.7	2.3
Netherlands	3.1	2.6	3.8	2.3
Polish	5.2	6.2	4.0	6.8
Russian	.9	1.0	.7	1.0
Scandinavian	3.7	3.8	3.7	4.1
Ukranian	11.3	13.6	8.5	15.0
Other European	8.6	9.4	7.6	8.3
Asiatic	.7	.9	.4	1.4
Other	1.4	1.6	1.1	2.0

Source : Report of the Social Service Audit, ( Winnipeg : Social Service Audit Committee, 1969 ) p. 12.

FIGURE I  
 Boundaries of Former Municipalities  
 in the Greater Winnipeg Area




THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATION  
 OF GREATER WINNIPEG  
 PLANNING DIVISION

LEGEND:

- Boundaries of area under former Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg.
- Additional areas included under "Unicity."

Source: Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, Planning Division

FIGURE 2  
Metropolitan Winnipeg ( 1960 )




**METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG—MUNICIPALITIES AND POPULATION—1960**

IN METRO AREA		PART IN METRO AREA AND PART IN ADDITIONAL ZONE*	
B	BROOKLANDS	4288	
EK	EAST KILDONAN	26869	
NK	NORTH KILDONAN	8649	
OK	OLD KILDONAN	1312	
SB	ST. BONIFACE	36361	
SJ	ST. JAMES	33817	
TR	TRANSCONA	14096	
TU	TUXEDO	1624	
WK	WEST KILDONAN	19675	
W	WINNIPEG	256733	
		<u>403424</u>	
A	ASSINIBOIA	6097	
C	CHARLESWOOD	6034	
ESP	EAST ST. PAUL	1982	
FG	FORT GARRY	16962	
MD	MACDONALD	180	
RO	ROSSER	350	
SP	SPRINGFIELD	220	
SV	ST. VITAL	26765	
WSP	WEST ST. PAUL	2032	
		<u>60622</u>	
		TOTAL METRO POPULATION 464046	

\*The additional zone also included parts of RICHOT (RI), TACHE (TA), ST. ANDREWS (SA) and ST. CLEMENT'S (SC).

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, Planning Division

FIGURE 3  
Metropolitan Winnipeg ( 1964 )



METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG—MUNICIPALITIES AND POPULATION—1964

IN METRO AREA

PART IN METRO AREA AND PART IN ADDITIONAL ZONE\*

B	BROOKLANDS	4405
EK	EAST KILDONAN	28112
FG	FORT GARRY	19197
NK	NORTH KILDONAN	10541
OK	OLD KILDONAN	1363
SB	ST BONIFACE	41516
SJ	ST JAMES	34459
TR	TRANSCONA	17920
TU	TUXEDO	1942
WK	WEST KILDONAN	20902
W	WINNIPEG	255796
		436153

A	ASSIMIBOIA	13489
C	CHARLESWOOD	7121
SV	ST. VITAL	29375
		49985

TOTAL METRO POPULATION 496138

\* The additional zone also included parts of EAST ST. PAUL (ESP), WEST ST. PAUL (WSP), MACDONALD (MD), RICKOT (RI), BOSSER (RO), SPRINGFIELD (SP), ST. ANDREWS (SA), ST. CLEMENTS (SC) and TACHE (TA).

FIGURE 4

Boundaries of Winnipeg Wards ( 1972 )




FIGURE 5

Boundaries of Winnipeg Community Committees ( 1972 )





FIGURE 6

Government of Winnipeg 1972



Source: Winnipeg: Canada's Third Largest City. (Winnipeg: City of Winnipeg, 1972) p.26.



how high the water had to go before the University was over-run and exams called off.

19. M. S. Donnelly, "Ethnic Participation in Municipal Government", in Politics and Government of Urban Canada, ed. Lionel Feldman and Michael Goldrick, (Toronto: Methuen Ltd., 1969), p. 64.
20. This point is well documented in Tom Peterson's "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba", in Canadian Provincial Politics, ed. J. Martin Robin, (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 69-115.
21. Ethnicity may also affect turnout. In 1956 almost 58% of the electorate went to the polls, the largest turnout since 1938 when an ethnic candidate had also run. In 1960 when Juba was elected by acclamation, the turnout fell to 38%, but rose in 1962 when another candidate appeared (eventhough the Mayor was in no trouble). In 1971, when a real contest appeared to be threatening Juba's position, the turnout rose to a record 60%.
22. J. E. Rea, "The Politics of Conscience: Winnipeg After the Strike", Historical Papers 1971, The Canadian Historical Association, p. 276.
23. Se for example, D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), David J. Bercuson, "The Winnipeg General Strike, Collective Bargaining and the One Big Union Issue", Canadian Historical Review, June 1970, pp. 164-176 and J. E. Rea, "The Politics of Conscience: Winnipeg after the Strike", Historical Papers 1971, The Canadian Historical Association, p. 276-288.
24. See Rea, "The Politics of Conscience", p. 280-282 for a description of the 1919 municipal election. This discussion of the Strike relies heavily on Rea's fine article.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. I wish to thank the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg for permission to reproduce this shorter version of my monograph, The Politics of Innovation: Report Number 2, Future City Series, Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, 1971).
2. See, for example, the article by Stephen Clarkson, "Winnipeg Shows Way to a Better Metro", in the Ottawa Journal, November 8, 1971.
3. For a good discussion of the impact of Jacksonian democracy, see Scott Greer, Governing the Metropolis, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962). The problems encountered in attempting metropolitan reform in the United States are discussed in D.A. Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville Consolidation, (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1963); William Harvard and Floyd Corry, "The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area" in J. Zimmerman, Government of the Metropolis, (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968); E. Sofen, The Miami Metropolitan Experiment, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963); and R. Wolff, Miami Metro, (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1960).
4. In the monograph, Politics of Innovation, I attempt to discuss the relevance of the literature on innovation and social change to the question of assessing urban reform.
5. Frank Smallwood, Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 368-313.
6. Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 157.
7. See Edward C. Banfield, James O. Wilson, City Politics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).

8. James Q. Wilson, in City Politics and Public Policy, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968) defines political culture as: "a widely shared, patterned view of the proper scope and behaviour of public institutions and specifically what ways of behaviour on public voters...would be thought legitimate", p. 12.
9. Report of the Social Service Audit, sponsored by the Government of Manitoba, United Way of Greater Winnipeg, the Winnipeg Foundation, Community Welfare Planning Council, June, 1969, p. 6.
10. "The Indian-Metis Urban Probe", a study by the Indian and Metis Friendship Centre and the Institute of Urban Studies, January, 1971. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly how many native people live in the city since the population is highly transient.
11. Ibid., p. 7.
12. Government of Manitoba, Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area, (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 9. Hereafter referred to as "The White Paper".
13. Social Service Audit, pp. 9-10.
14. Ibid., p. 10.
15. Planning Division, the Metropolitan Corporation, The Place of Greater Winnipeg in the Economy of Manitoba, (Winnipeg: the Metropolitan Corporation, 1971), p. 25.
16. Ibid., pp. 25-55.
17. Ibid., p. 84.
18. In the late 1960's a floodway was finally constructed. This removed a threat which had plagued Winnipeg since the great 1950 flood but it also destroyed one of the favourite spring pastimes of students -- estimating

33. See the Report of the Exploratory Sub-Committee on the Organization of Local Government Service in the Greater Winnipeg Area, Manitoba Provincial-Municipal Committee Report, February, 1953, p. 83.
34. Ibid., p. 84.
35. Hon. Douglas Campbell, "Statement of Government Policy", contained in the Manitoba Provincial-Municipal Committee Report, February, 1953, p. 174.
36. Mr. Kushner has spent much of his time on local government reviews. Secretary to the GWIC in 1959, he held the same position on the 1966 Local Government Boundaries Commission. In between, he was on the 1963 Municipal Enquiry Commission. The reports of the GWIC and the Local Government Boundaries Commission are remarkably alike.
37. The opinions of both the City of Winnipeg and the municipalities in 1957 were virtually unchanged in 1971. In July of 1956 and May of 1957, the City of Winnipeg stated that a Metro solution would be acceptable under certain conditions, but that amalgamation was inevitable and highly desirable. This galvanized the suburban municipalities to write a joint brief (Assiniboia, East Kildonan, West Kildona, St. Vital, North Kildonan, Fort Garry, St. James, Transcona and Tuxedo) which attacked the whole idea of amalgamation and advocated a Metropolitan Government with the members of the central council composed of the mayors and aldermen of the participating municipalities.
38. Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, Report and Recommendations, Winnipeg, 1959.
39. City of Winnipeg Council, "Submission to the Government of Manitoba", October, 1959.

40. Interviews.
41. This assessment of the options faced by the Government has been gleaned from interviews.
42. Winnipeg Tribune, June 3, 1961.
43. Winnipeg Tribune, June 5, 1961.
44. Winnipeg Tribune, September 22, 1969.
45. Interviews.
46. Bonnycastle once told an interviewer that his only previous political experience was in the 1920's when as a student in Oxford he worked in London for the election of Winston Churchill - Churchill lost.
47. Winnipeg Free Press, October 1, 1960.
48. Winnipeg Free Press, May 23, 1961.
49. George Rich, "Metropolitan Winnipeg", p. 368.
50. Winnipeg Tribune, April 10, 1967.
51. Winnipeg Free Press, February 13, 1962.
52. Jim Hayes, Winnipeg Tribune, April 10, 1962.
53. The Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg Review Commission, February 1964, p. 32.
54. Local Government Boundaries Commission, Provisional Plan for Local Government Units in the Greater Winnipeg Area, 1970, p. 66.
55. B. R. Wolfe, "A Review of Restructuring For Regional Government", a brief to the Law Amendments Committee, Province of Manitoba, July, 1971.
56. Interviews.
57. Winnipeg Free Press, June 10, 1971.
58. Winnipeg Free Press, December 23, 1970.
59. White Paper, P. 11,

60. Winnipeg Free Press, July 3, 1971.
61. James Lorimer, quoted by Gail Cook and Lionel Feldman, "Approaches to Local Government Reform", Canadian Tax Journal, May-June, 1972, p.218.
62. Bill Burdeney, "Party Politics and Regional Government" in the Future City, ed. Lloyd Axworthy, Institute of Urban Studies, Winnipeg, 1971, p. 34.
63. Winnipeg Free Press, October 7, 1971.
64. Mergers were to take place between East and North Kildonan; Old and West Kildonan; and Charleswood, Tuxedo, Fort Garry. The number of Community Committees was later increased to 13.
65. Winnipeg Tribune, February 25, 1971.
66. Winnipeg Free Press, December 24, 1970.
67. Winnipeg Free Press, January 22, 1971.
68. Winnipeg Tribune, July 20, 1971.
69. Winnipeg Tribune, February 13, 1971.
70. Winnipeg Free Press, March 26, 1971.
71. St. Boniface Courier, May 12, 1971.
72. Winnipeg Free Press, January 14, 1971.
73. Winnipeg Tribune, January 27, 1971.
74. Winnipeg Free Press, March 13, 1971.
75. Winnipeg Free Press, February 4, 1971.
76. Winnipeg Free Press, March 21, 1971.
77. Winnipeg Free Press, February 12, 1971.
78. Winnipeg Tribune, April 2, 1971.
79. Winnipeg Tribune, January 22, 1971.
80. Winnipeg Free Press, January 21, 1971.

81. Winnipeg Tribune, February 23, 1971.
82. Winnipeg Free Press, April 21, 1971.
83. Winnipeg Free Press, May 14, 1971.
84. Winnipeg Tribune, March 2, 1971.
85. Winnipeg Free Press, April 18, 1971.
86. Winnipeg Tribune, July 15, 1971.
87. Winnipeg Free Press, January 13, 1971.
88. Winnipeg Free Press, April 29, 1971.
89. The Liberal Party thus made a 180 degree shift from its pro-amalgamation position of 1968. However, since flexibility has always been one of cardinal Liberal virtues this flip flop seemed to bother party members not a whit.
90. Winnipeg Tribune, June 19, 1971.
91. Winnipeg Tribune, June 26, 1971.
92. Winnipeg Free Press, February 11, 1971.
93. Winnipeg Free Press, April 2, 1971.
94. Winnipeg Tribune, July 15, 1971.
95. Winnipeg Tribune, July 7, 1971.
96. Winnipeg Tribune, July 16, 1971.
97. In the October 6th election only 7 NDP candidates were successful. The turnout was a record 60.7% and Stephen Juba defeated his old rival Metro chairman Jack Willis 139,174 votes to 49,014.

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